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1.1 Introduction
Since the publication of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) study “To Err is human”, followed 
by “Crossing the Quality Chasm” two years later, patient safety has become an important 
concern for all involved: patients, professionals and health care organisations (Bleich, 
2005; Kohn, 2000). Over the last 10 years, significant improvements have been made 
and many innovative initiatives resulted in enhanced patient safety. At both national and 
international level checklists and performance indicators were developed, handovers 
restructured and reporting systems installed (Haynes et al., 2009; Lingard et al., 2005; 
Pronovost, Thompson, et al., 2006; Riesenberg et al., 2009). Recently, also patients are 
involved in patient safety initiatives (Conrardy, Brenek, & Myers, 2010; Davis, Koutantji, 
& Vincent, 2008). Although we have come a long way, there is room for improvement 
as research shows that medical errors and, more alarming, preventable medical errors 
still occur (Bleich, 2005; Zegers et al., 2009).
A significant part of medical errors is found in acute care hospitals and most of these 
errors in surgery (Makary et al., 2006). In the Netherlands in 2008, approximately 1.3 
million patients were admitted to the hospital. The results of a study, similar to the IOM 
study, showed one or more adverse events in 5,7% of patients admitted to the hospital 
and 2,3% of these were preventable. Almost 38.000 patients were subject to preventable 
harm, of which 6.000 patients ended up with permanent harm and approximately 1960 
patients died (Zegers et al., 2009). Causes of errors were diverse, ranging from technical 
and organisational factors to human and patient factors. The wide variety of factors also 
shows the complexity of addressing the right factor to improve patient safety. Patient 
factors and the skills and performance of the individual health care professional are the 
primary determinants of surgical outcome, but partly beyond the scope of influence. 
In other industries ergonomic or human factors (physical, cognitive and organisational 
factors) are system related and have been identified as important factors to create a 
safe work environment and achieve high quality performance (Vincent, Moorthy, Sarker, 
Chang, & Darzi, 2004). In most health care studies on patient safety, human factors, 
e.g. the work environment, task & technology related factors or team performance, are 
identified as the main contributors to the causation of adverse events. Although human 
errors are inevitable, human factors can be influenced and therefore a promising field 
to explore for contributory influencing factors to improve patient safety (Cuschieri, 
2006; Mills, Neily, & Dunn, 2008; Reader, Flin, Lauche, & Cuthbertson, 2006; Smits et 
al., 2010).  (see Table 1.1.)
Human factors focus on the interaction among humans and the system and vary from 
the inability to apply existing technical knowledge and skills, to poor communication 
and teamwork (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; Mills et al., 2008).
Over the last years significant advances were made and a lot of patient safety practices 
initiated, e.g. reinforcing guidelines and protocols for infection prevention, fall prevention 
or patient handovers (Nagpal, Arora, et al., 2010; Rask et al., 2007). As a large percentage 
of medical errors were found to be related to surgical outcomes, causing serious harm 
or sometimes even death, one of the first protocols to improve patient handover was 
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the Universal Protocol, developed by the Joint Commission, to prevent wrong site, 
wrong procedure and wrong person surgery (JCAHO, 2004; Norton, 2007). Although a 
lot of effort was put in implementation of the universal protocol, a study celebrating the 
5th anniversary showed that even a simple guideline like that is difficult to implement 
and preventable harm or near misses, such as wrong site surgery still occur (Stahel, 
Mehler, Clarke, & Varnell, 2009). Similar results were found in a systematic review on 
following guidelines for hand hygiene with a mean compliance rate of only 40% (Erasmus 
et al., 2010). In daily practice implementation of initiatives to improve patient safety 
appears to be difficult (Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane, Bate, & Kyriakidou, 2004; Grol 
& Wensing, 2004; Hawe, Shiell, Riley, & Gold, 2004; Leape et al., 2009). First of all, it is 
difficult to choose the right intervention for a specific problem, within a specific context 
and preferably evidence-based. The second problem is finding the right method for 
implementation: how to engage professionals and patients whenever possible, defining 
relevant process and outcome measures and how to monitor the results (Greenhalgh, 
Robert, Macfarlane, et al., 2004; Nagpal, Vats, et al., 2010; Weaver et al., 2010).
Research on patient safety in surgical care shows four areas, which complicate 
implementation of patient safety initiatives. First, the complex and dynamic character 
of surgical care in operating theatre (OT) makes clinical processes difficult to manage 
Table 1.1 | Factor types and contributory influencing factors (Vincent, 2010)
Factor Types Contributory Influencing Factors
Patient Factors
Condition (complexity and seriousness)
Language and communication
Personality and social factors
Task & Technology Factors
Task design and clarity of structure
Availability and use of protocols
Availability and accuracy of test results
Decision-making aids
Individual (staff) Factors Knowledge and Skills
Competence
Physical and mental health
Team Factors Verbal communication
Written communication
Supervision and seeking help
Team leadership
Work Environment Factors Staffing levels and skills mix
Workload and shift patterns
Design, availability and maintenance of equipment
Administrative and managerial support
Physical environment
Organisational and Management Factors Financial resources and constraints
Organisational structure
Policy, standards and goals
Safety culture and priorities
Institutional Context Factors Economic and regulatory context
National health service executive
Links with external organisations
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and vulnerable to human errors (J. T. Reason, Carthey, & de Leval, 2001). Second, the 
professional silos with specific workflow patterns and independent medical departments, 
interfere with multi-disciplinary clinical care processes and make team cohesion and 
information-sharing at system level, across disciplines and departments, difficult (Bogner, 
2003; Lingard et al., 2005). A third factor is the organisational culture. As encouraged in 
the afore-mentioned IOM report, health care needs to change from a punitive “blame and 
shame culture” to a “safe culture”, without hierarchical barriers, where team members 
can speak up to voice concerns and errors are perceived as opportunities to learn from. 
With the right culture, improvements in task & technology or management & organisa-
tional factors, will result in the desired outcomes (Hudson, 2001; Lange, Dekker-van 
Doorn, Haerkens, & Klein, 2011a). A fourth factor that needs to be addressed in relation 
to patient safety is the ability to learn as a team. The professional autonomy and the 
individual, mono-disciplinary character of professional learning and continuing education 
impede the necessary exchange of knowledge and expertise between disciplines and 
team members and thus team learning (Burke, 2004; Edmondson, 2004).
1.2 The complexity of surgical care and human factors
The complexity of surgical care is closely related to the patient’s condition, the surgical 
intervention and the increasing number of different medical disciplines involved. Changes 
in demographic trends and new surgical and technological innovations require close 
collaboration with other disciplines for a number of reasons. The aging patient popula-
tion, with an increasing number of patients with co-morbidity and fatal diseases that are 
turning into chronic conditions require multidisciplinary care. Surgical and technological 
innovations open up new possibilities to treat patients, but require different knowledge 
and skills from professionals sometimes leading to new medical or technological 
specialties (Fendrich, van den Berg, Siewert, & Hoffmann, 2010; Heinemeyer, 2012). In 
addition to complexity, surgical care is dynamic. Surgical teams are ad hoc, working 7 
days a week and 24 hours a day in different shifts and in changing team composition, 
not only in the number of team members but also in medical disciplines. Poor working 
conditions such as working different shifts in a row and working long hours were found 
to be a risk factor for patient safety, e.g. an increased risk for hospital acquired infec-
tions or for medical error (Ehara, 2008; Lockley et al., 2007; Stone, Clarke, Cimiotti, & 
Correa-de-Araujo, 2004).
Another dynamic factor that complicates surgical interventions is unforeseen changes 
in the surgical process, which requires anticipation and flexibility of team members. To 
perform safe surgery in such a complex and dynamic setting, surgical team members rely 
on each others capabilities to combine technical expertise with non-technical skills such 
as communication, teamwork, situation awareness, leadership and shared decision-
making (Yule, Flin, Paterson-Brown, & Maran, 2006). One of the concepts to reduce the 
risk of adverse events caused by human factors is Crew Resource Management (CRM) 
(Powell & Hill, 2006). CRM is defined as  “using all available sources — information, 
Chapter 1 | Introduction and Outline 
12
equipment and people — to achieve safe and efficient flight operations.” (Lauber, 1984, 
p. 20).. CRM is the process used by crewmembers, to identify existing and potential 
threats and to develop, communicate and implement plans and actions to avoid or 
mitigate perceived threats (www.apa.org American Psychological Association) CRM 
was first developed for high reliability industries such as aviation but there is emerging 
evidence that CRM is also valuable for acute medical specialties in health care (Flin & 
Maran, 2004). Aviation is similar to healthcare as teams in aviation are often ‘temporary’ 
in team composition, like surgical teams in acute care.
A surgical team is defined as: “a unit providing the continuum of care beginning with 
preoperative care and extending through perioperative (during the surgery) procedures 
and postoperative recovery. Each specialist on the team, whether surgeon, anaesthesiolo-
gist or nurse, has advanced training for his or her role before, during and after surgery.” 
(http://www.surgeryencyclopedia.com).
A basic surgical team includes at least five team members: the surgeon, the anaesthetist, 
the scrub nurse, the circulating nurse and the nurse anaesthetist, each with different 
functional areas, with specific tasks and responsibilities. (Table 1.2) With complex 
surgery, additional team members with the necessary expertise will join the team. At 
university and teaching hospitals attached to medical schools, interns, residents and 
students from various disciplines will also be added to the team. Participation of more 
medical disciplines depends on the kind and the complexity of the surgical intervention 
and the location and the kind of anaesthesia. Trauma surgery e.g. might involve the 
orthopaedic or plastic surgeon to repair the damaged bone or skin and underlying 
tissue, or a nurse specialised in cast and splints. With other interventions, a radiologist 
or perfusionist might join the team. In daily practice, this results in working with different 
team members from different units and departments in approximately every shift and 
with every intervention. To provide safe surgery transparency is required, so that each 
team member’s individual contribution to the surgical process is clear and understood 
by all team members (Mickan & Rodger, 2000).
Table 1.2 | Surgical Team Members
Surgeon Responsible for the surgical intervention, specialized in one or more medical disciplines
Scrub Nurse Responsible for materials and instruments and assisting the surgeon during the per-
operative process
Circulating nurse Responsible for handing over material and instruments to the scrub nurse and for all 
other activities that do not require a sterile position (outside the sterile area)
Anaesthesiologist Responsible for monitoring the patient during the per-operative process and 
administering anaesthetics, fluids, blood products and if necessary other drugs
Nurse Anaesthetist Responsible for preparing the patient for surgery pre-operatively; positioning, IV catheter, 
etc. Replaces the anaesthetist if absent.
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1.3 A systems approach and professional silos
Working with different disciplines from different units or departments, in different shifts 
complicates coordination and communication and increases the risk of human error. As 
errors can occur at each step in the surgical pathway with many different causes, safety 
should be looked at from a systems perspective (Cuschieri, 2006).
Errors can be divided into two main categories: 1) latent failures, which can be at-
tributed to absent or failing barriers in organisational processes and procedures and 2) 
active failures, due a lack of knowledge and skills, or poor communication and teamwork 
(J. Reason, 2005). To provide safe and high quality care, causes of errors need to be 
identified along the surgical pathway, throughout the healthcare system. When causes 
are identified, effective action can be taken to redesign systems and care processes 
accordingly and centred around the patient in the clinical micro-system, the unit where 
the actual care is delivered (Bogner, 2003). Identifying and eliminating latent failures at 
system level, will positively impact the clinical micro-system. However, most healthcare 
delivery systems are organised around health care providers and adapted to the needs 
of a professional discipline or the individual healthcare professional.
The complexity of surgical care, the number of different disciplines involved and 
the inevitability of human error, require collaboration between professionals, across 
disciplines and medical domains. Therefore, rather than loosely coupled independent 
medical disciplines providing care, health care delivery should be process- and patient-
oriented and organised within independent integrated clinical micro-units. In these 
clinical micro-systems different disciplines work together and can develop alternative 
strategies to improve patient safety (Mohr, Batalden, & Barach, 2004). Nelson et al (2006) 
describe a clinical micro-system as follows: 
“Within the clinical micro-system, care is provided by a core team of health care 
professionals, for a defined population to care for, with an information environment to 
support the functioning of the clinical micro-system, across disciplines and throughout 
the whole surgical pathway. With an administrative staff, equipment and the right work 
environment the clinical micro-system is an independent unit within the larger macro 
system with its own objectives and strategies and ability to monitor the patient and the 
process and take effective action whenever necessary” (Nelson et al., 2003).
Figure 1.1 | Clinical micro-system of patient undergoing surgical intervention
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The surgical clinical micro-system is organised around the surgical pathway and 
divided in three large sections: admission and preparation of the patient, the periopera-
tive process comprising three parts: pre-operative, per-operative and post-operative 
care and finally the post-operative care in the clinical ward and discharge.
To be effective in a complex environment like the operating theatre, team members need 
technical knowledge and expertise but also teamwork skills. Good communication and 
teamwork are critical for patient safety. Team members should be familiar with each 
others’ tasks and responsibilities in the surgical process, be able to anticipate to each 
others needs and have a shared understanding of the steps in the surgical procedure 
(Baker, Day, & Salas, 2006; Crofts, 2006). Therefore, team members should feel free 
to speak up, ask questions or voice concerns and not being hindered by hierarchical 
authority or an unsafe culture (Ummenhofer et al., 2001; Waring, Harrison, & McDonald, 
2007).
1.4 From Individual failure to a safe culture1
Procedures or systems to improve safety, such as protocols, checklists, or safety 
management systems, are often copied from high-risk industries. However, without a 
fundamental understanding of the differences in culture and structure between health 
care and industry, most procedures and instruments will be implemented top down and 
translate into a culture of bureaucracy and control, sometimes leading to repression 
(Edmondson, 2004; Hudson, 2001). The health care sector differs in certain respects 
from the industry. Different factors emerge that contribute to the failure of patient safety 
in daily practice: the professional autonomy, the traditional hierarchical structures 
and the so-called “Silent Power”, which represents the relation between the board of 
directors and the medical staff and finally the professional silos that form a barrier for 
multi-professional collaboration (Lingard, Espin, Evans, & Hawryluck, 2004).
One of the core elements of safety systems in high-risk industries is to create a safe 
and open environment, where errors are identified, reported and discussed and analysed 
to learn from (Pronovost, Berenholtz, et al., 2006). This is in stark contrast with the 
current culture in many hospitals, where one finds the cause of errors in the individual 
professional and much less in the organisation of care and identified as a system failure. 
To achieve a safe working environment for professionals and patients it is important 
to “Create an environment where individuals can speak up and express concerns and 
share common ‘critical language’ to alert team members to unsafe situations” (Leonard 
et al., 2004). This requires breaking through professional and departmental barriers and 
reshaping the traditional hierarchy. Traditional medical schools, where professionals 
are educated in silos, lay the foundation for this culture. Errors are related to individual 
performance and teamwork is not perceived as a chance to prevent errors. Whereas in 
1 Based on: Lange, Dekker et al.2010. “Safety Culture in the Hospital: Without real culture change 
just cosmetic surgery.”
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high risk industries teamwork is one of the main contributors to better cooperation and 
communication, thereby reducing the risk of disaster.
To improve patient safety we need a blame-free, organisational culture, where patient 
safety and transparency are obvious and care delivery is patient centred (Lange, Dekker-
van Doorn, Haerkens, & Klein, 2011b).  But: “This will only happen when the positive 
attributes of the medical hierarchy govern—such as leadership, promotion of shared 
team responsibilities and respect for all members of the healthcare team” (Walton, 2006).
In order to be successful and improve patient safety at a more structural and sustain-
able level, professionals must accept that human error is inevitable, should be discussed 
and analysed as a team and seen an opportunity to learn from.
1.5 Professional learning, team learning and patient safety
To discuss errors and learn from as a team, safety also depends on transparency, 
discipline and reporting and monitoring systems, such as a safety management system 
(SMS) (Hofinger, 2009; Wallace, Spurgeon, Benn, Koutantji, & Vincent, 2009). The 
essential feature of an SMS is the assurance of quality and safety in processes and 
systems of the organisation on the basis of a learning cycle (Waring et al., 2007). 
Successful implementation of improvement initiatives such as the introduction of a 
time out procedure and debriefing, requires learning as a team by a thorough analysis 
of errors and related causes, choosing the right intervention and the right strategies for 
implementation. The Plan Do Study Act-cycle (PDSA) is an important tool for successful 
implementation of improvement initiatives, through small and frequent improvement 
cycles (Hughes, 2008; Ovretveit, 1999).
In order to learn from mistakes, errors must be reported in multidisciplinary reporting 
systems and discussed as a team to find out what went wrong and why and prevent 
errors from recurring. (Croskerry, 2000; Edmondson, 2004; Neale, Woloshynowych, & 
Vincent, 2001). However, health care professionals are educated in silos around profes-
sional content and subject matter with little attention for development of the necessary 
team skills (Cox et al., 2009). As a result, improving the quality of care often translates into 
mono-disciplinary professional guidelines and protocols with specific workflow patterns, 
which makes it difficult to bring teams from different disciplines together (Lingard et al., 
2005; Shojania, Duncan, McDonald, Wachter, & Markowitz, 2001). Team members need 
a common language to exchange critical information, alert each other in case of unsafe 
situations and discuss errors to learn from (Leonard et al., 2004)
As adverse events are not always isolated errors but often reflect problems elsewhere 
in the healthcare system, learning needs to occur at individual, team and organisational 
level to improve quality and safety system-wide (Mikkelsen & Holm, 2007; Wang, Lave, 
Sirio, & Yealy, 2006). Errors caused by problems that include other disciplines and 
departments require a multidisciplinary approach, team learning and different types 
of learning. Single-Loop Learning (SLL) to solve simple problems; a one dimensional 
question asking a one-dimensional answer and Double-Loop Learning (DLL), to solve 
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complicated problems that require more additional steps (Argyris, 1994). Where single-
loop learning requires reflection in action to increase effectiveness of actions, such 
as ordering extra blood units when patients are loosing more blood than expected, 
double-loop learning requires reflection on actions to increase team effectiveness 
and improve patient care across disciplines and departments, system-wide (Clarke & 
Wilcockson, 2001; Edmondson, 2004).
Double-loop learning, means taking time out to reflect on the care process with the 
whole team, learn from it and take additional steps to solve problems. It is important 
to choose the right intervention and integrate it in processes or procedures in the local 
health care delivery system around the patient. To make it successful, the relevant 
professional disciplines should be engaged in that learning process. All too often patient 
safety initiatives are adopted by individual professionals but never fully adopted by all 
involved and in the end cease to exist or are abandoned (Greenhalgh, Robert, & Bate, 
2004).
1.6 Time Out Procedure and Debriefing at Erasmus MC
To improve safety and engage all professionals involved, Erasmus MC, University 
Hospital Rotterdam, introduced a team procedure consisting of a combined time out 
procedure (TOP) and debriefing (plus). Although a time out procedure is meant to reflect 
in action and detect and correct errors before harm is done, the principle aim of TOPplus 
was to improve communication and teamwork among surgical team members and 
improving patient safety at a more sustainable level. Rather than a checklist TOPplus was 
based on CRM principles and developed as a multidisciplinary team procedure to actively 
engage all OT team members, directly involved in the surgical procedure. The time out 
procedure provides a moment and a structure to exchange critical information about 
the patient and the surgical intervention just before incision. Questions and answers are 
assigned to designated team members in such a way that all team members are actively 
engaged in the discussion. The debriefing, prior to skin closure, structures the team 
discussion about problems encountered during surgery and, if well registered, provides 
a solid base to analyse and discuss errors to learn from. Both procedures are performed 
with the whole team present. TOPplus provides a time and moment to reflect as a team 
and creates the opportunity for each team member to ask for additional information, 
without being hindered by hierarchical structures. This way TOPplus contributes to a 
basic condition to improve patient safety; creating a safe environment for all involved.
1.7 Objectives and research questions
The main objective of the study is to find out if team learning to improve patient safety 
in OT can be enhanced by applying theoretical concepts from other industries: Crew 
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Resource Management from aviation and Participatory Design from Industrial Design 
Engineering.
The overall research question: How to design and implement a time out procedure and 
debriefing to improve communication & teamwork in the operating theatre?
1. What is the evidence of team interventions to improve team effectiveness? (Chapter 2)
2. What is the perception of communication & teamwork of OT team members? (Chapter 3)
3. How to design a time out procedure and debriefing and improve adaptation to the 
local context and adoption by all professionals? (Chapter 4 and 5)
4. How can participatory design be reinforced to improve adaptation and adoption? 
(Chapter 6)
5. Does implementation of TOPplus improve perception of nontechnical skills of OT 
team members? (Chapter 7)
6. Does implementation and usage of TOPplus impact at process and structure level 
across disciplinary boundaries within the healthcare system (Chapter 8)
1.8 Thesis Outline
Figure 1.2  | Thesis Outline
In chapter 2 of this thesis, the results are presented of a systematic review to identify 
team interventions or tools to improve team effectiveness. The aim of the study was 
to identify the effectiveness of team interventions, the groups the intervention was 
targeting, which outcomes were found, if these outcomes represented scientific evidence 
and at what level. The evidence supported our decision to use a time out procedure 
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and debriefing, based on the principles of Crew Resource Management (CRM), in the 
operating theatre as a study object.
Chapter 3 describes the differences in perception of communication and teamwork 
between surgical team members from the first 5 hospitals that joined the project. Good 
communication and teamwork improve the exchange of critical information and discus-
sion between team members and are vital in relation to patient safety. If professionals 
accept that human error is inevitable and are willing to discuss errors to learn from, a 
substantial proportion of serious complications can be avoided.
The chapters 4 and 5 focus on the design and further development of the Time Out 
Procedure plus Debriefing, TOPplus. Chapter 4 provides a description of the design 
and development of a prototype: the basic design of TOPplus to discuss relevant 
operative items systematically, actively engaging all team members and reduce avoidable 
damage during and after a surgical procedure.  A prototype of TOPplus was designed 
and implemented in five Dutch hospitals and tested in two ways: 1) designing TOPplus 
by means of participatory design and 2) testing the design’s content and usability. In 
chapter 5, implementation and adaptation of TOPplus to the local context in 15 Dutch 
hospitals, is discussed in detail.
Chapter 6 has a more theoretical content, based on Participatory Action Research and 
describes a model for implementation. The model is based on the experience of the 
researchers (CD/LW) during the iterative cycles of design, redesign and implementation 
of TOPplus in fifteen hospitals. During this process, it became clear that more time was 
needed for extra cycles to experiment and learn from as a team. This chapter elaborates 
on the necessity to put more emphasis on the learning process, which resulted in a new 
model combining participatory design and experiential learning.
Chapter 7 presents the results of a pre-post study. Based on the assumption that the 
way TOPplus was designed and implemented would positively impact communication 
and teamwork between professionals, we measured perception of these skills in all 
participating hospitals, before and following implementation. Statistical analysis included 
testing for reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) and for comparison and significant differences 
between T0 and T1 (Mann Whitney-U).
Chapter 8 concludes the study with the results of a multi-site study in six of the participat-
ing hospitals. The aim was to find out if implementation and usage of TOPplus impact at 
process and structure level across system boundaries and reinforce actions to improve 
patient safety and thus improve sustainability.
In the final chapter, chapter 9, a summary and overall conclusion, a critical reflection 
and implications and recommendations for practice and future research are presented.
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Abstract
Objectives: To review the literature on interventions to improve team effectiveness and 
identify their ‘evidence based’-level.
Methods: Major databases (PubMed, Web of Science, PsycInfo and Cochrane Library) 
were systematically searched for all relevant papers. Inclusion criteria were: peer-
reviewed papers, published in English between January 1990 and April 2008, which 
present empirically based studies focusing on interventions to improve team effective-
ness in health care. A data abstraction form was developed to summarize each paper. 
The Grading of Recommendations, Assessment, Development and Evaluation Scale 
was used to assess the level of empirical evidence.
Results: Forty-eight papers were included in this review. Three categories of interven-
tions were identified: training, tools and organisational interventions. Target groups 
were mostly multi-disciplinary teams in acute care. The majority of the studies found 
a positive association between the intervention and non-technical team skills. Most 
articles presented research with a low level of evidence. Positive results in combination 
with a moderate or high level of evidence were found for some specific interventions: 
Simulation training, Crew Resource Management training, Team-based training and 
projects on Continuous quality improvement.
Conclusions: There are only some studies available with high quality evidence on 
interventions to improve team effectiveness. These studies show that team training can 
improve the effectiveness of multi-disciplinary teams in acute (hospital) care.
Keywords: intervention studies; patient care teams; systematic review
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2.1 Introduction
The well-known publication of ‘To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System’ prompted 
a considerable rethinking of safety in health care (Kohn, 2000). The authors argued that 3 
to 4 percent of patients hospitalised in the United States were harmed by care received 
and 44.000 to 98.000 patients died as a result of medical errors. Their conclusion was that 
effective teamwork and better communication between caregivers could have prevented 
half of them. ‘To promote effective team functioning’ became one of the five principles in 
the 1999 IOM report to create safe hospital systems (Kohn et al., 1999). The assumption is 
that effective teamwork leads to higher-quality decision -making and medical intervention 
and, in turn, better patient outcomes (Bunderson, 2003). Since the publication of the report, 
research on team effectiveness in health care has significantly increased.
Research in health care has focused particularly on identifying characteristics of 
effective teams and developing instruments for measuring their effectiveness (Lemieux-
Charles & McGuire, 2006; Heinemann & Zeiss, 2002; Mickan & Rodger, 2000). Cohen 
and Bailey define a team as:
“A collection of individuals who are interdependent in their tasks, who share responsi-
bility for outcomes, who see themselves and who are seen by others as an intact social 
entity embedded in one or more larger social systems (for example, business unit or 
corporation) and who manage their relationships across organisational boundaries”
(Cohen & Bailey, 1997, p. 241).
Several models have been developed to conceptualise the aspects of teamwork that 
influence team effectiveness (Campion et al., 1993; Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006; 
Mickan & Rodger, 2000). These models can be useful in understanding how interven-
tions effect teams. For example, Lemieux-Charles and McGuire have presented ‘The 
Integrated (Health Care) Team Effectiveness Model’ (ITEM) (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 
2006)(Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006). This model shows that the organisational 
context in which a team operates (e.g. goals, structure, rewards, training environment) 
indirectly influences its effectiveness. This particularly has an effect on team processes 
(e.g. communication, leadership, decision-making), psychosocial traits (e.g. cohesion, 
norms) and task design (e.g. team composition, autonomy, interdependence). These 
aspects do have a direct influence on team effectiveness. Finally, team effectiveness 
can be measured by looking at objective outcomes (e.g. patient satisfaction, quality 
of care) and subjective outcomes (e.g. effectiveness as perceived by team members).
With respect to measuring team effectiveness, Heinemann and Zeiss (2002) have 
presented an overview of nine state-of-the-art instruments specific to health care teams 
that measure aspects such as team climate, collaboration, meeting effectiveness, 
attitude towards teams, team integration and development of teams. However, there are 
no (general) overviews of studies on different interventions to improve team effectiveness. 
Therefore, information on the effectiveness of these interventions is scattered. We do 
not know which interventions are most effective for which target group and for which 
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outcomes. Nevertheless, health care organisations are spending an increasing amount 
of money and energy on programs and projects to improve team effectiveness.
To assist health care organisations in their endeavour to improve team effectiveness, 
synthesise scientific knowledge on relevant interventions and identify gaps in this 
research, we performed a systematic review with a focus on two research questions: 
(1) Which types of interventions to improve team effectiveness in health care have been 
researched empirically, for which target groups and for which outcomes? (2) To what 
extent are these findings evidence based?
This article presents the findings of this systematic review.
2.2 Methods
Data sources
A systematic literature search was conducted using the PubMed, Web of Science, 
PsycInfo and Cochrane databases. We restricted the initial search to English articles with 
abstracts published in peer-reviewed journals between 1990 and April 2008. According 
to Lemieux-Charles and McGuire (2006), research interest in team effectiveness in 
health care started around 1990. Although research on interventions to improve team 
effectiveness seemed to appear somewhat later, we chose 1990 as a point of departure 
for the sake of thoroughness. Our search terms were team tool(s), team intervention(s), 
team building, team development, team training, team innovation, team program, team 
education, teamwork, team improve(ment) and team management. Rather than combin-
ing search terms, every term was used separately in each data base. When the search 
term consisted of two elements ‘AND’ was used; e.g. ‘team AND tool(s)’. A summary 
of the search results is presented in Table 2.1. The search produced 6508 references, 
including some duplicate articles due to parallel searches.
Inclusion/exclusion criteria
Articles included matched the following criteria: (1) peer-reviewed English-language 
publication: (2) a focus on health care, (3) a focus on how to improve (and not only 
measure) team effectiveness and (4) empirically researched results. No selection was 
made based on the design of the study, as long as empirical data was presented. Review 
articles that focused on interventions to improve team effectiveness were studied only to 
Table 2.1. Summary of results
Database Hits
Pubmed 3082
Web of Science 1819 
PsychInfo 1477 
Cochrane 130 
Total 6508
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identify other relevant empirical studies. Because we wanted to include both qualitative 
and quantitative articles, we did not require clear outcome measurements. Nor did we 
select studies based on a definition of a team because they were often lacking. Editorial 
letters, books and book summaries were excluded.
Selection process
A three-staged process was followed: (1) screening the title and abstract (authors MB, 
CD and JW), (2) examining the abstracts (MB, CD, JW and KW) and (3) summarizing 
accepted articles (MB, CD, JW and KW). If the title or abstract did not provide enough 
information to meet our criteria, the article was referred to the next stage of the process. 
The first stage resulted in 550 references. In the second stage two researchers, using the 
same inclusion criteria examined each abstract. When both researchers concluded that 
an abstract did not match the criteria, it was excluded. When only one of the researchers 
reached this conclusion a third researcher was asked to make the final decision. Stage 
two resulted in 90 articles, which were summarized using a standard format: (1) research 
question/subject, (2) target group (n), (3) methodology, (4) intervention, (5) results, (6) 
conclusion and (7) general remarks. The search included only one review that focused 
on interventions to improve team effectiveness, namely interprofessional education. 
This review was analysed to identify additional studies; but none was found (Reeves et 
al., 2008). After reading the full length articles, 42 articles did not match the inclusion 
criteria after all. In the end, 48 studies remained.
Organisation of results
Based on our findings a categorical description of interventions to improve team ef-
fectiveness was constructed. Articles were clustered accordingly. Three categories were 
identified: (1) training, (2) tools and (3) organisational interventions. Training involves a 
systematic process through which a team is trained (often by facilitators) to master and 
improve different aspects of team functioning (Harrison, 1990). We identified four types: 
(1) simulations, (2) training based on Crew Resource Management (CRM), (3) interprofes-
sional training and (4) team training. Simulations attempt to recreate characteristics 
of the real world. A simulated scenario can have a specific focus on (a segment of) a 
complex task or be designed to fully simulate a medical or nursing intervention. CRM is 
a management concept used in the aviation industry to improve teamwork. It has been 
adapted to high risk, complex medical departments such as emergency departments and 
operating theatres. CRM encompasses a wide range of knowledge, skills and attitudes 
including communication, situational awareness, problem solving, decision-making and 
teamwork (Helmreich, 2000). Interprofessional training incorporates different learning 
methods that aim to improve cooperation between different disciplines (Furber et al., 
2004). Team training includes different forms of training that focus on specific aspects of 
team functioning such as goal-setting and team building. Tools are specific instruments 
that teams can use independently to improve team effectiveness (e.g. checklists, goal 
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sheets) through better communication. Organisational interventions are actions or 
changes that focus on the organisational context but are expected to have an effect 
on team functioning, like integrated care or quality interventions, for example. Each 
intervention will be described using the same structure: target group, outcomes and 
level of empirical evidence (Table 2.2).
- Target group consists of two categories: sector (acute care versus long-term care) 
and team composition (mono-, multi-, or inter-disciplinary2).
- Outcomes represent the effect of the intervention. These can be objective outcomes 
focused on patients (e.g. functional status), teams (e.g. clinical quality of care) and 
organisations (e.g. cost-effectiveness) or subjective outcomes, namely perceived 
effectiveness by team members (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006).
- The level of empirical evidence is based on the Grading of Recommendations 
Assessment, Development and Evaluation scale (GRADE).
The GRADE system is used because it gives a general rating of not only the level of 
evidence, but also the quality of the article. The GRADE rating scale has four levels of 
quality of evidence: (A) high, (B) moderate, (C) low and (D) very low (GRADE, 2007). A-
Quality evidence implies that further research is highly unlikely to change the confidence 
in the estimated effect of the intervention. The category comprises multicentre random 
control trials (RCT), one large high-quality multi-centre trial and high-quality pre and post-
surveys. B-Quality evidence implies that further research is likely to have an important 
impact on the confidence in the estimated effect and may change it. This category 
consists of one-centre RCT, RCT with severe limitations and pre- and post-surveys. 
C-Quality evidence implies that further research is very likely to have an important 
impact on the confidence of the estimated effect and is likely to change it. This category 
consists of high-quality qualitative studies, quasi-experimental designs and pre- and 
post-surveys with limitations. D-Quality evidence implies that any estimated effect is 
2 Multi-disciplinary teams are less well developed as inter-disciplinary teams. Members of multi-
disciplinary teams focus on their own discipline and work in a parallel to each other. Inter-disciplinary 
teams have a high integration of disciplines (Heinemann & Zeiss, 2002).
Table 2.2 | Overall information of results
Interventions n
Training 32
Simulation training 7 
Training based on CRM 8 
Interprofessional training 6 
Team training 11 
Tools 8 
Organisational interventions 8 
Total 48
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very uncertain. This category consists of low-quality qualitative studies and pre- and 
post-surveys with severe limitations. Levels of evidence of our studies were judged by 
two researchers. When the two differed in opinion, a third researcher was asked to make 
the final judgment. Due to the lack of homogeneity across studies, statistical data could 
not be pooled; the interventions and outcome indicators differed too much.
2.3 Results
The results of the 48 articles are summarised in Table 2.3. Most were published after 
2000, only six between 1990 and 2000. The majority (32) evaluated a type of training 
to improve team effectiveness, mostly in multi-disciplinary teams in acute (hospital) 
care. The outcome indicators were highly diverse and often related to the so-called 
non-technical skills of teams such as communication, cooperation, coordination and 
leadership (Flin & Maran, 2004). The majority of the studies had a low quality of evidence 
(C). Most studies comprised a pre- and post-survey, experimental design, or used 
qualitative methods. Little statistical evidence directly related to the effectiveness of 
the interventions was found.
Training
Of the 32 articles that presented a type of training (simulation-based training, CRM 
training, interprofessional training, or team training), multi-disciplinary teams in acute 
(hospital) care were the most common target group, although inter-disciplinary teams in 
acute care and long-term (elderly) care were also significantly present. Outcomes were 
diverse, except for studies on CRM training, which mostly focused on safety by improving 
attitude and team climate (i.e. shared perceptions of the team’s work procedures and 
practices). Nine articles had a high or moderate quality of evidence, three of which 
presented training based on CRM.
Simulation training
We identified seven studies on simulations using audio-video, computers, manikins, hu-
man bodies, or actors. The scenarios were often combined with educational interventions 
and/or observation (schemes), which are used for debriefing. Teams in acute (hospital) 
care were the target group for all studies. Most simulations were aimed at team function-
ing in crisis situations. Both subjective and objective outcomes were used focusing on 
information sharing, perception, or team performance in terms of task completion (e.g. 
number, efficiency, effectiveness). Most studies found a positive association between 
simulation training and non-technical team skills.
Six of the seven studies had a low or very low quality of evidence. One found no 
association (based on the quantitative data) between the intervention (i.e. lecture-based 
teaching (LBT), simulation-based teaching (SBT), or a combination of lecture and 
simulation training (LAS) and team effectiveness. The qualitative data showed a slight 
indication of a positive effect between the intervention and team effectiveness (Birch et 
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al., 2007). One study with a moderate quality of evidence found a positive association 
between participation in emergency training and patient-actor perception using manikins 
or patient-actors. Training that make use of patient-actors seemed to yield the best 
results (Crofts et al., 2008).
Training based on CRM
Eight studies on training were based on one or more principles of CRM. For all studies 
the target group was teams in the acute (hospital) care and often (multi-disciplinary) 
emergency/trauma teams. In half of the studies improving attitudes towards teamwork 
and safety was an (subjective) outcome (Grogan et al., 2004; Leonard et al., 2004; Morey 
et al., 2002; Wallin et al., 2007). All but one found a positive association between CRM 
training and attitudes. Other (subjective) outcomes consisted of improving communica-
tion, collaboration, team behavior, workload, culture and climate. But also objective 
outcomes were used; reducing adverse outcomes and medical errors. One article also 
presented an interesting tool: a briefing checklist for the operating theatre (Makary et 
al., 2007).
The quality of evidence in this subgroup varied from high (A) to very low (D). Five of the 
eight studies presented a low or very low quality of evidence. Most found improvements 
in several aspects of team effectiveness such as culture, attitude, communication (with 
exception of nurses), team skills, perceived risk for wrong-site surgery and perceived 
collaboration. Only one study found no difference in team performance (Shapiro et al., 
2004). This study had a low quality of evidence. One study had a high quality of evidence 
(Nielsen et al., 2007) and two had a moderate quality of evidence (Grogan et al., 2004; 
Morey et al., 2002). These found that training based on CRM principles will likely result in 
improved team behavior, improved attitudes towards teamwork, improved assessments 
of institutional support and reduced medical errors (Morey et al., 2002; Nielsen et al., 
2007). No evidence, however, confirmed that CRM-based training reduces adverse 
outcomes (except for time from decision to performance) or subjective workload (Morey 
et al., 2002; Nielsen et al., 2007).
Interprofessional training
For five of the six studies on interprofessional training, the target group was inter-
disciplinary teams in long-term (elderly) care. One study (Watts et al., 2007) had multi-
disciplinary teams in acute (hospital care) as the target group. The interventions mostly 
involved many training sessions. Only subjective outcomes were measured focusing on 
learning and retaining information, attitudes, awareness and team climate.
All studies had a low or very low quality of evidence. Two studies found no positive 
associations and one did not present clear outcomes concerning team effectiveness 
(Clark, 2002; Clark et al., 2002; Cooley, 1994). The other three studies found that inter-
professional training resulted in improvements in team skills, team climate, awareness 
of professional roles, attitude, learning and retaining information and in morale
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Team training
Eleven studies used different forms of training but focused on specific aspects of team 
functioning, namely, team building, leadership, team assessments, staff, goal setting, or 
burnout. The target group and the outcomes (mostly subjective) of this subgroup were 
diverse due to the different subjects, but in most studies, positive results were found.
Although in practice team training is often used for team building, only three articles 
with a (very) low quality of evidence focused on team building (DiMeglio et al., 2005; 
Manzo & Rodriguez, 1998; Stoller et al., 2004. These studies found improvements in 
group cohesion, nurse interaction, turnover, competences and teamwork skills. Two 
studies did not present clear outcomes (Crofts, 2006; Frankel et al., 2006). Frankel, 
Leonard and Denham (2006) described a combination of interventions – training and 
tools – within a program. They presented a communication and a leadership tool, 
namely, the situational briefing model SBAR (Situation, Background, Assessment and 
Recommendation) and Leadership WalkRounds. SBAR is supposed to help providers 
organise their thoughts and communication to increase mutual understanding (Frankel 
et al., 2006). In a Leadership WalkRound, senior leaders of a health care organisation 
ask front-line staff about specific events, contributing factors, near misses and potential 
problems, then prioritize events and discuss possible solutions (Frankel et al., 2006). 
The studies did not present precise information on the evaluation of these tools, which 
makes it difficult to judge their value.
A study with a moderate quality of evidence on a team-based burnout intervention 
program found that the program is likely to decrease emotional exhaustion and de-
personalization (Le Blanc et al., 2007). Another B-grade study demonstrated that goal-
setting training programs are likely to increase self-efficacy and individual effectiveness. 
However, there was no evidence that the training increased team effectiveness (Gibson, 
2001). A study with a high quality of evidence demonstrated that staff training programs 
are likely to improve patients’ functional outcome (Strasser et al., 2008).
Tools
Eight articles studied the use of specific tools to improve team effectiveness. These 
tools are often presented as easy and less extensive to implement compared to other 
team interventions. Tools can roughly be divided into checklists, goal sheets and case 
analysis. Teams were given a training or instruction to use these tools in their daily 
practice, with the intention of improving communication by making processes, goals and 
case discussions more explicit. Three types of checklists were identified: preoperative, 
rehabilitation activities profile and quality improvement. These checklists had to be 
completed by the teams at a given moment. Two ways of analysing cases to gather 
themes for improvement are significant event analysis and critical case reviews (Benett 
& Danczak, 1994; Crofts, 2006b). The target group of most studies was multi-disciplinary 
teams in acute (hospital) care. Various outcomes (mostly subjective) were presented: 
communication failure, team communication, information exchange, team cohesion, 
satisfaction, team process, accountability, core issues and patient case issues. All 
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studies had a low or very low quality of evidence and showed positive results, especially 
on communication and team unity.
Organisational intervention
Earlier interventions were aimed at team processes, psycho-social traits and/or 
task design, which directly influence team outcomes (see Introduction; ITEM model 
Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006). Organisational interventions are mostly aimed at the 
organisational context which indirectly effects team outcomes. This category contained 
eight articles. It involves interventions that focus on decision-making, continuous quality 
improvement and redesign of care processes. The target group in the studies was often 
less specific, but mostly multi-disciplinary teams in acute (hospital) care. Some outcomes 
focused on specific aspects of team effectiveness as perceived by team members 
(such as teamwork, attitude, satisfaction, work ownership) and others presented a more 
general focus but with objective outcomes (such as quality and quantity of improvement 
projects, integration, discharge dates, turnover time).
Seven of the eight studies had a low or very low quality of evidence. Some of these in-
terventions aimed to improve team effectiveness indirectly, such as with inter-disciplinary 
work flow assessment and redesign, or reconstructing patient care teams (Cendan & 
Good, 2006; Freidman & Berger, 2004). These interventions seemed to help teams to 
provide insight in the strong and weak aspects of patient processes and were likely to 
result in shorter length of stay (Freidman & Berger, 2004) and operation room turnover 
time (Cendan & Good, 2006). Other interventions were directly related to improving 
team effectiveness (Ledlow et al., 1999; Macfarlene et al., 2004; Moroney & Knowles, 
2006). These interventions seemed to improve teamwork, patient services, ownership, 
satisfaction, patient involvement, relationships and work environment. Only one study 
on continuous quality improvement intervention presented a high quality of evidence 
(Engels et al., 2006). This intervention is likely to result in a higher number of quality 
improvement projects, a higher quality of these projects and improve achievement of 
self-defined objectives.
2.4 Conclusion and Discussion
We began with the question: Which types of interventions to improve team effectiveness 
in health care have been researched empirically, for which target groups and for which 
outcomes? We identified 48 relevant articles whose studies focused on training, tools 
and organisational interventions as primary intervention types. No study, however, 
evaluated precisely the same intervention. Most looked at training programs, which can 
be, either simulations, training based on CRM, interprofessional training, or (general) 
team training. The majority of the interventions aimed at improving the effectiveness of 
multi-disciplinary teams in acute (hospital) care. Because different outcomes were used, 
the findings are difficult to compare or to synthesize across studies. Most studies focused 
on non-technical team skills as outcome, for example, communication, cooperation, 
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coordination and/or leadership and most used subjective outcome indicators (i.e. 
perceived effectiveness by team members, see introduction). The majority of the studies 
found a positive association between the intervention and non-technical team skills.
Our second research question was: To what extent are these findings evidence-based? 
Most articles (37) presented a low or very low level of evidence (e.g. small sample 
pre- or post-studies, observational studies, case-studies). Only eight articles presented 
evidence-based on a study with a high or moderate quality of evidence (e.g. RCT, high 
quality pre- or post-survey). These were mostly training programs: simulation training 
(1), CRM-training (3) and team-based intervention training (3). Articles with high or 
moderate quality of evidence found positive associations with team behaviour, attitudes 
(towards teamwork), self-efficacy, individual effectiveness, emotional exhaustion, de-
personalization and perception of care. However, these training programs did not seem 
to succeed in reducing adverse outcomes, improving subjective workload, reducing 
length of stay, or reducing community discharge.
A downside of these high quality studies is that they often provide little information 
about the context in which the intervention was tested, making it difficult to determine 
if the intervention will also be effective in other settings. As interventions to improve 
team effectiveness are introduced in complex settings with many variables, research 
and practice would benefit from mixed-method approaches (Campbell et al., 2000; 
2007; Creswell, 2003). Using both qualitative and quantitative research methods will 
help to (1) explain the findings, (2) contextualize the results and (3) build new theories 
(Brown et al., 2008). The authors also suggest assessing the effect of the intervention 
on different end points by linking the intervention to structure, process and outcome 
indicators. New research designs are also emerging, such as Stepped Wedge Trial Design 
and Evidence-based Co-design, which seem better suited to evaluate interventions to 
improve team effectiveness than a classic RCT due to the complex and dynamic setting 
in which such interventions are introduced (Brown et al., 2008b).
There are several gaps in the literature on interventions to improve team effectiveness. 
Little research has been conducted in long-term care and most studies focus on acute 
hospital care. Few studies exist on interventions to improve team effectiveness in 
mono-disciplinary teams in health care. We identified only four such studies in acute 
care and none in long-term care. More cohesion in outcome measures is needed, as 
well as replication of same-intervention studies to enable synthesis of findings across 
different studies. Finally, more high quality evidence needs to be provided using objective 
outcomes, especially related to tools and organisational interventions to improve team 
effectiveness.
Some limitations of this systematic review have to be taken into account when interpret-
ing the results and recommendations. Our study was restricted to peer-reviewed articles. 
By not including books or ‘grey’ literature, we may have missed relevant publications. 
Our search was also restricted to a number of key words. They were, however, based on 
a preliminary search and corroborated during the main search by looking at key words 
in identified articles. Thus, it is possible, but unlikely that we have excluded relevant key 
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words leading to important publications. However, Salas and colleagues have found 
similar results concerning team training (Salas et al., 2008; 2008b). A meta-analysis of 
research in other sectors than health care found team training to be useful for “improv-
ing cognitive outcomes, affective outcomes, teamwork processes and performance 
outcomes… team training accounted for approximately 12–19% of the variance in 
the examined outcomes” (Salas et al., 2008b, p. 926). Team training also seems to be 
effective ‘across a wide variety of settings, tasks and team types’ (Salas et al., 2008b).
For reasons mentioned above, policy-makers should be aware that there is still 
little high quality evidence available about the effectiveness of the aforementioned 
interventions, but most evidence points in the same direction. For teams in acute care, 
there is growing evidence that communication skills and coordination in high risk, 
complex medical departments can be improved by simulation training and training 
based on Crew Resource Management. As these are departments where errors due 
to miscommunication and poor teamwork can have serious consequences, which can 
lead to a high number of adverse events (Kohn et al., 1999), we advise policy-makers 
to stimulate the implementation of these training methods. Although the evidence for 
long-term care also seems to indicate that team training, has positive effects for multi-
disciplinary teams in particular, the evidence is still too weak. More research needs to be 
conducted before any sound advise about the use of such interventions in long-term care 
can be given. Furthermore, policy-makers should make sure that, when implementing 
interventions, they also consult case studies, because they provide valuable insights in 
how to implement these interventions.
Finally, before an intervention is used, the specific circumstances of a team should 
be diagnosed. The right fit between the intervention and the problems, context and 
characteristics of a team are more important to improve team effectiveness than the 
underlying level of evidence.
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Abstract
Objectives: To assess surgical team members’ differences in perception of non-technical 
skills
Design: Questionnaire design
Setting: Operating theatres of one university hospital, three teaching hospitals and one 
general hospital in the Netherlands
Participants: sixty-six surgeons, 97 OT-nurses, 18 anaesthesiologists and 40 nurse 
anaesthetists.
Methods: All surgical team members, of five hospitals, were asked to complete a 
questionnaire and state their opinion on the current state of communication, teamwork 
and situation awareness in the operating theatre
Results: Ratings for ‘communication’ were significantly different, particularly between 
surgeons and all other team members (P≤0.001). The ratings of ‘teamwork’ differed 
significantly between all team members (P≤0.005). Within ‘situation awareness’ all three 
sub-categories showed different results for the ratings: ‘gathering information’ differed 
significantly between surgeons and other team members (P<0.001); ‘understanding in-
formation’ differed significantly between surgeons and OT nurses and between surgeons 
and nurse anaesthetists (P≤0.001); ‘projecting and anticipating future state’, differed 
significantly between OT nurses compared with anaesthetists and nurse anaesthetists 
(P≤0.002). Finally, most team members rated routine team briefings- and debriefings 
as inadequate.
Conclusions: This study shows discrepancies on many aspects in perception between 
surgeons and other surgical team members concerning communication, teamwork 
and situation awareness. This inhibits teams to recognize failures in, which could lead 
to adverse events, as these often have multiple causes related to process as well as 
systems failures. Team interventions should include multiple objectives related to the 
team as well as to the care process and support systems.
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3.1 Introduction
The surgical team consists of surgeons, anaesthetists, operating theatre nurses and nurse 
anaesthetists and is a dynamic, multi-disciplinary team. In this article a surgeon is defined 
as: “a medical specialist who performs surgery: a physician qualified to treat those diseases 
that are amenable to or require surgery” (“Merriam Webster’s Medical dictionary,” 2007). 
Performing safe surgery relies on the ability of the team members to combine professional 
knowledge and technical expertise with non-technical skills (e.g. communication, teamwork, 
situation awareness, leadership, decision making) (Yule, Flin, Paterson-Brown, & Maran, 2006).
Many errors that occur in the operating theatre (OT) are attributed to the non-technical 
skills of the surgical team (Cuschieri, 2006; Flin et al., 2003; Flin et al, 2004; Flin et al, 
2006; Helmreich, 2000; Leonard ett al, 2004; Makary et al, 2006; Mishra et al, 2008; Sex-
ton et al, 2006; Yule et al, 2006). In order to work safely and effectively, with a minimum 
of technical errors, the non-technical skills, communication, teamwork and situation 
awareness are the most important (Flin et al, 2003; Leonard M et al, 2004; Lingard et al, 
2008; Makary et al, 2007; Mishra et al, 2008; Undre et al, 2006; Yule et al, 2006.). In this 
context communication is defined as “skills for working in a team context to ensure that 
the team has an acceptable shared picture of the situation and can complete the tasks 
effectively” and teamwork is defined as “skills for working in a group context, in any role, 
to ensure effective joint tasks completion and team member satisfaction”.(University 
of Aberdeen., 2006b) Furthermore, situation awareness is defined as “developing and 
maintaining a dynamic awareness of the situation in theatre based on assembling data 
from the environment, understanding what they mean and thinking ahead what might 
happen next”.(University of Aberdeen., 2006b)
Communication failures have also been reported to contribute to accidents in other 
high-complex and high-risk industries. In aviation, communication failures between flight 
crew-members, rather than a lack of technical skills or malfunctioning of the airplane, 
were responsible for approximately 70% of accidents (Flin and Maran, 2004; Helmreich, 
2000; Leonard et al, 2004; Mishra et al, 2008; Sexton et al, 2006).
Procedures in OT are complex and demand intense interaction between team members. 
Therefore, work processes should emphasise the interdependency of team members and 
support a good understanding of each team members’ tasks, roles and responsibilities. 
This facilitates effective teamwork, ensures that action is linked to reflection and creates 
a culture that is open to change.(Edmondson, 2004; Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; 
Mishra, Catchpole, Dale, & McCulloch, 2008; Nestel & Kidd, 2006; Undre, Sevdalis, Healey, 
Darzi, & Vincent, 2006) Surgical teams should be cohesive and have similar perceptions 
of communication and teamwork; otherwise they cannot collaborate effectively, establish 
common goals for improving team performance and ensure patient safety.(Leonard et al., 
2004; Mills, Neily, & Dunn, 2008) The purpose of this study was to assess surgical team 
members’ perception of their non-technical skills, specifically communication, teamwork 
and situation awareness. Research questions were aimed at identifying the category or 
categories on which team members differed most and where the largest differences in 
perception between the different disciplines existed. As these non-technical skills are 
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important for surgical teams to work safely and effectively, it is important to identify these 
discrepancies before introducing interventions for improvement and adjust implementation 
strategies accordingly.(Haynes et al., 2009; Makary et al., 2007; Makary et al., 2006; Mills 
et al., 2008; Thomas, Sexton, & Helmreich, 2003; Undre et al., 2006; Yule et al., 2006)
3.2 Methods
This study was designed as a multiple case study among five Dutch hospitals, covering 
six percent of all hospitals in the Netherlands. The researchers (LW, CD) visited each 
hospital and gave surgical team members oral and written information on the project 
and provided a questionnaire for all surgical team members to complete and elicit their 
opinion on the current state of communication, teamwork and situation awareness in 
OT. Approximately 600 questionnaires were distributed by mail/email by the contact 
persons of the participating hospitals to the team members. Selection at team level, to 
perform analysis at that level, was not possible, as in most hospitals in the Netherlands 
surgical teams are ad hoc rather than dedicated.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire elicited background information, such as date, details on the respondent 
(age category, gender and function within the hospital) and respondents’ opinion on state-
ments about communication, teamwork and situation awareness. The statements were 
Table 3.1 | Definitions for Communication, Teamwork and Situation Awareness (University of Aberdeen., 2006a, 
2006b)
Subjects including number of statements in questionnaire 
Communication: Skills for working in a team context to ensure that the team has an acceptable shared picture of 
the situation and can complete the tasks effectively.
C1–Exchanging information: giving and receiving knowledge and information in timely matter to aid 
establishment of a shared understanding among team members. (n=6)
C2–Establishing a shared understanding: ensuring that the team not only has necessary and relevant 
information to carry out the operation, but that they understand it and that an acceptable shared ‘big picture’ of 
the case is held by team member. (n=7)
C3–Co-ordinating team activities: working together with other team members to carry out cognitive and 
physical activities in a simultaneous and collaborative manner. (n=5)
Teamwork: skills for working in a group context, in any role, to ensure effective joint tasks completion and team 
member satisfaction. The focus is particularly on the team rather than the task. (n=11)
Situational Awareness: Developing and maintaining a dynamic awareness of the situation in theatre based on 
assembling data from the environment (patient, team, time, displays and equipment): understanding what they 
mean and thinking ahead what might happen next.
S1–Gathering information: seeking information in the operating theatre from the operative findings, theatre 
environment, equipment and people. (n=5)
S2–Understanding information: updating one’s mental picture by interpreting the information gathered and 
comparing it with existing knowledge to identify the match or mismatch between the situation and the expected 
state. (n=2)
S3–Projecting and anticipating future state: predicting what may happen in the near future as a result of 
possible actions, interventions or non-interventions. (n=1)
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based on two rating systems: the Non-Technical Skills of Surgeons (NOTSS) and the 
Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS).(University of Aberdeen., 2006a, 2006b) Table 
3.1 presents the definitions of categories and subcategories used in the questionnaire.
The questions were randomly distributed over the questionnaire. Each statement had 
options on a five-point Likert scale ranging from “1” (strongly disagree) to “5” (strongly 
agree). The questionnaires were voluntary and anonymous to team member’s name, 
but not to team member’s function or hospital. All data were analysed confidentially.
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS 16.0 for Mac. Comparisons between 
surgical team members per subcategory were performed using Mann-Whitney U tests. 
Bonferroni adjustment was applied for multiple comparisons.
3.3 Results
Survey sample
The five hospitals that volunteered to participate comprised: one university hospital, 
three teaching hospitals and one general hospital. In total, 235 questionnaires were 
returned. Response rates per hospital ranged between 29% and 60%, with an average 
response rate of 39% (Table 3.2).
The respondents represented all disciplines directly involved in surgical procedures: 
66 surgeons (and residents), 97 OT nurses, 18 anaesthetists (and trainee anaesthetists) 
and 40 nurse anaesthetists (for distribution between hospitals, see Table 2). Fourteen 
participants did not include their function and were therefore excluded from the study. 
Within all hospitals the surgeons (78.5%) were predominately male and most OT nurses 
(87.2%) were female. Within the other two groups, men and women were represented 
Table 3.2 | Response to questionnaire
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Academic 180 78 43% 33 7 27 9 2
Teaching 1 150 54 36% 15 4 18 11 6
Teaching 2 65 39 60% 3 4 18 11 3
Community 1 130 38 29% 8 3 21 5 1
Community 2 78 26 33% 7 0 13 4 2
Total 603 235 39% 66 18 97 40 14
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equally (50% of anaesthetists and 59% of nurse anaesthetist were male). No significant 
differences were seen for gender between hospitals.
Table 3.3 presents the statements most team members rated as inadequate and Table 
3.4 presents the mean ratings, standard deviation and median per subcategory. Ad-
ditionally, Table 3.5 presents the significant differences of the team members’ ratings 
per subcategory using the Mann-Whitney U test. Here, application of the Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons suggests an appropriate level of P < 0.008.
Table 3.3 | Statements within Communication, Teamwork and Situation Awareness rated inadequate by surgical 
team members
Statements rated ‘inadequate’ by most surgical team members per subgroup S
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C1 | Exchanging information
Anaesthetist/nurse anaesthetist communicating an update on the administered 
medication
x x x x
Surgeon communicating that surgery is not going according to plan x
Anaesthetist communicating that surgery is not going according to plan x
C2 | Establishing a shared understanding
Surgeon communicating planned procedure and actions x x x
Anaesthetist communicating planned procedure and actions x
Pre-operative briefings with the whole team on the procedure x x x x
Debriefings with the whole team, discussing which problems occurred x x x
C3 | Co-ordinating team activities
Surgeon checking pre-operatively whether the whole team is ready to start the 
procedure
x x x
Anaesthetist checking pre-operatively whether the whole team is ready to start the 
procedure
x x
Stopping the procedure when asked by the nurse x x x
T | Teamwork
Addressing the anaesthetist by his/her first name x
Contentment with the communication and teamwork in OT x x x
Surgeon being a team player x x x
Resident being a team player x x
Anaesthetist being a team player x
S1 | Gathering information
Exchanging relevant patient data pre-operatively with the whole team x x x
Surgeon asking the anaesthetic team for update on the patient’s condition x x x
S2 & S3 not applicable
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Communication
Within communication, three different subcategories are addressed, which will be 
elaborated in the following paragraphs.
C1 | Exchanging information
Surgeons rated this subcategory as adequate, the mean rating was 3.95 (Table 3.4). 
The other team members rated this lower: mean 3.12–3.34. This difference of opinion 
between surgeons and other team members was significant (P<0.001, Table 3.5). No 
significant differences were found between the OT nurses and Anaesthesiologists 
(P=0.215), between the OT nurses and nurse anaesthetists (P=0.011), or between 
anaesthesiologists and nurse anaesthetists (P=0.677). All team members rated the state-
ment “Anaesthetist/nurse anaesthetist communicating an update on the administered 
medication” as inadequate (Table 3.3).
Table. 3.4 Team members’ ratings for the subcategories of communication, teamwork and situation awareness: 
Mean (on 1-5 scale, higher score = higher quality) standard deviation (STDEV) and Median
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mean (STDEV) 3.95 (1.05) 3.26 (1.25) 3.12 (1.08) 3.34 (1.07) 3.41 (1.14)
median 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
C2
mean (STDEV) 3.68 (1.14) 2.73 (1.15) 2.35 (0.99) 2.74 (0.97) 2.85 (1.19)
median 4.00 3.00 2.00 3.00
C3
mean (STDEV) 3.83 (1.16) 3.33 (1.32) 2.77 (1.25) 3.04 (1.23) 3.18 (1.31)
median 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00
Te
am
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mean (STDEV) 3.78 (1.07) 3.47 (0.99) 3.06 (0.99) 3.26 (0.89) 3.32 (1.04)
median 4.00 4.00 3.00 3.00
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SA1
mean (STDEV) 3.84 (1.03) 2.84 (1.24) 3.15 (1.14) 3.14 (1.20) 3.30 (1.18)
median 4.00 2.00 4.00 3.00
SA2
mean (STDEV) 4.35 (0.80) 4.11 (0.92) 3.91 (0.78) 4.05 (0.70) 4.07 (0.80)
median 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
SA3
mean (STDEV) 3.41 (1.23) 2.67 (0.89) 3.74 (0.97) 3.28 (0.63) 3.51 (1.01)
median 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00
Chapter 3 | Discrepant Perceptions amoung Surgical Team Members 
54
C2 | Establishing a shared understanding
Surgeons rated this subcategory as adequate: the mean was 3.68, versus a mean of 
2.73 for the anaesthesiologists and 2.74 for the nurse anaesthetists. The OT nurses’ 
mean ratings were lowest: 2.35. The difference of opinion between surgeons and other 
team members and between OT nurses and other team members was significant 
(P<0.001). No significant difference was found between anaesthesiologists and nurse 
anaesthetists (P=0.811).
All team members rated the statement “Pre-operative briefings with the whole team” 
as inadequate. Moreover, all team members except the surgeons rated “Surgeon 
communicating planned procedure and actions” and “Debriefings with the whole team” 
inadequate as well.
C3 | Coordinating team activities
Once more, these results showed the same overall pattern: the surgeons rated this 
subcategory highest (mean 3.83), followed by the anaesthesiologists (3.33) and nurse 
anaesthetists (3.04). Again, the OT nurses’ ratings were lowest: 2.77. The difference of 
opinion between surgeons and other team members was significant (P≤0.001), as was 
the difference between OT nurses and anaesthesiologists (P<0.001). No significant 
differences were found between the remaining team members.
The statements ”Surgeon checking readiness of team pre-operatively” and “Stopping 
the procedure when asked by the nurse” were rated as inadequate by most team 
members, except the surgeons.
Teamwork
Within this subcategory, the differences between all team members were significant 
(P≤0.005). Most surgeons and anaesthesiologists perceived ‘teamwork’ as adequate 
(group mean 3.78 and 3.47). The ratings of nurse anaesthetists and OT nurses were 
significantly lower (mean 3.26 and 3.06).
All respondents perceived themselves as team players, felt comfortable about express-
ing their opinion and perceived the OT nurse and nurse anaesthetist as team players. 
Table 3.5 | Significant differences between surgical team members (Mann Whitney U test with Bonferroni cor-
rection)*
Communication Team-work Situation awareness
Subgroups compared: C1 C2 C3 T SA1 SA2 SA3
Surgeon – OT nurse <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.170
Surgeon - Anaesthetist <0.001 <0.001 0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.146 0.025
Surgeon – Nurse Anaesthetist <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.001 0.237
Anaesthetist – OT nurse 0.215 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 0.023 0.074 <0.001
Anaesthetist – Nurse Anaesthetist 0.677 0.811 0.079 0.005 0.055 0.389 0.350
OT nurse – Nurse Anaesthetist 0.011 <0.001 0.013 0.001 0.919 0.174 0.002
* Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons suggests an appropriate level of P < 0.008
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However, the OT nurses did not see the surgeon or anaesthesiologists as team players 
and rated some statements related to this subject as inadequate (Table 3.3). Most team 
members, except the surgeons, rated “Contentment with communication and teamwork 
in OT” as inadequate.
Situation Awareness
Within situation awareness, three subcategories are addressed, which will be elaborated 
in the following paragraphs.
S1 | Gathering information
The ratings for this subcategory showed similar results as most subcategories within 
communication and teamwork. Surgeons awarded this subcategory an average rating 
of 3.84; the average ratings for the OT nurses and nurse anaesthetists were 3.15 and 
3.14. The anaesthetists’ ratings were lowest: 2.84. The only significant difference found, 
was between the surgeons and other team members (P<0.001).
Most team members, except for the surgeons, rated the statements “Exchanging 
relevant patient data pre-operatively with the whole team” and “Surgeon asking the 
anaesthetic team for update on the patient’s condition” as inadequate.
S2 | Understanding information
Most team members rated this subcategory as adequate: mean ratings for the groups 
ranged from 3.91 to 4.35. Significant differences (P≤0.001) were found only between the 
surgeons and OT nurses and between the surgeons and nurse anaesthetists.
S3 | Projecting and anticipating future state
This subcategory entailed the statement “During laparoscopic procedures, the instru-
ments for a possible conversion are always present in OT”. Within this subcategory 
a lot of missing data were found: 50% of surgeons, 29% of anaesthesiologists and 
20% of nurse anaesthetists did not answer this question. In contrast, the OT nurses 
showed a near full response (98%) and most nurses rated this item as adequate (mean 
3.74). If rated at all, the surgeons rated this statement as adequate, the mean being 
3.41, which was higher than the mean of 3.28 awarded by the nurse anaesthetists. The 
anaesthesiologists’ ratings were lowest: mean 2.67.
Significant differences were found only between the OT nurses and anaesthesiologists 
and between OT nurses and nurse anaesthetists (P≤0.002).
3.4 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to study the discrepancies in team members’ perception of 
1) communication, 2) teamwork and 3) situation awareness. Having a shared perception 
on what to improve and why, is a necessary precondition to learn collectively and will 
facilitate the implementation of quality improvement initiatives.(Carroll & Edmondson, 
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2002; Haynes et al., 2009; Makary et al., 2007; Makary et al., 2006; Mills et al., 2008; 
Thomas et al., 2003; Undre et al., 2006; Yule et al., 2006) Overall, this study showed a 
significant discrepancy in perception between the surgical team members in all three 
categories. Throughout the questionnaire, the surgeons rated most items as adequate 
(mean 3.41-4.35) in contrast to all other team members where more differences in opinion 
were found. All team members agreed on two statements being inadequate: ”Pre-
operative briefings with the whole team on the procedure” and ”Anaesthesiologists/nurse 
anaesthetist communicating an update on the administered medication”. Pre-operative 
briefings create an opportunity, just before the start of the surgical intervention, to 
exchange information on the patient and on the surgical procedure with the whole team.
Within the category, ‘communication’ results showed a large variety in opinion be-
tween team members. The largest discrepancy was found in ‘establishing a shared 
understanding’, which is an important factor when performing complex procedures, 
such as surgery. All team members should understand and be well informed about 
the surgical procedure and about specific patient related subjects, such as allergies or 
co-morbidity. A lack in this ‘shared understanding’ among team members might result 
in adverse events.(Mills et al., 2008; Sexton et al., 2006) Errors are not always easy to 
solve, because usually they are complicated and rooted deeply in every day processes. 
Most team members experience a lack of communication on what to expect, whereas 
the majority of the surgeons’ ratings on this subject were positive. In addition to that, 
surgeons do not recognise the error as a communication failure, in contrast to the 
other team members, which was confirmed in this study. Although human errors are 
inevitable, team members are reluctant to discuss failures. Surgeons might be hesitant 
to discuss failures because they find it hard to acknowledge that errors are made.(Wu, 
2000) Other team members might be discouraged to speak up because of traditional 
hierarchical structures, authority, social barriers or differences in professional training and 
responsibility.(Edmondson, 2004; Makary et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2003; Wu, 2000) 
Although there are fundamental differences like these between nurses and doctors, it 
is not fully understood yet why these discrepant attitudes exist.(Thomas et al., 2003)
The overall ratings concerning ‘teamwork’, also differed between surgical team 
members. Most surgeons and anaesthetists rated these as adequate. However, the 
majority of both nurses and nurse anaesthetists rated these as inadequate. Experiencing 
poor teamwork could lead to team members’ withdrawal from discussions, but also to 
decreased job satisfaction and efficiency and finally result in communication failures and 
poor performance. In this situation, not hierarchical status seems to be of influence, but 
not taking time out to discuss complications as a team or to perform a thorough analysis 
of what went wrong and why. Research in aviation shows that, regardless of workload, 
poor performing teams spend only 5% of their time to discuss possible complications 
compared to 33% of time spend by effective teams (Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000).
Most team members rated ‘understanding information’ one of the subcategories within 
‘situation awareness’ as adequate. However, all team members, except the surgeons, 
rated ‘gathering information’ as inadequate. Room for improvement and time for a team 
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discussion can only be created if team members share the same perception.(Makary 
et al., 2006; Mills et al., 2008)
The overall findings of this study are consistent with prior research. The most common 
pattern being that surgeons have a positive perception of communication and teamwork 
and that nurses have the most negative perception.(Flin, Fletcher, McGeorge, Sutherland, 
& Patey, 2003; Flin, Yule, McKenzie, Paterson-Brown, & Maran, 2006; Makary et al., 
2006; Mills et al., 2008; Nestel & Kidd, 2006; Sexton et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2003) 
OT nurses who have a poor perception of communication, might find it difficult to speak 
up and are afraid of confrontation. This could also withhold other team members from 
correcting errors before patients are harmed and inhibit discussing and learning from 
errors as a team.(Edmondson, 2004; Helmreich, 2000; Nestel & Kidd, 2006; Sexton et 
al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2003)
A limitation of this study was the number of centres involved; only five hospitals 
participated of the approximately 90 hospitals in the Netherlands (6%). However, these 
hospitals represent the whole spectrum of hospital types at a regional level and are 
comparable for quality of care. On the national list of quality indicators for patient care 
the volunteering hospital ranked from average to good, but changed positions annually 
when compared over the last five years.(H Pons, H Lingsma, & Bal, 2009)
Additionally, this study’s overall response rate, was relatively low compared to other 
related studies.(Flin et al., 2006; Makary et al., 2006; Mills et al., 2008) Although the OT 
nurses’ response rates were lower compared to Mills et al. (2008), the response rates for 
the surgeon and anaesthesia ‘crew’ were higher compared to Makaray et al. and Mills et 
al.(Makary et al., 2006; Mills et al., 2008) Overall, the sample is a good representation of 
the Dutch hospitals and of the population of surgical team members within the hospitals.
This study shows the difference in perception of surgical team members in relation to 
non-technical skills. Further research on patient safety should focus on team interven-
tions for improvement that include technical as well as non-technical skills. As surgical 
procedures are complex and error prone, mastering non-technical skills is as important 
as mastering technical skills in order to perform safe surgery.(Institute of Medicine, 
2001) These interventions should support the dialogue between team members, create 
a shared mental model and focus on team, process and system problems.(Cuschieri, 
2006; Edmondson, 2004; Haynes et al., 2009; Helmreich, 2000; Leonard et al., 2004; 
Lingard et al., 2008; Makary et al., 2007; Makary et al., 2006; Sexton et al., 2006; World 
Health Organization, 2005; Yule et al., 2006) Interventions to improve communication 
and teamwork should thus include multiple objectives related to the team, the care 
process and to the support systems.
So far research shows very little evidence on positive results of team interventions on 
team effectiveness.(Buljac-Samardzic, Connie M. Dekker-van Doorn, Jeroen D.H. van 
Wijngaarden, & Wijk, 2009) There is emerging evidence however, that team interventions 
that include technical as well as non-technical skills might lead to better outcomes.
(Haynes et al., 2009) If teams strengthen their ability to reflect collectively on problems 
encountered, it will improve learning from experience and create a shared understanding 
between team members. These are all necessary preconditions to prevent adverse 
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events.(Edmondson, 2004) Interventions like a pre-operative briefing and post-operative 
debriefing include these different aspects and might be successful and lead to improved 
team performance.(Haynes et al., 2009; Lingard et al., 2008; Makary et al., 2007; Makary 
et al., 2006; Sexton et al., 2006)
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4.1 Introduction
The focus in healthcare is changing from cost-effective ways of delivering care to 
delivering care that is safe, has a high standard of quality and improves patient outcomes 
like a shorter hospital stay and less complications. In this respect, concerns about 
patient safety are rising worldwide. Different studies suggest that 30–40 per cent of 
patients do not receive care in compliance with current scientific evidence and, possibly 
even worse, 20–25 per cent of the care provided is not needed or potentially harmful 
(Grol 2001, Schuster et al., 1998). Although surgical safety knowledge has improved 
substantially, it is estimated that 3–16 per cent of all hospitalized patients are affected 
by adverse events and almost 50 per cent of these events occur during surgical care, 
involving all surgical disciplines (Cuschieri 2006, World Health Organization, 2008). 
The replication of the Harvard Medical Study in the Netherlands showed that 5.7 per 
cent of all patients hospitalized suffered from adverse events causing temporary or 
permanent disabilities and 4.1 per cent of all patients who die during hospitalization 
die because of these probably preventable incidents (de Bruijne 2007, Wagner and de 
Bruijne 2007). Inadequate anaesthetic safety practices, avoidable surgical infection and 
poor communication among team members are issues that are common, deadly and 
preventable problems in all countries and all settings (World Health Organization 2008).
It is suggested that half of adverse events can be prevented, provided professionals in 
healthcare accept that human error is inevitable, teams are willing to learn from mistakes 
and organisations are looked at from a systems perspective. In this context the team is 
a small separate unit of a larger organisational system in which management decisions 
and organisational processes are important factors in relation to patient safety. The lack 
of support (managerial as well as financial), inadequate training and staff or the absence 
of reliable management information systems can all be causes for latent failures that 
eventually lead to adverse events (see Figure 4.1).
	  Figure 4.1 | Causes for latent failures leading to adverse events (adapted from Reason 2005)
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If a team works together effectively in the right working environment, it can avert a 
considerable proportion of life-threatening complications. ‘Improve cooperation among 
team members’ and ‘Promote effective team functioning’ are two recommendations of 
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) to achieve a healthcare system that is: safe, effective, 
patient centred, timely, efficient and equitable (Institute of Medicine, 2001). These recom-
mendations support the creation of a system where it is easier ‘to do things right than 
to do things wrong’ and underscore the importance of teamwork and communication in 
relation to patient safety. This is especially true within a complex and critical environment 
like the operating theatre (OT).
Errors in OT might result in serious consequences for patients and families but also 
for healthcare professionals themselves and the entire healthcare organisation. Poor 
communication and collaboration between OT members, being one of the major causes 
for incidents, renders the team itself to be the most critical resource to improve surgical 
safety (Sexton et al., 2006). In addition to technical knowledge and skill, good com-
munication and teamwork are critical for teams to be effective in complex and critical 
environments like the OT (Yule et al., 2006). Good teamwork depends on each individual 
team member having a better understanding of what others do, to anticipate the needs 
of other team members, adjust to each others actions and have a shared understanding 
of the procedure (Baker et al., 2006). Establishing a high level of situational awareness 
is one of the conditions for teams to work effectively. Yet, most teams in OT have had 
little team training and cannot rely on adequate work structures to improve effective 
teamwork and improve patient safety.
The aim of the project TOPplus is to improve situational awareness, decision- making, 
transparency and cooperation among team members; characteristics that are key in 
the requirements of the World Health Organization (WHO) Guidelines for Safe Surgery 
(World Health Organization 2008). Improvement of these characteristics helps individual 
team members to make the transition from autonomous professional to team player and 
overcome one of the barriers to achieve safe care. Healthcare professionals must be 
open to others with respect to problems and anticipate accordingly. This also requires 
looking at a care process as a system including other departments like the clinical ward 
(Amalberti et al., 2005). This in turn leads to reliable processes where a team of healthcare 
professionals work together for the benefit of the patient and structurally decrease the 
number of incidents and preventable deaths. It is at this specific team level where the 
proposed intervention TOPplus is situated, the level that is also the least well understood 
level of the structure of healthcare (Batalden and Splaine 2002).
4.2 TOPplus and Underlying Principles
TOPplus is based on the principles of crew resource management (CRM). CRM training 
encompasses a wide range of knowledge, skills and attitudes including communication, 
situational awareness, problem solving, decision-making and teamwork (also referred 
to as non-technical skills).
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In aviation, where links between teamwork and performance are paramount, CRM 
has successfully been used for teaching error management to flight crews, ‘error 
management’ meaning:
Using all available data to understand the causes of errors and taking appropriate actions, 
including changing policy, procedures and special training to reduce their incidence of 
error and to minimize the consequences of those that do occur. (Helmreich 1998, p. 1)
One of the underlying principles of error management is the recognition of the inevitability 
of human error and the adoption of a blame-free environment.
Most of the time commercial pilots fly as ad hoc teams and often work with unfamiliar 
team members, with different skills and knowledge and different tasks and responsibili-
ties. circumstances that are similar to the multidisciplinary teams that work together in 
OT. Like flight crews, surgical teams need good, easy-to- transfer non-technical skills 
in order to work effectively.
As healthcare is a high risk and technically complex industry, cooperation between 
professionals is crucial to assure safety and reliability of care processes. Although 
interdependency is high and teamwork essential, teamwork is often poorly developed 
(Leggat 2007). One of the barriers for teamwork is partly due to the individual’s formal 
education and training. Professional education forms a solid base for proficiency in 
technical knowledge and skills and standardization of processes, but also creates job 
boundaries and ‘status’ thus stifling communication (Boonstra 2004). Another barrier for 
teamwork has to do with the culture of the medical profession, like stress recognition. 
Healthcare professionals have a tendency to deny the influence of stressors such as 
fatigue, danger and personal problems on performances. Denial of these stressors leads 
to defensive reasoning, blaming the environment rather than reflecting critically on one’s 
own work performance (Argyris 1991, pp. 99–109).
Another important contributing factor to teamwork is the organisational context in 
which the teams operate. This directly affects the design of teams and the training and 
resources available to them (Lemieux-Charles and McGuire 2006). The linkages between 
the different systems and levels must be seamless, timely, efficient and reliable (Nelson 
et al. 2002). One of the main contributors of effective teamwork in the organisational 
context is the influence of leadership (Mickan and Rodger 2005). Leadership at all levels 
of the organisation – senior leaders, team leaders as well as the front-line staff – plays 
an important role in the strategy for leading change and creating the desired culture 
(Pronovost et al. 2006).
The main factors influencing teamwork are these non-technical, behavioural skills 
rather than a lack of technical knowledge and skills. Teams make fewer mistakes when 
they know each other’s responsibilities, are able to anticipate the needs of others, adjust 
to each others actions and have a shared understanding of a certain procedure (Baker 
et al. 2006). Non-technical skills, individual as well as team skills are directly related to 
failures and patient safety (Flin and Maran 2004). These skills are difficult to measure 
and difficult to change. However, there is emerging evidence that interventions, like 
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pre-operative briefings (also called ‘time out’) have a positive effect on teamwork climate 
and the reduction of incidents (Makary et al. 2006). In 2003, the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) introduced the Universal Protocol 
based on three primary components: (1) the pre-operative verification process, (2) 
marking the operative site and (3) taking a ‘time out’ immediately before starting the 
procedure (Joint commission on accreditation of Health Care Organizations 2003).
After introduction of the time out in the ‘Eye Hospital Rotterdam’ in 2004, wrong site 
incidents were reduced to zero. The introduction of a time out in Intensive Care Units 
(ICUs) at New York’s public hospitals drastically reduced the number of serious infections 
(Hartocollis 2008). In a recent Canadian study it was concluded that inter-professional 
checklist briefings reduced the number of communication failures and promoted proac-
tive and collaborative team communication (Lingard et al. 2008). Rather than introducing 
the whole CRM- concept including team training, development of checklists and a time 
out at once, it was decided to introduce the time out and a debriefing as the first step, 
called TOPplus (Time Out Procedure plus Debriefing).
TOPplus: Development and Introduction of a Time Out Procedure and 
Debriefing
TOPplus is designed to support team learning and engage the OT team in double-loop 
learning. Both the time out (briefing) and the debriefing put a strong emphasis on 
reflection, which is one of the main principles of adult learning. Leading to reflection in 
action and reflection on action, moving from single-loop learning to double-loop learning.
Double-loop learning occurs when an error is detected and corrected in ways that 
involve the modification of an organisation’s underlying norms, policies and objectives 
(Argyris and Schön, 1978, pp. 2–3; Smith, 2001).
In case incidents occur because of a lack of technical skills or knowledge, or because 
of negligence, team members need their non-technical skills to solve the problem. The 
team member being ‘lower’ in the traditional hierarchy should know how to address 
the other team member who, in turn, needs to know how to react on suggestions for 
improvement. also, the team member higher in hierarchy should know how to address 
technical shortcomings from other team members in a positive way. all this implies the 
combination of highly specialized technical expertise with the ability to work effectively 
in teams, form productive relationships and critically reflect on and then change organi-
sational practices (Argyris, 1991). Therefore TOPplus is team- and dialogue-based and 
involves the use of a structured communication protocol.
Registration of TOPplus provides structured and reliable information on incidents as 
well as on communication and teamwork, which is an important condition to support 
error management. The time out is the final step in a series of checks, which start when 
the patient leaves the clinical ward and is performed in OT just before incision. In the 
debriefing, just before closing the wound, incidents occurred during surgery are reported. 
These data provide a reliable base for a reporting system, which in turn provides the 
ability to learn from failures and enhance patient safety. If incidents are reported, analysis 
might show similarities and patterns in sources of risk that may otherwise go unnoticed. 
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This in turn leads to knowledge and actions for improvement: ‘Ultimately it is the action 
we take in response to reporting – not the reporting itself – that leads to change’ (World 
Health Organization 2005b, p. 3). According to the WHO (World Health Organization 
2005b, p. 49), guidelines for safety reporting and learning system must:
• be safe for the individuals who report;
• lead to constructive response and meaningful analysis;
• have a solid base of adequate expertise and financial resources.
The reporting system must be capable of disseminating information on hazards and 
recommendations for changes.
To support TOPplus, a poster was developed to structure and support the time out and 
debriefing. This was based on The Universal Protocol of the JCAHO (Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, 2003), the WHO recommendations on 
Safe Surgery (including their safety checklist) (World Health Organization, 2008) and 
expert opinions of the ‘Eye Hospital, Rotterdam’. The aim of the TOPplus procedure 
was to include all members of the surgical team and double-check important factors 
related to the surgical procedure and patient characteristics. The poster was developed 
to structure the process, ensure the participation of all team members and improve the 
dialogue between team members. The objectives of TOPplus were:
• to reduce the number of incidents;
• to improve communication and teamwork;
• to reduce hierarchical structures.
Questionnaire: Communication and Teamwork
In order to measure the change in perceptions and opinions of team members on com-
munication and teamwork, a questionnaire was developed comprising four teamwork 
characteristics: Teamwork and Communication, Decision-making, Situational awareness 
and leadership. The questionnaires’ characteristics were based on the research on 
identification of non-technical skills and the development of behavioural markers for 
anaesthetist, surgeons and OT-teams (Fletcher et al. 2003, Undre and Healey 2006, Yule 
et al. 2006). The questionnaire ‘Communication and Teamwork in Operating Theatre’ 
consisted of 59 questions. Table 4.1 shows the design of the questionnaire. All questions 
had to be rated on a five-point scale, ranging from fully disagree to fully agree. At the 
end of each questionnaire, comments could be written down.
Team learning starts with dialogue, the capacity of team members to suspend as-
sumptions and enter in a genuine ‘thinking together’ (Senge, 1990). A factor that might 
inhibit this kind of learning is the perception of communication and teamwork, which like 
the perception of leadership, varies considerably among the different team members. 
Where physicians rate teamwork as high, nurses at the same time perceive it as mediocre 
(Makary et al. 2006). A cross-sectional survey including physicians and nurses from 
teaching and general hospitals revealed that, unlike physicians, nurses reported that it 
is difficult to speak up, disagreements are not appropriately resolved, more input into 
decision-making is needed and nurse input is not well received (Thomas et al. 2003). All 
this might inhibit team learning and thus sustainable improvement and patient safety. 
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Therefore, measuring the effect of TOPplus on improving communication and teamwork 
and the reduction of the hierarchical structures is as important as measuring the effect on 
the reduction of incidents. In the research final project fifteen hospitals are participating, 
following the protocol for implementation shown in Table 4.2.
4.3 Material and Methods
Pilot TOPplus in Operating Theatre
The project was piloted at three locations: the ambulatory care department of an 
academic hospital, a teaching hospital and a community hospital. TOPplus consisted of 
Table 4.1 | Overview questionnaire Communication & Teamwork in Operating Theatre
Number of 
questions
Subject
7 General information (age, sex, hospital, years working in function in particular hospital)
1 Who does the team regard as the leader during the surgical procedure?
53 ‘Communication and Teamwork’ (based on the definitions of the NOTSS and ANTS rating systems) 
subdivided into:
18/11 - Communication and Teamwork: Skills for working in a team context to ensure that the team has 
an acceptable shared picture of the situation and can complete the tasks effectively. 
8 - Situational Awareness: Developing and maintaining a dynamic awareness of the situation 
in theatre based on assembling data from the environment (patient, team, time, displays and 
equipment); understanding what they mean and thinking ahead what might happen next. 
11 - Decision-making: Skills for diagnosing the situation and reaching a judgement in order to choose 
an appropriate course of action. 
5 - Leadership: Leading the team and providing direction, demonstrating high standards of clinical 
practice and care and being considerate about the needs of individual team members. 
Table 4.2 | Time frame TOPplus project
Month 1–2 Visit hospital to provide additional information about TOPplus
Distribute questionnaire ‘Communication and Teamwork in OT’ (T0)
(Week 1 – Distribution, Week 3 – Reminder, Week 4 – Closure)
Month 2 Introduction TOPplus in OT according to poster
Perform TOPplus during 100 surgical procedures
Analyse response questionnaire
Month 3 Analyse data and evaluate registrations of TOPplus
Adapt poster to local context if necessary
Present analysis of questionnaire (T0) and TOPplus
Month 4–6 Resume TOPplus in OT according to (adapted) poster
Month 7 Redistribute questionnaire ‘Communication and Teamwork in OT’ (T1)
(Week 1 – Distribution, Week 3 – Reminder, Week 4 – Closure)
Month 8 Analyse data and evaluate registrations of TOPplus
Analyse questionnaire T1 and compare to T0
Month 9 Present data on incidents and questionnaire
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three interventions: (1) a questionnaire ‘Communication and Teamwork in OT’, (2) a time 
out and (3) a debriefing. The main objective of the pilot was to test the poster, which was 
designed to support the time out and debriefing procedures. The main objective of the 
questionnaire was to measure the effect of TOPplus on the perception of teamwork and 
communication of the individual team members. The first results of the questionnaire will 
be used for validation of the Dutch translation and will not be elaborated in this chapter.
The objectives of the pilot study were the following:
• Improve patient safety and efficiency during the surgical procedure. improve com-
munication involving all team members.
• Test the design of the time out and debriefing: layout of the poster, structure and the 
designation of specific team members to certain questions and answers.
• Test the registration of incidents that occur during surgery.
• Measure how much time the time out and the debriefing take.
Implementation
Poster A feasibility study was initiated to test the design and the usability of the poster. 
In all three participating hospitals, the use of the poster was presented and explained 
to representatives of the OT team. They in turn explained the project’s aim and use of 
the poster to all team members verbally by means of meetings and/or presentations. in 
addition, all participants received a letter with more detailed information.
The poster was developed based on literature and expert opinions (figure 4.2) (Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations 2003, World Health Organiza-
tion 2008).
Participants were asked to comment on the layout and structure of the poster. 
Furthermore, they were asked to comment on the designation of the different team 
members to ask or answer specific questions. The questions were all related to the 
formal responsibility of each team member in the operative process. Participants were 
invited to propose suggestions for improvement.
The shaded bars and corresponding bullets preceding the questions indicated the team 
member intended to ask the question. The purpose of the questions was to engage the 
dialogue between the team members and was not to memorize the questions. The bullets 
at the end of each line indicated the team member(s) intended to answer the question.
The surgeon starts the time out. Then the anaesthetist or anaesthetic nurse starts 
with the first question: ‘What is the name of the patient?’ The surgeon is supposed to 
answer. Then the surgeon will ask the next question and so on according to the poster.
Time out The time out was initiated when all operating team members were present in 
OT, just before the first incision. Because the time out is a double-check, the patient 
did not have an active role, as he/she was already under anaesthesia or pre-medicated 
in addition to a regional block anaesthesia.
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During the time out the anaesthetic nurse (demanding a special qualification, which 
is unknown outside the Netherlands) filled out a registration form, which included the 
following aspects:
• Did the designated team member ask the question?
• Did the designated team member answer the question?
• Were the questions asked as stated on the poster or in a different way?
• Did all team members participate? If not, please indicate which person did not.
• The time it took to perform the time out.
Debriefing The debriefing had to take place just before closing the wound. This particular 
moment in the surgical procedure was chosen because, in academic and most teaching 
hospitals, the supervising surgeon will leave the OT. The surgeon initiated the debriefing 
by asking: ‘Were there any details to be reported?’ All team members were invited to 
report incidents related to the operative process or related to communication and 
teamwork.
Figure 4.2 | TOPplus poster, first version tested during pilot
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As in the time out, the anaesthetic nurse fi lled out the registration form. This form 
included the following aspects:
• the time it took to perform the debriefi ng;
• the remarks/incidents mentioned by the different team members.
4.4 Results
Implementation of TOPplus
This section represents the results of the pilot of the time out and debriefi ng in three 
participating hospitals during 308 surgical procedures (academic n=28, teaching n=180, 
community n=100).
The time out was performed and reported in 206 out of the 308 procedures. In reality 
the time out was performed during more procedures, but was not reported. No specifi c 
reason was given for not reporting the time out.
Did the designated team member ask the question? An important aspect was the layout 
of the poster. The layout was directly related to each person’s tasks and responsibilities 
and was meant to involve the whole team in the discussion. Usually checks are performed 
individually and team members exchange little information, partly due to the strong 
hierarchical structure in OT. The time out is a relatively small intervention in the operative 
process but, because of this specifi c structure, a rather drastic one. Information from 
the team members directly involved provides important information on the feasibility 
of the project.
The designated team member asked most questions (Figure 4.3). Differences in a team 
member asking questions than the one indicated on the poster, were minor and improved 
during the course of the implementation process. If the designated team member did 
not ask the question, other team members took the initiative.
	  Figure 4.3. | Questions asked by team members as indicated on the poster
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Did the designated team member answer the question? The designated team member 
answered most questions (Figure 4.4). In those cases where a team member other than 
the designated one answered the question, most of the time the surgeon answered.
Were the questions asked as stated on the poster or in a different way? One of the pilot’s 
objectives was to find out which layout would best support the time out and debriefing 
and support the involvement of the whole team. In one location, two versions of the 
poster were used: one version with unabbreviated questions (1) and a second version 
presenting short remarks (2), more resembling a checklist. It was expected that the 
questions in version 1 would be abbreviated to short remarks. However, the results 
(n=28) showed no significant difference in usage between the two versions. Both 
questions were asked and answered as indicated on the poster. In addition to the pilot 
in one location, representatives of the different OT teams were asked which poster they 
preferred. All OT teams in the participating hospitals decided to use the poster with the 
unabbreviated questions, as these full sentences would support the communication 
and dialogue within the team.
In most cases (n=160) questions were asked according to the poster, in 68 cases it 
was unknown and in 80 cases a different way of questioning was followed. During almost 
half of these, differences were reported. The most frequent ones were:
• The team members asking the questions were not reported, only the ones answering 
the questions (n=27).
• The questions were shortened (n=7).
• The content of the question asked was identical to the one on the poster, but the 
question was formulated differently (n=4).
Figure 4.4 | Answers given by the team members as indicated on the poster
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Did All Team Members Participate? If Not, Please Indicate who Did Not? In 157 cases 
all team members participated in the time out. In 76 cases no additional information 
was given on team members’ participation. In 101 cases where not all team members 
participated, the specific team member was reported (surgeon n=11, nurse n=14, 
anaesthetist n=61, anaesthetist in training n=1, anaesthetic nurse n=14). The high number 
of anaesthesiologists not participating (61 out of 101 cases) was mainly the result of 
working structures. This structure entails that he/she works in two OTs concurrently. A 
qualified anaesthetic nurse mans both rooms. Therefore, the anaesthesiologists did not 
participate in the time out because he/she was not present in OT at that specific moment.
How long does it take to perform the time out? The time out took an average of 1.6 
minutes (95.58 seconds, see Table 4.3). When the time out took significantly more time, 
most incidents reported were related to instruments or material missing. There was no 
specific explanation found for the duration of the time out taking longer in the academic 
and the teaching hospital.
How long does it take to perform the debriefing? The registration of the debriefing was 
carried out in the academic and community hospital. There is a significant difference in 
time/duration needed to perform the debriefing between the two locations (Table 4.4). 
The debriefing in the academic hospitals took twice as much time (52.2 seconds) as the 
debriefing in the community hospital (24.31 seconds). As with the time out no particular 
reason was indicated.
Table 4.3 | Duration of the time out (in seconds)
Average (sec) STDEV (sec) n= other missing data
1. Academic 101.79 65.49 28 - -
2. Teaching 98.61 67.19 122 4 54
3. Community 86.35 59.09 78 1 21
Total 95.58 63.92 228 5 75
Table 4.4 | Duration of the debriefing (in seconds)
Average (sec) STDEV (sec) n= other missing data
1. Academic 52.22 28.33 28 – –
2. Teaching – – – – –
3. Community 24.31 31.04 70 9 21
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What were the remarks/incidents mentioned during the debriefing? Several remarks and 
incidents were reported; the most reported ones are described below, subdivided into 
the categories used in the questionnaire.
• Communication and teamwork (n=44)
 – Improving communication between all team members, improving
 –  Information on patient characteristics, surgical day schedule, necessary equip-
ment and surgical approach (32 per cent of the remarks ‘communication & 
teamwork’).
 – Improve team spirit and teambuilding (20 per cent).
 – Show respect for your all OT-members and be honest (11 per cent).
• Situational awareness (n=30)
 –  Improving information on the surgical day schedule, better preparation of surgery 
(including instrument set-up), improve written communication,
 – Introduce pre-operative team meeting (33 per cent).
 – Update on status of surgery (7 per cent).
 –  Implement standards and protocols, including communicating this to all team 
members (7 per cent).
• Decision-making (n=1)
 – Improvements should be implemented faster.
 – Leadership (total 5 remarks)
 – Less hierarchy, more commitment, increase consultation and direct communica-
tion (60 per cent).
4.5 Discussion
The results of the pilot provided important information for implementing TOPplus on a 
wider scale and ensure that it supports its objectives. Some elements of the poster are 
still subject to discussion. The main conclusions are presented below. In general, four 
topics for discussion were reported:
1.  The moment of the time out just before incision, rather than before administering 
total or local anaesthesia.
2. Performing a debriefing with patients under local anaesthetic.
3.  Performing a time out and debriefing when three or more similar and relatively simple 
surgical procedures are scheduled successively.
4. The content of the time out being context specific (as expected).
The recently published ‘Surgical Safety Checklist’ of the WHO (World Health Organization 
2008, p. 153) splits the checking process in three parts:
• Before induction of anaesthesia: including patient data confirmed by patient himself/
herself, surgical site, anaesthesia safety check completed? pulse oximeter on patient 
and functioning?, allergies?, difficult airway/ aspiration? and risk of blood loss?
• Before skin incision: similar to TOPplus.
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• Before patients leaves OT: nurse verbally confirms name of procedure reported, 
instruments, sponge and needles correct?, correct labelling specimen?, equipment 
problems? and review by the whole team on key concerns for recovery and manage-
ment of this patient.
TOPplus focused on Part 2. The hospitals that participated in the pilot are now analysing 
their pre-operative and post-operative process and adding checks related to these 
phases to their checks. Therefore, TOPplus acted as a catalyst for improving and 
checking the care process.
Topic 1: Performing a time out after the patient has been given a local or general 
anaesthetic and is ready for surgery, raised questions. Some incidents might result in 
postponement of surgery for one or two hours or even another day which might harm 
the patient, physically as well as mentally. However, one of the problems is the presence 
of the whole team as a requirement for the time out. Especially for the surgeons being 
present before anaesthesia as this means a drastic change in routine procedures. At 
the moment, in one of the hospitals a pilot is carried out to report incidents related to 
the moment of the time out just before incision.
Team members participating in the pilot suggested several solutions:
• Starting the time out before total or local anaesthesia is administered, with the whole 
team present including the surgeon.
• Starting the time out before total or local anaesthesia is administered, with the 
whole team present and one of the surgical staff members or one of the residents 
representing the surgeon.
• Starting the time out just before incision, but reducing the number of questions asked 
and developing multidisciplinary checklists carried out by two or more professionals 
during the pre-operative process.
Questions and answers indicated to be asked/answered by the anaesthetist should 
be adapted to the local situation. In case the anaesthetist is not present, because of 
different work structures, the anaesthetic nurse can take over.
Topic 2: Free exchange of information during the debriefing when patients are under 
local anaesthetic requires good and timely information to the patient and an open and 
blame-free culture, which takes longer to develop. TOPplus by itself is a relatively simple 
intervention and easy to introduce into daily routines but, in relation to professional and 
organisational culture, a rather drastic one. Although the first reaction was very positive, 
it took all participants four to six months to take the appropriate steps for communication 
with everyone involved and to establish the necessary commitment and support.
Topic 3: in those cases where four or more similar, small and routine surgical proce-
dures were scheduled and the team remained the same, it was suggested to adapt the 
time out and debriefing:
• Before the whole session: Perform one overall time out, discussing surgical proce-
dures and patients’ characteristics with the whole OT-team and perform a reduced 
time out with every surgical procedure, just before incision.
• Perform one overall debriefing of all patients after all scheduled surgeries.
However, this subject is still open to discussion.
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Topic 4: Some questions were considered irrelevant and some questions were not 
addressed in the time out, but perceived as being important in a specific local context. 
The questions asked during the time out and therefore stated on the poster, should 
be relevant to all team members. The most important adjustments were the following:
• Questions were adjusted to the ambulatory department such as the anaesthetic 
procedure, blood products ordered or ASA classification (Physical Status Classifica-
tion of the American Society of Anaesthesiologists).
• Specific questions on subjects such as allergies, antibiotics or thromboprophylaxis 
were added according to the needs of the local OT teams.
• Sometimes questions were added to the poster because these were related to 
specific projects in the hospital such as infection prevention.
The ability to discuss the questions and adapt the content subsequently was much 
appreciated and is an important condition for establishing commitment and support 
of all parties involved. This is one of the principles of adult learning where personal 
involvement is crucial and in line with one of the basic rules of change management, to 
create powerful guiding coalitions:
Efforts that lack a sufficiently powerful guiding coalition can make apparent progress for 
a while. The organisational structure might be changed, or a reengineering effort might 
be launched. However, sooner or later, countervailing forces undermine the initiatives. 
(Kotter 1996, p. 6)
During the pilot, one adjustment to the poster was made. It concerned the registration 
of the incidents reported in the debriefing. Analysis of the incidents showed that a more 
detailed registration of incidents was necessary for adequate reporting. It was decided 
to create four categories: incidents related to surgery, anaesthesiology, materials and 
instruments and communication and teamwork (Figure 4.5). As mentioned before several 
initiatives were started by the hospitals to include checks during the whole care process.
4.6 Conclusion
Most professionals received the development of TOPplus, introducing a time out and a 
debriefing in OT, as a very good initiative. Especially the specific design of the time out 
(team-based and dialogue-based) and the objective to make it evidence-based created 
many positive reactions. The objective was to include two non-academic hospitals in 
the study. At this moment ten Dutch hospitals are participating in the project and a few 
more have shown interest.
Although results from the final research project are not yet available, some conclusions 
can be drawn from the pilot study. Conditions for successful implementation are:
• The ability to adjust the poster to the local context in regard to the questions as well as 
the designated team members is important for successful implementation, because 
ambulatory care, clinical care and some specific medical specialties have different 
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requirements. The poster should provide a template including basic questions (an ‘in 
addition to’ format). Hospitals and departments should then add specific questions 
and topics relating to their local context and wishes. The questions on the poster 
should be ‘owned’ by all OT-team members.
• Good and timely information to the patient about the objectives of the time out and 
debriefing.
• Creating a blame-free and safe environment. This means that the registration of the 
incidents should be kept confidential and should be related to the kind of incidents 
and frequency and not to specific team members.
Figure 4.5 | Final version of the poster
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The precise moment of the time out and consequences for the questions asked is still 
open to discussion. These questions will be addressed in the final research project. There 
might be a concern about the time it takes to perform the time out and debriefing. One 
concern is related to the difference between the academic and community hospital. 
The second has to do with the total time it takes to perform the time out and debriefing.
A logical explanation for the difference in time between the two hospitals might be the 
number of people present in OT because of the teaching aspect. Another factor might 
be new residents joining the OT team rather frequently, as they change hospitals every 
few months during their medical specialist training. This might influence the time it takes 
for new work procedures like the time out to become a standard operating procedure. 
Finally, some hospitals used a different method of time recording during the time out. 
For example, when a specific instrument was not present, some hospitals recorded the 
time until the instrument was actually in OT, while others did not include this in their time 
recordings. Another explanation might be the fact that a correction for patient case-mix 
was not applied in the analysis. In general, 20–30 per cent of the patients, hospitalized 
in academic and maybe a little less in teaching hospitals, consists of tertiary referrals in 
general, including more complex patients where standard protocols are not applicable. 
Tertiary referrals are rare in community hospitals.
The total time it takes to perform both the time out and debriefing with every surgical 
procedure might become a concern. With an average production of 20,000– 25,000 
surgical procedures per annum, the total time adds up to quite an investment. Comparing 
the costs of the time invested in the time out and debriefing with the costs of incidents 
might help to overcome financial barriers. Healthcare associated infections in the United 
Kingdom are estimated to cost £1 billion (€1.26 billion) a year. In the United States, the 
estimate is between £2.3–3 billion (€3–3.7 billion) per year (World Health Organization 
2005a). The average costs for a surgical site infection amounts to £5393 (€6780) (World 
Health Organization 2005a). Furthermore, a re-operation to restore iatrogenic ductal 
injury after a laparoscopic cholecystectomy costs 4.5–6 times the initial cost of an 
uncomplicated surgery (Savader et al. 1997). All these costs involve hospital budget. 
Besides, there are also costs involved for society, such as loss of wages of the patient and 
caretakers, additional treatment in an outpatient department and additional medication. 
Also, medical claims due to medical liability lead to cost increase. In conclusion, TOPplus 
is a feasible instrument which, once adapted to the local context, improves teamwork 
and communication and in the end improves patient safety. Although it requires some 
extra time, this will be compensated by fewer incidents in the end.
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5.1 Introduction
Healthcare is one of the most dynamic and expanding areas in the world. The number 
of chronically ill patients is increasing, leading to an increased demand for healthcare 
(Clemensen, Larsen, Kyng, & Kirkevold, 2007a). At the same time, (inter) national studies 
have shown that annually many medical errors occur. In 2000, it was estimated that 44 
000 to 98 000 Americans die each year as a result of medical errors (Kohn, Corrigan, & 
Donaldson, 2000). In the Netherlands, this accounts for 1735 deaths annually (de Bruijne, 
Zegers, Hoonhout, & Wagner, 2007). Half of these (possibly preventable) medical errors 
occur in the operating theatre (OT) (Cuschieri, 2006; de Bruijne et al., 2007). The actual 
number of medical errors could even be higher, as errors are likely to be underreported 
(Leape, 1997; Verdaasdonk, Stassen, van der Elst, Karsten, & Dankelman, 2007).
Psychological and human factors research has shown that most errors are caused 
by defects in the system (Leape, 1997; Reason, 2000). Examples of these system 
defects are design failures (process, task and equipment design) and organization and 
environmental failures (psychological precursors, team building and training) (Cuschieri, 
2006; Leape, 1997; Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; Reason, 2000; Verdaasdonk, 
Stassen, Widhiasmara, & Dankelman, 2009; Vicente, 2006).
Today’s OTs become even more complex systems that are comparable to other high-
tech, high-risk industries such as aviation, nuclear, oil and offshore industry (Helmreich, 
2000; Mishra, Catchpole, Dale, & McCulloch, 2008; Sexton, Thomas, & Helmreich, 2000). 
The increased use of more complex equipment (instruments and apparatus) and the 
growing complexity and continuing developments in surgical procedures, demands that 
knowledge and skills of the entire operating theatre team (OT-team; surgeons, nurses, 
anaesthetists, assistants and residents) should increase accordingly (Cleary & Kinsella, 
2004; Clemensen, Larsen, Kyng, & Kirkevold, 2007b; Healey, Undre, & Vincent, 2006; 
Makary et al., 2006; Undre, Sevdalis, Healey, Darzi, & Vincent, 2006; Verdaasdonk et 
al., 2007). Furthermore, the OT-team should be more actively involved during surgery 
(Healey et al., 2006; Undre et al., 2006).
Although other industries have already introduced quality systems decades ago, these 
existing systems have to be adapted for optimal use in the healthcare sector. Besides 
improving the safety of equipment, literature shows that many underlying causes of 
errors originate on the system’s ‘team level’ (Healey et al., 2006; Mishra et al., 2008). 
Within the team level it is estimated that 70-80% of errors are caused by insufficient 
non-technical skills (e.g. communication, situation awareness, teamwork) rather than 
insufficient technical skills (e.g. knowledge of anatomy and pathology, dexterity, hand-
eye coordination) (Cuschieri, 2006; Helmreich, 2000; Leonard et al., 2004; Makary et al., 
2006; Mishra et al., 2008; Sexton et al., 2000; World Health Organization, 2008; Yule, 
Flin, Paterson-Brown, & Maran, 2006).
A proven method for improving these non-technical skills in aviation that has been 
applied in healthcare recently, is crew resource management (CRM) (Cuschieri, 2006; 
Helmreich, 2000; Leonard et al., 2004; McGreevy & Otten, 2007; Sexton et al., 2000). 
This CRM-concept encompasses a wide range of knowledge, skills and attitudes 
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including communication, situation awareness, problem solving, decision-making and 
teamwork. Furthermore, the CRM-concept also includes team training, simulations and 
development of checklists, briefings (time out procedure) and debriefings (Cuschieri, 
2006; Helmreich, 2000; Leonard et al., 2004; McGreevy & Otten, 2007). Rather than 
introducing the whole CRM-concept at once, it was decided to introduce a Time 
Out Procedure plus a Debriefing procedure (TOPplus) as the first step (Leape, 1997; 
McGreevy & Otten, 2007).
The Time Out Procedure (TOP) is the final step in a series of checks, which starts 
when the patient leaves the clinical ward. This double-check is performed in OT just 
before incision with the whole OT-team being present.(Leonard et al., 2004; Makary et 
al., 2006) In the debriefing, just before closing the wound, ‘incidents’ occurred during 
surgery are reported (Leonard et al., 2004). These data provide a reliable base for a 
reporting system, which in turn provides the ability to learn from failures and enhance 
patient safety (Helmreich, 2000). If incidents are reported, analysis might show similarities 
and patterns in sources of risk that may otherwise go unnoticed (Leonard et al., 2004; 
World Health Organization, 2005(p.3)).
The final TOPplus will be supported by two applications: a Procedure Support Ap-
plication for the TOP and a Feedback Application for the Debriefing (Figure 5.1). The 
Procedure Support Application should support the discussion within the OT-team of 
the double-check of patient and procedure related factors that are important to prevent 
errors. The Feedback Application should support the discussion and reporting of patient, 
procedure, team and communication related details. This Feedback Application should 
then sent (e.g. weekly) its feedback to the surgical staff.
	  Figure.5.1 | Overview of the applications to support the Time Out Procedure and Debriefing
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Both applications aim to improve the non-technical skills ‘communication’ and ‘team-
work’ within the whole OT-team and reduce errors. The final applications will present 
their content and data by means of monitor screens in OT, enabling all team members 
to participate in both the TOP and Debriefing. As this user interface thus becomes the 
connection between man and instruments, it has to be designed adequately. Especially 
in OT, it is important that the interface is intuitive to the team members, i.e. does not 
take too much time to understand and only addresses relevant items that are necessary 
at a specific moment (Degani & Wiener, 1993; Johnson, Johnson, & Zhang, 2005). This 
makes the content of both applications very important (Degani & Wiener, 1993; Johnson 
et al., 2005; Verdaasdonk et al., 2009).
As all team members have to work with the applications, they should all be involved 
in the design process (Cuschieri, 2006; Verdaasdonk et al., 2009). Therefore, the ‘Par-
ticipatory Design’ approach has been used. Participatory Design (PD) actively supports 
multi-disciplinary user participation and engagement into the design process, leading 
to a designed product that meets the users’ specific needs (Namioka & Rao, 1996). 
Their input is important in order to reach good situation awareness on specifications 
of the design and the restrictions of the environment, enable development of realistic 
expectations and reduce resistance to change (Clemensen et al., 2007b; Namioka & 
Rao, 1996; Vimarlund, Eriksson, & Timpka, 2001).
The aim of this study consisted of three parts: designing the TOP and Debriefing 
(TOPplus) by means of PD, testing the design’s content and usability and evaluating if 
PD was an appropriate method for designing the TOPplus.
5.2 Design of TOPplus
In order to design, test and evaluate TOPplus, the model presented in Figure 5.2 was 
followed (see following paragraphs).
Content
Time Out Procedure (TOP)
Preceding the demand of the Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate that each Dutch hospital 
has to perform a ‘time out procedure’ before each surgical procedure (starting 1 July 
2009), we started with the first step – analysis - in September 2007. The content of the 
‘time out procedure’ was derived from several reports and expert opinions. The most 
contributing factors were:
- Universal Protocol by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Orga-
nizations (JCAHO). The protocol was based on three primary components: (1) the 
pre-operative verification process, (2) marking the operative site and (3) taking a ‘time 
out procedure’ immediately before starting the procedure, verifying patient, side and 
procedure (Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations, 2003).
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- Time out procedure of the ‘Eye Hospital, Rotterdam’. This procedure was introduced 
in 2004 and is part of a series of checks. The time out just before incision entails 
verifying whether the patient is positioned on the right table, name and date of birth 
of the patient, patient’s health status, operative side, procedure and whether all 
equipment and material is present. The introduction in 2004 of the time out reduced 
their wrong site incidents to zero.
- General Guidelines for designing checklist (Degani & Wiener, 1993).
- Opinions of experts: surgeons, nurse anaesthetists, an anaesthetist, scrub nurses, 
a human factors specialist/technician, head of the OT department, managers and 
researchers.
Furthermore, a taskforce was assembled; the design-expert-team. This team consisted 
of two surgeons, a nurse/ educational scientist, an anaesthetist, a psychologist, a 
Figure 5.2 | Model for designing, testing and evaluating TOPplus
Source: Adapted from Eekels and Roozenburg (1991)
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human factors specialist/ technician, heads of two OT departments and researchers. 
All members met during the kick-off meeting in September 2007 where the content of 
TOPplus was determined. Hereafter, the design-expert-team communicated mainly 
via email or meetings where most members were present. The researchers (LW, CD) 
coordinated this process.
Debriefing
Errors on incidents that occur during surgery are often not discussed as substantial 
pressure still exists to cover up mistakes (Sexton et al., 2000). However, in order to learn 
from errors made and prevent similar errors in the future, a debriefing was added to the 
procedure (McGreevy & Otten, 2007). For the design of a surgical debriefing little literature 
was available at the moment of design (McGreevy & Otten, 2007). It was decided with 
the design-expert-team to pilot the debriefing simply by asking, “Were there any details 
to be registered” and also ask for a summary of the details in the conclusion.
Design
Before designing the actual applications, the content was first structured in a poster. 
Advantages of this approach are that people feel less obstructed to change items (high 
adaptability), less costs are involved with restructuring elements and it is highly reliable 
(Johnson et al., 2005; Powsner, Wyatt, & Wright, 1998; Verdaasdonk et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, not all OT’s have appropriate infrastructure to view the applications yet.
In September 2007, the basic TOPplus poster (Figure 5.3 was designed with the 
design-expert-team (Step 2, Figure 5.2) (Clemensen et al., 2007b). Here, the ‘call-do-
response’ method, based on checklists used in aviation, was used (Degani & Wiener, 
1993). Team members have to verify (cross-check) that an action was taken. This way 
all team members are involved and all items are checked systematically.
The coloured bars and corresponding bullets preceding the questions, indicated 
the team member who has to ask the question. The purpose of the questions was to 
engage in dialogue between team members and was not intended to memorise the 
questions (Degani & Wiener, 1993). The bullets at the end of each line indicated the 
team member(s) who should answer the question. The team members answering the 
questions are the ones responsible for specific tasks directly related to the surgical 
procedure. The anaesthetist and nurse anaesthetist were assigned to the same questions 
and answers. Due to Dutch working structures, the anaesthetist supervises two beds 
and in his absence the nurse anaesthetist takes over.
The colours used are the basic corporate design colours of the Erasmus University 
Medical Centre.
The TOP was initiated when all team members were present in OT, just before the first 
incision (Verdaasdonk et al., 2009). Because the TOP is a double-check, the patient did 
not have an active role, as (s)he could already be under anaesthesia or pre-medicated 
in addition to a regional block anaesthesia (Makary et al., 2006).
The Debriefing had to take place just before closing the wound, as in academic and 
most teaching hospitals the supervising surgeon will then leave OT. The surgeon initiated 
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the debriefi ng and all team members were invited to randomly comment (both positive 
and negative) on the surgical process, on communication and teamwork, the TOPplus 
procedure itself, or other striking events.
5.3 Materials and Methods: testing content and usability 
and evaluating PD approach
Participants
Five hospitals volunteered to participate in the pilot phase of this study: an academic 
hospital, two teaching hospitals and two community hospitals.
In each hospital the content of the poster was discussed with representatives of the 
OT-team; the hospital-expert-team (Clemensen et al., 2007b). This hospital-expert-team 
Figure 5.3 | TOPplus basic poster very fi rst prototype
Participatory Design: Implementation of Time Out and Debriefing in the Operating Theatre | Chapter 5
89
could adjust the content of the basic TOPplus poster to local needs when considered 
necessary (Step 2, Figure 5.2). They, in turn, engaged their staff and explained the 
project’s aim and use of the poster to all team members by means of meetings and/
or presentations. Furthermore, all participants received a letter with more detailed 
information. Each hospital decided, which department(s) would start the TOPplus project.
Method
In the third step – test (Figure 5.2) – each hospital had to perform the TOPplus, as 
described on the poster, for at least 100 surgical procedures. This testing had to be 
performed and supervised by each local hospital-expert-team itself. During the TOPplus 
the nurse anaesthetist observed and registered the following aspects:
• Was the TOP/ Debriefing performed? – Yes/ No: why not?
• How long did it take to perform the TOP/Debriefing?
• Did the designated team member ask and answer the questions in the TOP/Debrief-
ing? – Yes/ No: why not?
• During the TOP, were the questions asked as stated on the poster? – Yes/No: in what 
way?
• Did all team members participate in the TOP? – Yes/No: who (function) did not 
participate and why?
• The remarks/incidents mentioned by the different team members in the Debriefing.
Evaluation with the hospital-expert-team
In the fourth step – Evaluate (Figure 5.2) – the design’s content and usability was 
evaluated with the design-expert-team and the hospital-expert-teams by means of 
interactive discussions. Additional comments and remarks were discussed. When 
considered necessary, the basic TOPplus poster and procedure were adapted, leading 
back to re-designing the TOPplus poster (step 2 Figure 5.2)
5.4 Results
Although all hospitals started the project, community hospital C2 stopped after one 
day due to resistance of the surgical staff. Reasons mentioned were: “this TOP is too 
time-consuming”, “publication of the results could endanger the hospital’s image”, “the 
TOP is a double-check, but we do not have a check yet” and “the TOP will probably lead 
to more errors; current processes are already well organised”.
The other four hospitals did complete the pilot phase. The ambulatory care department 
of the academic hospital (A2) was analysed separately. In total 627 registration forms 
were obtained. Table 9.1 presents the participating departments, response and start 
date of the TOPplus for each hospital.
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Time Out Procedure (TOP)
The TOP was followed completely in 506 surgical procedures (81%), partially in 16 (2%) 
and not at all in 31 cases (5%). Documentation was missing for 74 procedures (12%). 
The main reasons for non-compliance with the TOP protocol were:
- The surgeon does not fully cooperate; he does not see the ‘added value’ in performing 
a TOP (n=9).
- There was no time; the surgeon was in a hurry (n=4).
- The team members forgot to perform the TOP (n=4).
Duration TOP
On average, the TOP took 96 seconds (STDEV = 63 seconds) (A1: 97 ± 56 sec; A2: 90 
± 61 sec; T1: 99 ± 67 sec; T2: 104 ± 74 sec; C1: 86 ± 60 sec).
Coordination of procedure by designated team member
This part of the registration form was completed for 596 procedures (partly) performed. 
Table 5.2 shows that in most cases, 57.9%-76.3%, the designated team member 
asked the questions. Differences in a team member asking a question other than the 
one indicated on the poster were minor and also improved during the course of the 
implementation. If the designated team member did not ask the question, other team 
members took the initiative.
Questions A to I were predominately answered by the designated team member 
(64.1-90.3%). The answer to question J was often not recorded (39.6%). However if 
answered, the nurse and (nurse) anaesthetist answered question J as intended (37.4% 
and 20.1% respectively). In cases where a team member other than the designated one 
answered the question, most of the time the surgeon answered.
Compliance with procedure as described on poster
In 422 cases the questions were asked according to the poster (70.0%). In 87 cases 
it was unknown and in 25 cases only the team member answering the question was 
reported. In the remaining 62 cases a different way of questioning was followed, such as:
Table 5.1 | Participating departments, response and start date TOPplus
Hospital type
Code Department Number of 
Registration forms
Start date
Academic A1 All 150 2 July 2008
Academic A2 Ambulatory care 100 2 July 2008
Teaching T1 Surgery 180 16 October 2007
Teaching T2 Surgery 97 16 July 2008
Non-academic C1 Gynaecology 100 7 January 2008
Non-academic C2 All Stopped 1 June 2008
Total 627
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- The questions were shortened or summarised (n=12),
- The surgeon asked and answered all questions (n=8),
- Some questions were skipped (n=7),
- The surgeon did not cooperate (n=6) and
- A different, not reported way was used (n=15).
Participation of team members
During most procedures (n=378) all team members participated in the TOP. In 119 cases 
no additional information was given on team members’ participation. During the remain-
ing 99 surgical procedures where TOP was performed, one or more team members did 
not participate. In total, 143 team members did not participate: 15 surgeons, 19 nurses, 
93 anaesthetists, 1 anaesthetist in training, 14 nurse anaesthetists and 1 unidentified 
person. The high number of anaesthetists not participating was mainly the result of work-
ing structures, as (s)he was not present in OT at that specific moment. This was already 
foreseen in the design; the poster states that the anaesthetist or nurse anaesthetist has 
to ask or answer the question. Of the 143 team members not participating, 13 did not 
want to participate (6 surgeons, 1 nurse, 3 anaesthetists and 3 nurse anaesthetists).
Debriefing
The Debriefing was performed completely in 341 cases. The nurse anaesthetist explicitly 
reported six cases in which the Debriefing was not followed; team members forgot to 
debrief (n=4), or most team members had already left OT (n=2).
Table 5.2 | Percentages of team members asking and answering the questions during the TOP
Question [%]
Asked by: Start A B C D E F G H I J
Surgeon 68.1 7.7 76.3 74.7 73.5 7.9 7.4 71.1 73.8 74.0 73.8
(Nurse) Anaesthetist 5.9 73.0 6.7 6.7 6.4 15.4 13.4 6.4 6.2 5.9 5.5
Scrub nurse 3.7 1.8 2.0 1.5 1.3 62.8 57.9 2.2 1.2 0.8 2.0
Missing data 22.3 17.4 14.9 17.1 18.8 13.9 21.3 20.3 18.8 19.3 18.6
Answer to question [%]
Answered by: Start A B C D E F G H I J
Surgeon 5.9 83.9 6.5 3.0 5.4 90.3 83.2 4.0 3.9 2.9 2.9
(Nurse) Anaesthetist 64.1 6.5 87.9 88.4 83.1 3.5 2.3 85.9 86.9 85.6 20.1
Scrub nurse 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.2 1.5 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 37.4
Missing data 29.7 8.9 4.9 8.2 11.4 4.7 13.4 9.9 9.1 11.6 39.6
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Duration Debriefing
The duration of the Debriefing was recorded in all hospitals except hospital T1. On 
average the Debriefing took 58 seconds (STDEV = 58 sec) (A1: 68 ± 59 sec; A2: 73 ± 
83 sec; T2: 54 ± 35 sec; C1: 30 ± 28 sec). However, there was a significant difference in 
duration of the Debriefing between the three locations. In the ambulatory care department 
of the academic hospital (A2, Average: 1.2 minutes) the Debriefing took more than twice 
as long as in the gynaecology department of the community hospital (C1, Average: 0.5 
minutes). As with the TOP no particular reason was indicated.
Only hospitals A1, A2 and T2 recorded if the designated team member asked and 
answered the questions. However, this part of the registration form was often (30.9-
61.0%) not filled out (Table 5.3). The remaining data show that the designated team 
member asked and answered the questions.
Coordination of procedure by designated team member
Remarks/incidents
During the Debriefing 228 details were recorded. Seventy details encompassed ‘TOP 
remarks’ (general remarks on the procedure) e.g. TOP not performed, Debriefing partly 
or not performed, registration forms not completed. Twenty-three of these ‘TOP remarks’ 
concerned the design or content of the TOPplus poster. For the TOP this entailed:
- Add questions concerning: patient’s allergies (n=7), previous surgeries (n=2), pros-
thesis (n=2), blood type (n=1), catheter inserted (n=1), lab test on drug resistant 
bacteria  (n=2), medication (to be) given (n=1), availability of charts (n=2) and duration 
of procedure (n=1).
- Phrasing: replace ‘epidural’ with ‘regional anaesthesia’ (n=1).
- Some questions seem to be superfluous and other questions have to be added for 
specific procedures (n=5).
Question [%]
Asked by: Details Summary
Surgeon 60.4 36.7
(Nurse) Anaesthetist 6.7 2.1
Scrub nurse 1.2 0.3
Missing data 31.7 61.0
Answer to question [%]
Answered by: Details Summary
Surgeon 23.6 44.9
(Nurse) Anaesthetist 24.3 0.3
Scrub nurse 21.2 0.9
Missing data 30.9 54.0
Table 5.3 | Percentages of team members asking and answering the questions during the Debriefing
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- Question E ‘Which intra operative measures are necessary’ is unclear (n=1).
For the Debriefi ng, this entailed adding questions concerning: teamwork (n=1), surgical 
process (n=1) and postoperative measures (n=1).
Furthermore, one general comment was made: “The fact that everyone should ask a 
question seems disorderly, but I guess I have to get accustomed to this”.
Of the remaining 158 remarks, nine positive remarks were made, such as good 
communication and teamwork and surgeon timely present.
Figure 5.4 presents the classifi cation of the remaining 149 remarks. Fifty-one percent 
(n=76) entailed aspects relating to the non-technical skills communication and teamwork, 
leadership and situation awareness. The most frequent mentioned remarks are described 
below (for defi nitions see University of Aberdeen, 2006 (University of Aberdeen., 2006).
• Communication and teamwork: Lacking information on patient characteristics, 
surgical day schedule, necessary equipment and surgical approach (n=21).
• Leadership: The surgeon does not (take the initiatives to) perform the TOP adequately 
(n=13) and the surgeon is too late (n=2).
• Situation awareness: The TOP was not performed adequately (n=11), the patient was 
not prepared adequately (e.g. markings, positioning) (n=8) and information in charts 
and on the computer was incorrect or missing (n=8).
Another substantial part of the remarks entailed the instruments/material. Of the 25 
remarks, 15 report defects and four report incomplete instruments/ material.
Evaluation with the hospital-expert-team and adaptation of the poster by means 
of PD techniques
As a fi rst step in the PD-process, before starting TOPplus in OT, the basic TOPplus 
poster was discussed in interactive discussions with the hospital-expert-teams (Step 
2, fi gure 5.2). All hospitals decided to use the poster in the pilot phase without any 
alterations.
Figure 5.4 | Classifi cation of the 158 remarks concerning the procedure (anaesthetic, surgical), the instruments 
or non-technical skills
Chapter 5 | Participatory Design: Implementation of Time Out and Debriefing in the Operating Theatre 
94
Following the pilot, a report was drawn up, describing all relevant items as discussed 
in the paragraphs above. After testing TOPplus, interactive discussions were conducted 
with the hospital-expert-team, asking them if the results portrayed the situation accu-
rately (Step 4, Figure 5.2). Most of the results were in line with their experiences. However, 
although they knew errors happened, team members were sometimes surprised by the 
amount of identical errors mentioned in the Debriefing.
Table 5.4 | Adaptations to basic TOPplus posters
Hospital Question T1 T2 T3
→ Start Time Out √ √ √
A. Name of the patient? √ √ √
B. Date of birth of the patient?
√
Add: Patient ID 
number & date of 
birth; check with 
wristband
√
C. ASA classification? ≥2 explain √ √ √
Will it influence the procedure?
√ Add: Allergies
Add: Blood type, 
rhesus factor, 
anaesthetic details
D. How many packed cells are 
ordered?
X √ Moved to C
E Which procedure are we 
performing
√ √ √
According to which protocol? X X X
Is the patient positioned
adequately?
√ √
√
What are the critical moments? √ √ √
Which intra-operative measures 
are necessary?
√ X X
F. Which side will be operated on? √ √ Moved to E
G. Which type of anaesthesia? √ √ √
Did the epidural work? X √ √
H. Are antibiotics administered? If 
yes, explain
√ √ Moved to C
I. Are anticoagulants administered? 
If yes, explain.
Moved to C √ Moved to C
J. Are instruments & apparatus in 
working order?
√ √ √
√ question kept as if
X question deleted
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Important items for redesigning the poster were the data on ‘coordination of the pro-
cedure by the designated team member’, ‘compliance with the poster’ and the remarks 
on the TOPplus design. Also the incidents mentioned in the Debriefi ng were important 
as in case identical incidents occurred rather frequently, it could be advantageous to 
add these (temporally) to the poster to improve situation awareness.
The results showed that most questions were asked and answered as stated on the 
poster by the designated team member. The hospital-expert-teams of hospitals T1, T2 
and C1 confi rmed this, so there was no need to change the basic structure of the poster. 
However, the hospital-expert-team of hospital A (1&2) adapted the designated team 
member asking the questions, as they felt the current way of questioning/answering 
was counterintuitive and disruptive. It was decided to assign the nurse anaesthetist as 
designated team member for asking the questions. As a result, questions where the 
nurse anaesthetist was supposed to answer, the anaesthetist took over (see Figure 5.5).
Further evaluation of the remarks and incidents mentioned in the Debriefi ng resulted in 
deleting some questions, which were considered irrelevant and adding some questions 
Figure 5.5 | Redesign TOPplus poster for hospital A1&2
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which were not addressed in the TOP, but perceived as being important in a specific 
local context of hospitals T1, T2 and C1. The most important adjustments for hospitals 
T1, T2 and C1 are presented in Table 5.4.
Another point of interest discussed with the hospital-expert-teams was when to 
perform the TOP; just before incision or before administering total or local anaesthesia? 
Hospitals T1, T2 and C1 decided to keep the original moment of the TOP (just before inci-
sion), as all team members are present in OT and able to participate. In order to prevent 
incidents to occur however, they developed multi-disciplinary checklists carried out by 
two or more professionals during the transfer moments in the pre-operative process.
Rather than developing pre-operative checklists, hospital A decided to split the TOP 
into two parts (Figure 5.5), as the results of the Debriefing showed that a significant 
part of the incidents (e.g. postponement of surgery, extra anaesthesia, repositioning 
the patient) could possibly be avoided if the TOP would take place before anaesthesia.
Finally, another interesting point discussed with the hospital-expert-teams was related 
to the registration of the ‘incidents’. The recorded incidents showed that a more detailed 
registration was necessary for adequate action. Therefore, all hospitals adapted the 
registration, creating four categories, as these incidents were the most frequent reported: 
incidents related to surgery, anaesthesiology, materials & instruments and communica-
tion & teamwork Figure 5.5).
5.5 Discussion
In order to reduce incidents and improve non-technical skills it was decided to design 
and implement the TOP and Debriefing, one of the items of the CRM-concept, as the 
first step (Leape, 1997; McGreevy & Otten, 2007). This is important to create a fertile 
ground for other initiatives, such as team training and the introduction of checklist. 
Starting with TOPplus also provided team members with information about the whole 
peri-operative phase and created awareness about the gaps in information transfer 
between team members and departments.
The first aim of this study was to design the TOPplus by means of participatory design 
(PD). Designing the basic TOPplus poster proved to be valuable and relatively fast and 
easy as the content was more or less provided. However, assigning the questions to 
the designated team members required the opinion of field experts. This resulted in 
most team member’s tasks feeling appropriated and intuitive. This was also confirmed 
during the presentation in the participating hospitals. Here, the team members were 
invited to ask questions or post remarks on this basic TOPplus design. However, most 
comments were related to the duration and when to perform the TOP and Debriefing 
and not to the design.
The second aim was to test the design’s content and usability. During the pilots a large 
amount of registration forms was not (completely) filled out. This was probably caused 
by the high workload of the nurse anaesthetists. However, the recorded data showed 
that the TOPplus poster design was mostly used as intended and most team members 
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participated in the process. Most hospitals only changed the order or the phrasing of 
the questions. However, hospital A also changed the designated team member asking 
the questions and the moment of performing the TOP. The second version of the TOP 
of hospital A seems similar to the first two parts, ‘sign in’ and ‘time out, of the recently 
published ‘Surgical Safety Checklist’ of the WHO (World Health Organization, 2008).
When to perform the TOP was also subject to discussion in the other hospitals. 
However, they chose to keep the original moment of the TOP, as all team members would 
be able to be present in OT. However, they are now developing pre-operative checks 
(similar to check 1 of the WHO) to safeguard the process before induction of anaesthesia. 
Changing the moment of the TOP will also require changes in other routine procedures 
e.g. the surgeon now has to be present before anaesthesia and has to bridge the time 
in the surgical department between the start of anaesthesia and incision. This means 
that the workflow and the work environment have to change accordingly (e.g. providing 
extra computers to perform administrative work during waiting).
The Debriefing was relatively undefined first, which probably explains the large amount 
of missing data for this part. Furthermore, this part of the registration could also be 
forgotten due to daily routines or activities to be performed by the nurse anaesthetist 
after the procedure. The results also showed a difference in duration of the Debriefing 
for the different hospitals. A logical explanation might be the number of people present 
in OT as of teaching aspects and the fact that new people (residents, assistants) join 
the OT-team regularly. This might influence the time it takes for new work procedures to 
become a standard operating procedure. Another explanation might be the procedure’s 
complexity, where standard protocols are not applicable.
During the Debriefing many details were (self) reported in contrast to the official error 
reporting systems, which only included incidents leading to direct patient harm. It 
seems that the threshold for reporting these details in the Debriefing was relatively low, 
partly caused by the ‘pilot’ character (without punishment) of the study (Leape, 1997). 
Performing a Debriefing is important, since this is the part in which (small) defects in 
the procedure can be expressed and reported, providing insight in the ‘errors’ made. 
Furthermore, reporting makes it more visible for other people and departments and 
it enables quantitative analysis (Cuschieri, 2006; World Health Organization, 2005). 
Reducing reported incidents could improve the operative process, as they often are 
relatively easy to solve, e.g. instrument related details, administration of antibiotics, 
surgical site infection (de Vries, Hollmann, Smorenburg, Gouma, & Boermeester, 2009; 
Haynes et al., 2009; Verdaasdonk et al., 2007).
In this study, most incidents mentioned during the debriefing were related to ‘surgery’, 
‘anaesthesia’ and/or ‘instruments’. Seeing that the TOPplus project focuses on reducing 
non-technical skills, ‘team and communication’ was added. The hospital-expert-teams 
and the design-expert-team therefore decided during the interactive discussions to add 
these four items to the Debriefing in order to remind the OT-team on reporting these 
incidents. The Debriefing is also comparable to the third part, the ‘sign out’, of the 
‘Surgical Safety Checklist’ (World Health Organization, 2008). Moreover, future evaluation 
by means of case studies with the hospital-expert-teams will provide information if these 
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four items are sufficient for reporting incidents. However, the registration in this study 
already provided valuable input for designing pre- and postoperative checks. Therefore, 
TOPplus acted as a catalyst for improving and checking the care process.
The final aim was to evaluate whether PD was an appropriate method for designing the 
TOPplus. PD proved to support situation awareness on design’s specifications and the 
restrictions of the environment and enabled the development of realistic expectations. 
Most professionals perceived the development of TOPplus as a very good initiative. 
Especially the ability to discuss the questions and adapt the content subsequently was 
much appreciated. Making small changes and making TOPplus, context-specific is an 
important condition for establishing commitment and support of all parties involved, 
as ambulatory care, clinical care and some specific medical specialties have different 
requirements.(Makary et al., 2006; Verdaasdonk et al., 2009) The poster and later the 
applications, should provide a template including basic questions (an ‘in-addition-to’ 
format). Hospitals and departments should then adapt the poster: add specific ques-
tions and topics relating to their local context and wishes. The questions on the poster 
should be ‘owned’ by all team members. However, the adaptations have to fit the 
original design: the TOP is a double-check, all team members have to be present and 
open questions have to be asked. Having a hospital specific design also contributes 
to a higher acceptance of this design. Other factors contributing to the acceptance is 
good communication (both presentations and documentation) before implementation 
and enthusiasm of local hospital-expert-teams. This resulted in a relative high rate of 
participation; only 13 team members did not participate during the pilot.
Another advantage of PD is the reduction of resistance to change. In most hospitals 
this was the case, as besides the basic design developed by the design-expert-team, 
the hospital-expert-team could also adapt the poster. This eliminated the resistance 
caused by ‘not designed here’. Although at first 13 team members did not participate, it 
is expected that they will participate once working with the context-specific procedures. 
Nevertheless, PD proved to be insufficient for one hospital to fully implement the 
TOPplus, as they did not finish the pilot. However, although TOPplus was not fully 
implemented at that moment, it started the dialogue between all surgical staff involved. 
In addition, it also acted as a catalyst for designing the pre-operative checks first, before 
further developing the double-check (TOP).
The content and usability of the TOPplus proved feasible. Designing the procedure 
and content by means of the poster first proved advantageous, as the low costs enabled 
a fast introduction of the TOPplus. Now the next step is to design the applications 
using the PD approach, starting with digitalising the poster’s content for performing the 
TOPplus (Johnson, 2005). Expected advantages of digitalisation will be, the automatic 
registration of duration of the TOP and Debriefing, built in barriers that prevent the 
procedure to be started before all necessary information and equipment is available 
and (double) checked, integration with the patient’s electronic patient records, improve 
data collection and the ability to design procedure specific TOPs and Debriefings (de 
Vries et al., 2009; Helmreich, 2000; van Lier, 2008; Verdaasdonk et al., 2009). However, 
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the ultimate goal of this instrument is to reduce incidents in the peri-operative period 
and thereby improve patient safety.
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6.1 Introduction
Patient Safety Practices (PSPs) are too often implemented without adaptations to ad-
dress the needs of professionals or the characteristics of the local context (Bogner, 2003; 
Gennari, Weng, & Benedetti, 2005; Kohn, 2000; Leape et al., 2009; Vicente, 2006). PSPs 
are interventions, strategies or approaches used to prevent and mitigate unintended 
consequences of healthcare delivery and improve patient safety (Dy et al., 2011; Foy 
et al., 2011). PSPs are typically introduced by a small, disciplinarily limited group of 
professionals and consequently do not support all professional disciplines in their daily 
practices. As a result, PSPs are not always regarded as meaningful and are not fully 
adopted (Buchanan et al., 2005; Leape et al., 2009). Furthermore, the contextual features 
(organisational characteristics, policies or types of care) that influence the effectiveness 
of PSPs vary across healthcare settings and require different implementation strategies 
(Taylor et al., 2011). Most PSPs, involve changes in the clinical process and adaptation 
of individual work routines and behaviours (Batalden & Splaine, 2002; Foy et al., 2011). 
Changing behaviours involves learning new behaviours and unlearning old routines, 
which is often hampered by existing behaviours, such as hierarchical positions, fear of 
the unknown, or lack of awareness (Rushmer & Davies, 2004). Therefore, PSPs should 
be flexible and adaptable and include strategies for improving learning and unlearning.
Most initiatives to improve care delivery processes require a high degree of cooperation 
within and between teams (Berwick & Nolan, 1998; Bogner, 2003; Ferlie & Shortell, 
2001). Most patients are now treated by multidisciplinary teams of professionals, 
supported by a team of administrative personnel and using sophisticated technology 
(Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001). This requires the active engagement of all involved, to 
allow PSPs to be adapted to the organisational context and to the needs of healthcare 
professionals (Gennari et al., 2005; Keller, 2010; Plsek & Greenhalgh, 2001; Sjoberg 
& Timpka, 1998; Vicente, 2006; Weng, McDonald, Sparks, McCoy, & Gennari, 2007). 
Consequently, implementation strategies should include clinical, organisational and 
behavioural interventions and emphasise interdisciplinary collaboration (Dy et al., 2011; 
Foy et al., 2011).
Looking at existing theoretical concepts for implementation, many emphasise partici-
pation of professionals and discuss the impact of the organisational context (Bogner, 
2003; Grol, 2002). Most concepts present facilitators and barriers, describe the steps for 
implementation and emphasise a system approach. However, these concepts provide 
little information on how to choose the right strategies or on how and when to include 
(particular) healthcare professionals. Also they mostly involve only a limited group of 
professionals in the design and implementation process. Furthermore, there is a real 
danger that by adapting PSPs, their essential features are lost and they become less 
effective. According to Greenhalgh et al. (2004), a more theory-driven, process-oriented, 
participatory approach is needed (Greenhalgh, Robert, & Bate, 2004). Foy et al. (2011) 
has recommended combining implementation strategies from different theoretical 
domains (Foy et al., 2011). Therefore, the present study combines two theoretical 
concepts: Participatory Design (PD) from Industrial Design Engineering to structure the 
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design and implementation process and Experiential Learning (EL) from Organisational 
Learning to structure the learning process. PD engages a limited group of end-users 
in the design process in a structured, efficient and safe way, leading to an improved 
user-oriented design (Gennari et al., 2005; Pilemalm & Timpka, 2008; Weng et al., 2007). 
To expand the design process to a learning process for all professionals involved, PD is 
combined with EL. EL emphasises the value of learning cycles, where knowledge can 
be created and recreated through experience and reflection at individual and at team 
level. In this way professionals are able to adapt the PSP and make it effective in their 
own local situation (Kolb, 1984; Kolb & Boyatzis, 1999).
The aim of this study is to explore whether a model combining PD and EL supports 
the design, implementation and team learning process. This study focuses on the 
introduction of a PSP in hospital surgical care, namely the so-called Time Out Procedure 
combined with a Debriefing (TOPplus).
In surgical care, more than 50% of patients are harmed by preventable errors (Bruijne 
de, Zegers, Hoonhout, & Wagner, 2007; Cuschieri, 2006). Almost 70% of these errors, 
result from a lack of standardized procedures and protocols, inadequate coordination 
of care and poor communication and teamwork (Bogner, 2003; “Preoperatief traject 
ontbeert multidisciplinaire  en gestandaardiseerde aanpak en teamvorming,” 2007; 
Reason, 2000; Wolff, Boermeester, Janssen, Pols, & Damen, 2010). Previous research 
has suggested two specific procedures to increase safety in the operating theatre (OT): 
a Time Out Procedure (TOP), a double-check that takes place immediately before the 
surgical intervention and a Debriefing (plus) to be held before skin closure (de Vries et 
al., 2010; Haynes et al., 2009; Wauben et al., 2010). TOPplus is a complex intervention 
that affects professional behaviour and interferes with clinical processes. To improve 
adoption among team members, the implementation process should include design 
(and redesign) strategies and plans for experimenting, learning and making benefits 
observable (Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane, Bate, & Kyriakidou, 2004). Although 
introduction of TOPplus allows detection and correction of errors (single-loop learning), it 
may also necessitate changes in other clinical processes to prevent errors (double-loop 
learning) (Argyris, 1999a). Therefore, team learning is required.
6.2 Theoretical background
This study combines two theoretical concepts: PD - Participatory Design (Foy et al., 
2011; Pilemalm & Timpka, 2008) and EL - Experiential Learning (Kolb & Boyatzis, 1999; 
Sjoberg & Timpka, 1998).
Participatory Design (PD) - Structure the Design and Implementation 
process
PD was developed to actively involve end-users in the design and decision-making 
processes (Gennari et al., 2005; Pilemalm & Timpka, 2008; Scott, Mannion, Davies, 
& Marshall, 2003; Scott, Mannion, Marshall, & Davies, 2003; Sjoberg & Timpka, 1998; 
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Weng et al., 2007). The PD process consists of four primary steps: Design, Test, Evaluate 
and Redesign. During this process, a small group of experts and end-users develops a 
prototype and another group of end-users is invited to provide feedback to improve the 
design and the usability of the product. To prevent the loss of essential features, experts 
safeguard the basic product criteria. For the time out procedure these included questions 
to prevent wrong side, wrong person and wrong surgical intervention. Research has 
shown that PD leads to more user-oriented designs and improves actual usage (Weng 
et al., 2007). Therefore, we assume that applying PD principles structures the design 
and implementation process of PSPs without sacrificing its essential features.
However, research has shown that the use of PD in healthcare fields is scarce and 
occurs only on a small scale, within specific units, with a limited number of profession-
als (Pilemalm & Timpka, 2008). In both Industrial Design Engineering and healthcare, 
professionals often encounter complex and unstable environments. Protocols help 
professionals to respond quickly and adequately to unforeseen changes, but compliance 
with new protocols and procedures can only be achieved if these procedures solve 
problems in the clinical process and if professionals are willing to change individual 
behaviours and work routines. Because new protocols implemented in one depart-
ment or discipline might lead to unintended consequences for other departments or 
disciplines, all professionals should be involved in the learning process of the design 
and implementation iterations (Kolb, 1984; Pilemalm & Timpka, 2008).
Experiential Learning (EL) - Structure the Learning Process
Including all professionals in the learning process requires that special attention be 
paid to individual and team learning during PSP implementation (Carroll & Edmondson, 
2002). To overcome resistance and improve adoption rates, extra time is needed to 
learn from experience and to be able to adapt PSPs to the local context (Shekelle et al., 
2011; Wauben et al., 2010). EL emphasises experience, reflection and learning at the 
individual and organisational level (Kolb, 1984).
EL is defined as ‘The process whereby knowledge is created through the transformation 
of experience’ (Kolb & Boyatzis, 1999). EL includes four steps: Learn, Test, Evaluate, 
Reflect and Learn and Act. Users actively observe their experiences and determine 
whether and how the PSP improves patient safety and how it affects the work environ-
ment (Argyris, 1999b). Therefore, we assume that combining PD with EL principles 
improves the learning process of all professionals involved.
Adaptive Design (AD)
PD and EL are combined in a new implementation model called ‘Adaptive Design’ (AD) 
(see Table 6.1). The AD model blends design and learning cycles in which designers and 
professionals learn as a team and redesign TOPplus in iterations.
The Adaptive Design (AD) model is visualized in Figure 6.1. AD combines several 
design and learning iterations, each consisting of several steps involving three groups 
of participants.
Chapter 6 | Adaptive Design: Theory-driven Implementation of Patient Safety Practices in the Operating Theatre 
108
Table 6.1 | Design Process: Participatory Design – Experiential Learning – Adaptive Design
Process
Participatory
Design (PD)
Experiential
Learning (EL)
Adaptive
Design (AD)
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Adaptation/ 
Adoption
Adoption Adaptation Adoption & Adaptation
Orientation Product Process Product & Process
Design cycle Structured Unstructured Semi-structured
Knowledge Objective
Subjective
> created & recreated
Objective & Subjective
> created & recreated
End product Final Final (uncertain) Provisional
D
es
ig
n 
p
ro
ce
ss
Process
Steps
Design
Test
Evaluate
Redesign
Learn
Experience
Reflect & Learn
Act
Design & Learn
Test & Experience
Evaluate & Reflect/Learn
Redesign & Act
Cycles Iterative Iterative Iterative
User participation
Small, ad hoc
end-user group
End-users chosen at 
random from designated 
group
All end-users from designated 
group
Influence Limited No pre-set limits Adaptable within pre-set limits
Acceptance Early adoption
Adoption varies between 
end-users or user groups
Early adoption by small group, 
increasingly by more users, 
eventually by all end-users
Learning Participating user group
Individuals & teams from 
designated users
All users from designated group: 
individual, team & organisation
End product
One end product for all 
end-users
End product might differ 
between end-users (user 
groups)
Provisional per user group, 
subject to change over time
Figure 6.1 | Adaptive Design Iterations
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Participants
In each hospital, three core groups are actively involved in the design and implementation 
process:
1) the design expert team – a small team of designers and key-users representing 
all disciplines in OT and well informed about national and international rules and 
regulations;
2) the local expert team – a group of users representing all disciplines involved in surgical 
care (surgical, nursing, anaesthesiology, managerial, support staff) and familiar with 
the local context;
3) all OT-team members – all healthcare providers that are directly involved in surgical 
care.
Steps in each iteration
1a. DESIGN & LEARN. The hospital’s local expert team functions as a steering group 
to provide the necessary information on the local context to adapt the prototype (if 
necessary). The design expert team safeguards the basic criteria.
1b. TEST & EXPERIENCE. The prototype is tested by a small group of users to obtain 
feedback on content and usability and possible changes required in clinical pro-
cesses.
1c. EVALUATE, REFLECT & LEARN. The design expert team analyses the registered 
data and presents formal progress reports to the local expert team and all team 
members. Both teams look for additional information that requires revision of the 
basic criteria.
1d. REDESIGN & ACT. The design and local expert team discuss suggestions to redesign 
the prototype to ensure the best possible introduction and define evaluation criteria 
for the TEST & EXPERIENCE step in the second iteration.
To ensure structural evaluation of the procedure following the second iteration, a 
patient safety committee is involved in the decision-making process and replaces the 
design expert team.
6.3 Methods
This study is a multiple-site study that uses participatory action research to explore the 
application of the Adaptive Design model with the design and implementation process 
of TOPplus in OTs of hospitals in the Netherlands. Hospitals were not pre-selected, but 
joined the project voluntarily over time (2008-2009). Fourteen hospitals were included 
in this study: four university hospital locations (U1-4), five teaching hospitals (T1-5) and 
five general hospitals (G1-5). They represent the three main types of Dutch hospitals. 
The four university hospital locations were regarded as separate hospitals because they 
differed in size, patient population, type of care provided and in autonomy in policies, 
working procedures and budget.
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Participatory action research permitted the improvement of PSPs and the gathering 
of empirical data in each iteration, both of which contribute to building a scientifi c 
body of knowledge (Bowling, 2002; Trondsen & Sandaunet, 2009). In participatory 
action research, the researcher has a dual role. At the university hospital locations, the 
researchers (CD/LW) were actively involved as project leaders and thereby attained a 
better understanding of the problems and professionals involved. In the other hospitals, 
the researchers were active as researchers and project advisers.
The TOPplus study included four main phases: 1) the start-up, 2) the pilot to test 
the prototype with one or two disciplines during one hundred surgical interventions, 3) 
implementation on a small scale and 4) implementation hospital-wide. A basic TOPplus 
poster (the prototype) was developed to support team members in performing the 
TOPplus in OT (see Figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2 | Basic TOPplus poster (prototype)
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Preceding the fi rst iteration, a presentation was given providing background information 
on patient safety issues, the TOPplus procedure and the project. All users received 
written information about TOPplus by mail and e-mail. In some hospitals, the researchers 
also met with team members on the work fl oor.
Extra pilots and adaptations to the poster or adding specifi c evaluation criteria were 
discussed and applied when necessary. Two hospitals (U3, T1) were used as pilot loca-
tions to test the AD model and the prototype. After the initial pilot, posters and evaluation 
forms were tested again in each participating hospital and adapted to the local context 
in two or more iterations. To test actual usage and usability of the prototype, four levels 
of infl uence were identifi ed: basic criteria, content, process and layout.
Levels of Inﬂ uence
To visualize the users’ infl uence, the authors developed a model representing the levels 
of infl uence based on (Verschuren & Hartog, 2005) (Figure 6.3).
The level of basic criteria comprised items that should be addressed in the TOP to 
guarantee patient safety. These items were in line with national and international rules and 
regulations set by professional organisations, such as the World Health Organisation, the 
Joint Commission or by scientifi c professional associations (Weiser et al., 2010; Wolff et 
al., 2010). As TOPplus was a team intervention, it was also decided that all professional 
team members directly involved in the surgical intervention should be present. Prior to 
each iteration, developments at national and international level were checked to see if 
the basic criteria needed adaptation.
The content level consisted of questions to exchange critical information about the 
patient and the surgical intervention. Designated team members would ask or answer 
questions. At each iteration team members were invited to give feedback and add, delete 
or rephrase questions, or change the designated team member asking or answering 
questions.
At the process level, the design and local expert teams decided at which moment in 
the surgical intervention the TOP and Debriefi ng should be carried out. Again, at each 
iteration team members could propose changes.
Figure 6.3 | Four levels of users’ infl uence
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At the start of the project the design expert team determined the layout level of the 
posters. Colours, structure and font were functional: the colours represented the different 
medical disciplines, the structure supported the procedure and the font should be easy 
to read from a distance. Following each step, users were free to change the layout. All 
changes were based on consensus after discussing the analysed data from the iterations 
with the local expert team.
Data Collection and Analysis
Applying the AD model to TOPplus resulted in several iterations (Figure 6.1). Preceding 
the development of the first iteration (the start-up), the design expert team outlined the 
prototype for TOPplus using expert opinion and the relevant literature to determine which 
items should be included in the procedure (see Figure 6.2)(de Korne et al., 2011; Wolff 
et al., 2010). For the design of the prototype, see Wauben et al. (2010) and Dekker et al. 
(2009) (Dekker - van Doorn et al., 2009; Wauben et al., 2010). To improve communication 
and teamwork, requirements to emphasise the team aspect of TOPplus were established.
During each iteration, data were gathered on actual usage and usability of TOPplus 
at the four levels of users’ influence:
1. Basic criteria: items added because of external guidelines, regulations or local needs;
2. Content: the sequence of questions, questions added, deleted, or rephrased, the 
team member designated to ask/answer the questions and items discussed in the 
Debriefing;
3. Process: changes in the surgical care process and its effect on documents or 
systems;
4. Layout: colours, font or size of the poster.
To measure all adaptations in the TOPplus procedure and in the surgical process during 
each iteration, (paper) evaluation forms were developed. In the first iteration, testing the 
prototype in one hundred surgical interventions, detailed information was gathered on 
the alterations to adapt TOPplus to the local context. Information included:
- Date and the surgical intervention
- Content of TOPplus: were all questions asked and answered, by the designated team 
member conform to the poster, or by one of the other team members
- Presence and active participation of each team member, if not why
- Duration of both TOP and Debriefing
- Moment in the per-operative process the time out procedure and debriefing were 
performed
- Incidents that occurred during the per-operative procedure. Initially incidents included 
four categories: incidents related to the surgical intervention, to the anaesthetic 
procedure, to lacking or defect of material or instruments and to communication 
and teamwork
- Extra remarks or suggestions for improvement of the content and process of TOPplus, 
could be added
All incidents were included in the formal reports and clustered in the four categories, 
but in this stage not analysed. The data about incidents gathered during the iterations 
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was meant to create awareness and decrease resistance. During the following iterations 
registration included again the date and the surgical intervention, if TOPplus was 
performed according to the redesigned procedure, if all team members participated 
and if not why, the duration of both procedures, incidents in the four categories and 
additional remarks and suggestions.
All data were self-reported and manually registered by one of the OT-team members 
(in most hospitals by the nurse anaesthetist) during or directly following the surgical 
intervention. The researchers (CD/LW) gathered and analysed the data. To validate the 
data and initiate the discussion between team members, both the data and the analysis 
were presented to and discussed with the local expert teams and in most hospitals 
with all team members, following each iteration. The number of feedback moments, 
depended on the number of iterations needed for adaptation and full implementation. 
Again all team members were invited to provide feedback. To inform each involved in 
the design and implementation process, formal progress reports presenting all data and 
the analysis were distributed in hard copy and/or e-mailed to all professionals. Possible 
adaptations that would improve the procedure were discussed and, if approved by the 
majority of team members, implemented. Adaptations related to a specific discipline, 
e.g. Ear Nose Throat (ENT) surgery or Ophthalmology, were discussed with that discipline 
and the involved OT-team members. The adaptations were then tested in a new iteration.
As one of the researchers (LW) redesigned the posters to adapt the procedure as a 
result of the team discussion in the implementation process, all alterations to TOPplus 
and inclusion of more disciplines were carefully monitored
To measure adoption of the design and implementation processes across hospitals, 
data were gathered to determine if TOPplus was implemented hospital-wide in all OTs, 
with each surgical intervention and according to the protocol with all team members 
present and actively participating and not as a tick box exercise. In each hospital, the 
following data were gathered: the sequence and duration of the iterations, the participa-
tion of the disciplines involved and implementation hospital wide.
6.4 Results
Fourteen hospitals introduced TOPplus in their OTs. Almost all of the hospitals adapted 
TOPplus at the content, process and layout levels, but little was changed at the level 
of basic criteria. The results are described at each level of influence; the basic criteria, 
content and process of TOPplus  and the lay out of the poster and for each iteration.
Results at the Basic Criteria Level
In the first iteration (during the first one hundred surgical interventions), all team members 
accepted the basic criteria without deleting or adding items. In the second iteration, 
one hospital (G5) decided to change the TOP format. Rather than asking each other 
questions, the surgeon and anaesthesiologist informed the other team members about 
the patient, the surgical intervention and the anaesthetic intervention. Other team 
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members were invited to crosscheck and ask for additional information, thus keeping 
the team dialogue intact. In the four university hospitals (U1-4), the criterion ‘with all 
team members present’ was adapted by adding that the resident performing the surgical 
intervention could represent the staff surgeon provided he/she was actively involved 
in the intervention.
Results at the Content Level
Alterations following the first iteration were limited to the TOP (see Table 6.2). Some 
questions were irrelevant for small surgical interventions and were deleted, e.g. for 
ambulatory care ‘Did the epidural work?’ was deleted, as this kind of anaesthetic 
procedure is never used in ambulatory care. Some questions were added because of the 
complexity of the surgical intervention (e.g. ‘Are co-practitioners informed?’), the large 
number of people present in OT (e.g. ‘Does everyone know each other?’), or because 
the patients were included in a research project (e.g. ‘Is this a study patient?’).
Following the second iteration, to improve patient handover from OT to recovery, three 
hospitals (T4, T5, G5) added additional questions to the debriefing about post-operative 
care addressing ‘postoperative orders’ or ‘additional diagnostic lab work’. With complex 
interventions, team composition may change during an intervention. Because nurses are 
always present, three hospitals decided that the nurse anaesthetist (T4, G5) or circulating 
nurse (U4) would ask all of the questions.
Table 6.2 | Hospitals making alterations at the Content Level
Questions Start-up Iteration 1 Iteration 2
Questions reordered in
TOP U1, U4, G4
U1, U3, T3, T4, T5, 
G1, G4
T4, T5, G5
DEB - G4 -
Questions added in TOP
U1*, U4*, T4*, T5, G2, 
G4, G5
U1*, U3*, U4, T2*, T3*, 
T4*, T5*, G1*, G2*, G3
U4, T4*
DEB U1, U4, T4 U1*, T2, T3, T5* T4, T5, G5*
Questions deleted in
TOP U1*, U2*, U4*
U1*, U2*, U3*, T2*, T3*, 
T4, T5, G1*, G2, G3*, 
G4*, G5
G5*
DEB - U2, G4 G5*
Questions rephrased in
TOP
U1*, U4*, T4*, T5*, 
G4, G5
U2*, U3*, T2*, T3*, T4*, 
T5*, G1, G3*
U4, T4*, G5*
DEB - T3 T4*, G5*
Procedure
Designated team member 
asking question in
TOP U4* U1*, U3*, U4 U4*, T4*, G5
DEB U4 U1, U3 T4
Designated team member 
answering question in
TOP U4* - U4, T4, T5
DEB U4* - T4, T5
*Hospitals making more than one alteration
TOP: Time Out Procedure
DEB: Debriefing
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Results at the Process Level
Alterations at the process level were primarily related to the time at which the TOP was 
performed. Some team members stated that performing the TOP just before incision 
was too late. Errors like wrong patient or wrong site should be detected and corrected 
before induction. To perform the TOP before induction was difficult, as it interfered with 
existing surgical routines, such as early-morning patient handover. To solve this problem, 
the four university hospitals decided that the residents could replace the surgeon. Nine 
hospitals (U2, U4, T1, T2, G1, G2, G3, G4, G5) adapted the pre-operative process by 
adding a pre-anaesthesia check, conducted by two of the team members (G1, G2). 
Five hospitals (U1, U3, T3, T4, T5) decided to perform the TOP before induction and 
introduced a second comprehensive TOP just before skin incision. The children’s hospital 
(U1) decided to perform the TOP without the patient because it would be too stressful 
for children. All adaptations were regarded as good solutions that better fit local needs 
without endangering patient safety.
Experimenting with 100 surgical interventions in the first iteration resulted in more 
comprehensive TOPs for small surgical interventions requiring only local or regional 
anaesthesia (G4), ophthalmology, ear, nose and throat (ENT) surgery (U1, U2, T1, T2, 
T3, T4, G2, G3) and ambulatory care (U3).
In the second iteration, hospitals U1 and U4 introduced a TOP to structure patient 
handover from the clinical ward to OT. ENT specialists in hospital U1 implemented 
another initiative that introduced two new TOPs provided the OT-team did not change: 
1) TOP-5, to discuss five small consecutive interventions and 2) a comprehensive TOP, 
in which only the intervention, the surgical site and patient identification were checked 
again just before each intervention.
The implementation of TOPplus in OT also initiated discussions with other medical 
disciplines. These resulted in new TOPplus procedures for similar complex interventions 
with other medical disciplines, such as intervention cardiology, intervention radiology, 
oncology (chemotherapy) and obstetrics. TOPplus implementation also inspired the 
design and implementation of a checklist covering all of the critical steps in the surgical 
care path (U1, U2, U3, U4, T1, G1).
Results at the Layout Level
Only four hospitals made changes at this level. Over time, the TOPplus layout became 
almost standard. Following the first iteration, U1 combined the pre-anaesthesia TOP 
and the pre-incision TOP, performed in two different rooms, into one poster. For each 
room the other TOP was de-emphasised (smaller and grey font). Hospital U2 combined 
the basic TOPplus and the TOPplus for small interventions into one poster. Following 
the second iteration, T4 and T5 adapted the layout and colours to correspond to the 
hospital’s corporate house-style.
User Participation & Duration of implementation
User participation varied between hospitals: six hospitals initially implemented TOP in 
all surgical disciplines (U2, U3, U4, T3, G4, G5), seven hospitals (U1, T1, T2, T4, T5, G2, 
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G3) in one surgical discipline and one (G1) in two disciplines. Ultimately all end-users 
were actively involved in the design and implementation process. However, the time to 
include all users varied (see Figure 6.4).
The whole project included four phases: the start-up, the pilot to test the prototype with 
one or two disciplines, implementation on a small scale and implementation hospital-
wide. The TOPplus study itself included only the last three phases.
The largest differences were found in the period preceding the pilot, the start up 
phase. Three hospitals (U2, U3, T3) spent a signifi cant amount of time discussing the 
project getting the means and support. Only one hospital (G3) stayed within the initially 
planned time of one to two months. Although, the three hospitals that spent the most 
time before starting the pilot were large hospitals, much time was also spent by two of 
the smaller hospitals. One large academic hospital spent less time (U1). The duration 
of the fi rst iteration was almost the same for all hospitals. Teams tested the prototype 
with one hundred surgical interventions and data were gathered in one week. The next 
phases, implementation on a small scale and hospital-wide implementation, varied 
per hospital. Some hospitals decided not to start on a small scale, but to involve all 
OTs at once. Others decided to successively include different disciplines over time. 
Most hospitals completed the iterations to implement TOPplus hospital-wide within 
one year. For the whole design and implementation process (from start-up till hospital 
Figure 6.4 | Time for each of the four phases in each participating hospital
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wide implementation), the university and teaching hospitals required an average of 12.8 
months and 10.6 months respectively and the general hospitals required an average 
of 8.2 months. Most hospitals needed at least three iterations to adapt TOPplus to the 
surgical disciplines or the type of care provided (clinical or ambulatory). The following 
topics were discussed mostly: whether to perform the TOP before or after induction, 
the necessity of having all team members present for both the TOP and Debriefing and 
whether and to what extent TOPplus could be adapted to meet local needs.
6.5 Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore whether Adaptive Design, a combination of PD 
and EL, supports the design, implementation and team learning process of TOPplus. 
The results showed that each hospital adapted TOPplus to its own needs and context. 
Adaptations were primarily made at the content, process and layout levels. The basic 
criteria remained essentially unaltered. All of the hospitals succeeded in implementing 
TOPplus with all surgical disciplines in all OTs.
Only recently, experts in the field of patient safety acknowledge the importance of 
understanding both contextual and psychological factors that influence implementation 
of PSPs (Foy et al., 2011; Kaplan et al, 2011; J. C. Ovretveit et al., 2011). Foy et al. (2011) 
suggested combining different theoretical domains to successfully implement PSPs. 
However, little or no research is available on the theory-driven design and implementation 
of PSPs. Research in this field has focused primarily on behavioural aspects and is 
rarely combined with theories related to contextual factors (Foy et al., 2011; Perkins et 
al., 2007).
Combining Participatory Design and Experiential Learning principles into the Adaptive 
Design model appeared to be successful for implementing TOPplus. The design cycles 
facilitated team discussion and promoted the active participation of all professionals 
through experimentation and learning in a structured way. The formal reports provided 
objective information and data transparency and created awareness about the number 
and the kind of errors that occurred during surgery. Both the structured approach and the 
objective information flow with the formal reports stimulated team members’ willingness 
to participate and improved adaptation and adoption. Changes to TOPplus were easy 
to track, as one of the researchers (LW) would redesign the posters used and design of 
new procedures for other disciplines took place in close cooperation with the researchers 
(CD/LW). The researchers role was limited to asking clarifying questions (e.g. which items 
need to be addressed and by whom, or adding new team members as the perfusionist 
with thoracic surgery) and adapting the poster and the evaluation forms accordingly.
The learning cycle established by Adaptive Design deepened the team learning 
process, from single-loop learning by adding or deleting (irrelevant) questions to 
TOPplus to enhance error detection, to double loop learning by initiating additional 
interventions to prevent errors from occurring. For instance, performing the TOP before 
induction was a major decision for the surgical staff because it meant adapting their 
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long-standing early-morning patient handover (Argyris, 1999a, 1999b; Rushmer et al, 
2004). The data gathered with each iteration, including duration and the incidents during 
the per-operative process, helped in the decision-making process. Adaptations were 
implemented step-wise and re-evaluated with each iteration. Implementing TOPplus 
with one or two disciplines at a time increases motivation and adoption (Greenhalgh, 
Robert, Macfarlane, et al., 2004; Resar, Rozich, Simmonds, & Haraden, 2006). In some 
hospitals, the local expert team decided to include all disciplines in the pilots. Although 
this did not affect the AD design iterations, it did sometimes increase the time needed 
for an iteration so all users could experiment, provide feedback and become involved 
in the decision-making process.
The iterative process of adaptation and engaging professionals supported and facili-
tated adoption. Professionals valued the possibility to be able to adapt the procedure 
step by step, which made it feel like an initiative of their own. When professionals are 
allowed to experiment and the results are visible and the new procedure is perceived as 
practical, resistance decreases (Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane, et al., 2004; Iedema 
et al., 2009; Molleman, Peters, Hosman, & Kok, 2005; J. Ovretveit, 2009). To create ‘a 
fertile ground for change’, it is important to put the professional in the lead, provide 
frequent structured feedback and actively involve all team members (Berwick & Nolan, 
1998; Iedema et al., 2009).
Differences in the duration of the project were partly by choice. Some hospitals decided 
to start with all disciplines at once, while others took a stepwise approach. The time 
it took to start with the pilot mainly differed because of the level of support that was 
already available in a specific hospital for introducing TOPplus.
This study has certain limitations. Voluntary participation and the supportive nature 
of the project might have influenced the results positively, but did not guarantee actual 
participation of all professionals. Working with many hospitals simultaneously and being 
actively involved as researchers was time consuming and resulted in delays to follow up 
on questions and to provide feedback. The time required by each hospital to complete 
the project is not predictable. Barriers that emerge during the course of the project might 
require an extra iteration. However, this is exactly the aim of AD, it is not “… a simple 
linear process done to people” but a strategy to encourage team members to decide 
what works best in their local context, based on evidence (J. Ovretveit, 2009). Another 
limitation was the dual role of the researchers, which challenged the researchers’ ability 
to remain objective. To prevent bias, member checks were done during each iteration 
in each hospital by presenting the data and the analysis and discussing these with the 
local expert teams and in most hospitals with all team members.
A third limitation is the lack of a control group. However, we explicitly used participatory 
action research to explore if and how Adaptive Design could be effective, find out what 
would work and what not and validate the method used. The experience and scientific 
knowledge gathered in this study, allows better matching of groups in future research 
with an experiment and control group.
The impact of TOPplus might be greater and more lasting than can be demonstrated 
in this research project and, over time, may result in more changes at the system level 
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(Ferlie & Shortell, 2001). It is important to obtain a better understanding of the impact 
of similar PSPs on clinical as well as behavioural aspects. Future research should use 
a longitudinal approach to measure results over time and include a multi-level analysis.
Participatory action research permits the accumulation of a significant amount of 
knowledge and experience, identifying which adaptations are generalizable with slight 
alterations and which are highly context specific. It provides insight into the factors that 
prevent and facilitate PSP implementation and how they can be resolved or exploited. 
In 56 interviews, which the researchers (CD/LW) conducted in six hospitals following the 
project, it was confirmed that especially the step-wise introduction, the involvement of 
all professionals and the objective data were highly appreciated. Compliance to the TOP 
was almost 100%, to the Debriefing almost 60% (forthcoming article). Since PSPs, but 
also the organisational context differ in size, character or complexity and over time other 
confounders might influence the results, it is important to carefully structure and monitor 
the implementation process and adapt the steps in the iterations when necessary. Every 
hospital has its specific local circumstances that need to be taken into account and 
only surface in the process of implementation. The Adaptive Design model provides a 
structure for successful implementation.
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Abstract
Objective: Measure the effect of the introduction of a team-based combined time out 
procedure and debriefing on surgical team members’ perception of: Communication, 
Teamwork, Situation Awareness, Decision-making and Leadership.
Background: In surgical care, a large percentage of preventable complications are 
caused by inadequate non-technical skills, such as poor teamwork and communication 
breakdowns. Research suggests that team interventions, like a time out procedure with 
a focus on the process of care, support these skills, improve team performance and 
ultimately improve patient safety.
Methods: In a pre-post study design (T0-T1), perception of team members of Operating 
Theatres (OT) in 13 Dutch hospitals was measured, using a questionnaire compris-
ing 62 items (statements) on relevant non-technical skills and additional questions 
on respondents’ characteristics. Participating OT-team members were: surgeons, 
anaesthesiologists, OT-nurses and nurse anaesthetists. Statistical analysis included 
testing for reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) and for comparison and significant differences 
between T0 and T1 (Mann Whitney-U).
Results: T0 resulted in an overall response rate of 44% (n=725) and T1 in 36% (n=554). 
Especially perception of ‘Communication’ and ‘Decision-making’ were rated significantly 
higher at T1. The items ‘discussing the surgical intervention pre-operatively with the entire 
team’, ‘performing debriefings with the whole team’ and ‘checking whether the team is 
ready to start’ showed the highest increase in ratings (P<0.001). OT-nurses showed the 
most significant increase in ratings (33 items), nurse anaesthetists the least (12 items).
Conclusion: A time out procedure and debriefing in OT, designed and implemented as 
a team procedure improves perception of important non-technical skills.
Keywords: Patient Safety, Human factors, Non-technical skills, Multidisciplinary teams, 
Surgical Team Checks
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7.1 Introduction
In surgery, complications are common and a large percentage is preventable (Kohn, 
2001). Although surgeons are highly trained and educated, inadequate non-technical 
skills, such as poor communication and teamwork, often undermine the effectiveness 
of surgical care (Catchpole, Giddings et al. 2007). Mastering both technical and non-
technical skills is an important condition to create a safe and reliable work environment 
(Undre, Sevdalis et al. 2006, Makary, Mukherjee et al. 2007).
Surgical care is complex and high risk provided by multidisciplinary teams, involving 
medical specialists, nurses and administrative support staff. With some surgical disci-
plines, allied healthcare professionals with a technical background join the team. This 
multidisciplinary team has a shared responsibility to secure the well-being and safety of 
each patient (2009). Inadequate non-technical skills, such as a lack of information sharing 
or communication breakdowns, are directly related to patient safety and might lead to 
a higher risk for complications or sometimes even death (Mazzoco, Petitti et al. 2009). 
‘Communication’, ‘Teamwork’, ‘Situation Awareness’, ‘Decision-making’ and ‘Leader-
ship’ are identified as important non-technical skills to decrease preventable errors 
and improve team performance (Leonard, Graham et al. 2004, Mishra, Catchpole et al. 
2008). These skills are vital and enable teams to create the right environment to discuss 
problems encountered, which in turn supports shared decision-making and learning 
collectively (Edmondson 2004, Lemieux-Charles and McGuire 2006). However, attaining 
these skills as a team is difficult. In practice, surgical teams mostly work in changing 
team compositions and team members have different perceptions of each other’s roles, 
tasks and responsibilities within the team. This undermines good communication and 
coordination of tasks within the surgical team (Undre, Sevdalis et al. 2006).
Research suggests that team interventions with a focus on the clinical care process 
support teams in attaining those necessary non-technical skills to improve team effec-
tiveness (WHO 1988, Buljac-Samardzic, Dekker-van Doorn et al. 2010) Work processes 
should support communication and teamwork among team members and emphasize 
the interdependency of team members (Sexton, Makary et al. 2006). Several studies 
indicate that the introduction of a time out procedure in the operating theatre (OT) 
helps to improve teamwork and reduce errors (Lingard, Regehr et al. 2008, de Vries, 
Hollmann et al. 2009, Haynes, Weiser et al. 2009, Norton and Rangel 2010). However, 
most studies measured the effect on medical errors right after or a few months fol-
lowing implementation and not over a longer period of time. To find out if the effect on 
improved teamwork is sustainable, more time is needed. Literature suggests that to 
reduce resistance and scepticism and improve acceptance of new work procedures, 
it is important to use a ‘bottom up’ approach and to include all relevant professionals 
in the design and implementation process (Greenhalgh, Robert et al. 2004) (Wilkinson, 
Rushmer et al. 2004).
The aim of this study is to measure the effects of a combined Time Out Procedure 
and Debriefing (TOPplus), 12-18 months after implementation in OT, on team members’ 
perception of the non-technical skills: 1) Communication, 2) Teamwork, 3) Situation 
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Awareness, 4) Decision-making and 5) Leadership. TOPplus was designed and imple-
mented engaging all professionals involved in surgical care.
TOPplus: Time Out Procedure (TOP) and Debriefing (plus)
Based on literature and expert opinion a Time Out Procedure (TOP) and Debriefing 
(plus) were developed. Both were designed and implemented as team procedures, 
inviting all team members to actively participate in these procedures. To improve 
implementation, the procedures were adapted to the local hospital context step-
wise and in close collaboration with all team members from all relevant disciplines. 
With each step in the design and implementation process more professionals and 
disciplines were invited to participate and provide feedback, so TOPplus could be 
adapted to their specific needs (Dekker - van Doorn, Wauben et al. 2009, Wauben, 
Dekker-van Doorn et al. 2010, Taylor, Dy et al. 2011).
Figure 7.1 | Basic TOPplus poster
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7.2 Methods
Study design and sample
This study used a pre-post study design. The setting consisted of OTs in 13 Dutch 
hospital locations, which volunteered to participate: three university hospital locations 
(U1-3), five teaching hospitals (T1-5) and five general hospitals (G1-5). Together these 
hospitals represent the main types of hospitals in the Netherlands and cover approxi-
mately 15 percent of all Dutch hospitals.
Data collection
Perception of OT-team members on ‘Communication’, ‘Teamwork’, ‘Situation Aware-
ness’, ‘Decision-making’ and ‘Leadership’ was measured preceding the introduction of 
TOPplus in OTs (T0) and 12-18 months following implementation (T1). The whole project 
took almost four years; the first hospital started early 2008 and the last hospital finished 
late 2011. The time from the start of the project towards full implementation of TOPplus 
hospital-wide in all OTs differed per hospital.
The questionnaire was based on two validated observational rating systems developed 
by the University of Aberdeen: the Non-Technical Skills of Surgeons (NOTSS) (University 
of Aberdeen. 2006) and the Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills (ANTS) (University of 
Aberdeen. 2006, Mills, Neily et al. 2008) (See Table 7.1). The questionnaire comprised 
62 statements (items) to measure the respondent’s opinion on non-technical skills and 
additional questions to obtain background information, such as date and respondent 
Table 7.1 | Definitions of categories and subcategories used in the questionnaire (University of Aberdeen. 
2006a, 2006b)
Category & definition Sub-category
Communication
Skills for working in a team context to ensure that the team has 
an acceptable shared picture of the situation and can complete 
the tasks effectively.
C1: Exchanging information
C2: Establishing a shared understanding
C3: Coordinating team activities
Teamwork
Skills for working in a group context, in any role, to ensure 
effective joint tasks completion and team member satisfaction.
No sub-category
Situation Awareness
Developing and maintaining a dynamic awareness of the 
situation in theatre based on assembling data from the 
environment, understanding what they mean and thinking ahead 
what might happen next.
S1: Gathering information
S2: Understanding information
S3: Projecting and anticipating future state
Decision-making
Skills for diagnosing the situation and reaching a judgment in 
order to choose an appropriate course of action.
D1: Considering options
D2: Selecting and communicating option
D3: Implementing and reviewing decisions
Leadership
Leading the team and providing direction, demonstrating high 
standards of clinical practice and care and being considerate 
about the needs of individual team members.
L1: Setting and maintaining standards
L2: Supporting others
L3: Coping with pressure
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characteristics (age category, gender, function within the hospital, years working in func-
tion and years working in that particular hospital). The items were randomly distributed 
over the questionnaire using a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘1’ (strongly disagree) 
to ‘5’ (strongly agree). All professionals directly involved in surgical care in OT were 
invited to fill out the questionnaire, thus including four groups of professional disciplines: 
surgeons, anaesthetists, OT nurses and nurse anaesthetists. In this article, the surgeon 
is defined as: “a medical specialist who performs surgery: a physician qualified to 
treat those diseases that are amenable to or require surgery” (Merriam-Webster.com. 
Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 30 July 2014. <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
surgeon>). The questionnaires were anonymous to team members’ name, but not to 
team members’ function or hospital. All data were analysed confidentially.
Data analysis
Statistical analyses were performed using IBM SPSS Statistics Version 19.0.0 for Mac. 
Reliability of scales was tested using Cronbach’s Alpha. A distinction was made between 
five subscales: 18 items Communication (αT0/T1=0.88/0.86), 11 items Teamwork (αT0/
T1=0.78/0.77), 8 items Situation Awareness (αT0/T1=0.57/0.64), 11 items Decision-making 
(αT0/T1=0.86/0.88) and 14 items Leadership (αT0/T1=0.82/0.85). Although Situation 
Awareness’ Cronbach’s Alpha was low, it is still acceptable, as a Cronbach’s Alpha 
from 5 to 7 is acceptable for scales with less than 10 items (Field, 2005). Comparisons 
between T0 and T1 for all OT-team members per statement were performed using the 
Mann-Whitney U-test to test for significant differences, making P<0.05 statistically 
significant.
7.3 Results
Survey sample
Table 7.2 shows the respondents and their characteristics. In each hospital, all four 
groups of professionals participated in the project and filled out the questionnaires. The 
‘surgeons’ and ‘residents’ represent the following surgical disciplines: General Surgery, 
Gynaecology, Ear Nose Throat (ENT), Urology, Plastic Surgery and Orthopaedics.
With a total of 725 respondents, the T0 resulted in an overall response rate of 44% 
ranging from 29% to 74% between hospitals. Sixty-three respondents did not provide 
information about their function or belonged to other groups than the four groups of 
professionals in a surgical team and therefore excluded from analysis (see Table 2). T1 
resulted in an overall response rate of 36% (n=554), ranging from 14% to 90% between 
hospitals. The non-response analysis showed that the underlying reason for a low 
response differed per hospital. According to the OT-manager of one of the teaching 
hospitals, the low response with the second measurement (T1) was related to an overload 
of questionnaires from other projects at that particular moment and in one of the other 
teaching hospitals, the group of nurse anaesthetists refused to participate in T1 because 
of poor communication wit the surgical staff (oral communication). At T1, 35 respondents 
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did not belong to one of the four groups of professionals in a surgical team, or did not 
fill out their function and were thus excluded from the study.
All disciplines were represented at all sites and comparable to surgical teams in other 
OT-settings national as well as international. Women were overrepresented among 
OT-nurses and the surgeons were mostly male. Within the group of anaesthetists and 
nurse anaesthetists, male/female were equally represented.
Perception non-technical skills
Table 7.3 shows the P-values, the mean values and the standard deviation at T0 and 
T1 of all statements concerning non-technical team skills. Three items appeared to be 
irrelevant in some hospitals and were excluded from the final analysis: two items were 
related to the resident and anaesthetist in training and are not relevant for general 
hospitals, one item was related to conversion (changing from endoscopic to open 
surgery) and were not applicable for all surgical disciplines.
In total, 39 items (66.1%) were rated significantly higher at T1 compared to T0 by at 
least one discipline: 11 items by all four disciplines, 5 items by three disciplines, 14 
items by two disciplines and 9 items by only one discipline. Twenty items (=33.9%) with 
high ratings at T0 scored similar high ratings at T1. One item - L2.2: ANEST gives me 
constructive criticism where necessary - scored significantly lower at T1 (P=0.027) by 
one discipline, the nurse anaesthetists.
Especially the categories Communication and Decision-making were rated significantly 
higher at T1. Within the category Communication, the items ‘discussing the surgery 
pre-operatively with the entire team (C2.5)’, ‘performing debriefings with the whole 
team (C2.6)’ and ‘checking whether the team is ready to start (C3.1-2)’ showed the 
highest increase in ratings (P<0.001). The anaesthetists’ ratings (mean) related to 
discussing the surgical intervention pre-operatively increased from 1.58 to 3.43. Within 
the category Decision-making, the items concerning ‘discussing pros and cons of the 
surgical approach with all relevant team members (D1.3)’ and ‘discussing the guidelines 
(D1.4)’ were rated significantly higher (P<0.001) with all four disciplines. Again, the 
anaesthetists’ ratings ‘discussing the pros and cons’ increased most: from 1.54 to 2.88. 
Within the subcategory Leadership L1, mean ratings were high, but statistical analysis 
showed no significant differences, which was expected as similar high ratings were 
already found at T0 (>3.92).
The group of OT-nurses showed the most significant increase in ratings (33 items), fol-
lowed by the anaesthetists (29 items) and the surgeons (21 items). The least significantly 
increased ratings were found within the group of nurse anaesthetists (12 items).
7.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to measure the effects of the introduction of a team-based 
time out procedure and debriefing (TOPplus) in OT on team members’ perception of 
the non-technical skills that are critical to provide safe care. The assumption that this 
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introduction would improve perception (Wauben, Dekker-van Doorn et al. 2011), was to a 
great extent confirmed by our findings. Significant improvement within all disciplines was 
found with items in all categories and subcategories except in the subcategory Leader-
ship L1, which already received high ratings at T0. As this subcategory mainly refers to 
norms and values of professional behaviour, in following protocols and guidelines, high 
ratings at both T0 and T1 were expected.
Significant increase in ratings for all disciplines was found in 11 out of 59 items in the 
questionnaire, the majority (n=7) within Communication and Teamwork. These results are 
in line with earlier research findings that show that the use of a surgical safety checklist 
not only reduces the number of incidents in surgical care (Lingard, Regehr et al. 2008, de 
Vries, Hollmann et al. 2009, Haynes, Weiser et al. 2009), but also improves non-technical 
skills, especially communication skills (Norton and Rangel 2010, Helmio, Blomgren et 
al. 2011, NHS 2011). In this study, the most significant effects of TOPplus were found 
within the group of OT-nurses (33 items) and the least significant effects were found 
within the group of nurse anaesthetists (only 12 items improved significantly). These 
results might also be a reflection of the non-response of the nurse anaesthetists because 
of poor teamwork in one of the participating hospitals (T2). The overall lower ratings by 
the nurse anaesthetists could be due to strong hierarchical structures in OT 33, 40. In the 
additional comments in the questionnaire, some respondents (n=11) explained that 
sometimes they found it difficult to take their role and speak up which depended on the 
surgeon or anaesthesiologist they were working with that day. The nurse anaesthetists 
also rated one item (L2.2 anaesthetist giving constructive criticism) significantly lower, 
but in the additional comments by the respondents no specific explanation was found.
As expected, all disciplines seemed to have experienced a significant improvement in 
non-technical skills. The most significant improvements among all disciplines were found 
within the category ‘Communication’. Items that improved significantly were directly 
related to exchanging critical information with each other just before surgery and right 
after surgery before the patient leaves OT. Timely sharing of critical information, just 
before and right after surgery, supports team performance and improves patient safety 
(Awad, Fagan et al. 2005). It enables team members to anticipate unforeseen changes 
in the surgical procedure during surgery and take appropriate action to prevent errors 
from occurring in the postoperative process (Davies, 2005). Other studies have shown 
that reflection as a team on what went wrong and why may lead to process redesign 
and clarified responsibilities and thus structurally decrease the number of workarounds 
and improve patient outcomes (Edmondson, Bohmer et al. 2001, Aston, Shi et al. 2005, 
Awad, Fagan et al. 2005, Weaver, Rosen et al. 2010).
The most significant effects measured at T1 were related to discussing the patient, the 
procedure and possible complications that might occur during surgery with the whole 
team pre-operatively. Within the category ‘Decision-making’, all team members scored 
significantly higher on two items: ‘discussing pros and cons of the surgical approach’ 
and ‘discussing the guidelines’ with the whole team pre-operatively. Research shows 
that surgeons use different decision-making strategies to solve problems that occur 
(intuitive, rule-based, analytical or creative) as opposed to other OT team members who 
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work mostly rule-based (Flin, Youngson et al. 2007). As this leaves little or no time to take 
preventive measures for other team members, it is important to discuss options at the 
appropriate moment before surgery (Flin, Youngson et al. 2007). Although this might not 
influence decision-making directly, exchanging critical information improves situation 
awareness among team members and encourages speaking up intra-operatively. In 
addition to the necessity of being well informed, good communication and teamwork 
are also important because the surgical team is not only separated from the anaesthetic 
team by professional domain, but during surgery also physically by large sterile drapes, 
which complicates communication. This physical separation during surgery makes oral 
communication before and during surgery vital for patient safety as timely and accurate 
information will increase team members’ awareness and support pro-active behaviour 
(Wauben, Dekker-van Doorn et al. 2011).
Communicating critical information about the patient and the surgical procedure before 
the surgical intervention and discussing problems that occurred intra-operatively in the 
debriefing, also enables team members to detect errors before harm is done and to act 
proactively to prevent complications later in the post-operative trajectory (Edmondson, 
2004). By discussing patients and possible complications as a team, OT-team members 
become more open to each other and accept that human error is inevitable but manage-
able. If problems are discussed without blaming individual team members, a more open 
and more effective improvement climate of psychological safety can be established and 
errors are considered as learning opportunities (Tucker and Edmondson 2003).
The fact that participation was voluntary might have influenced the ratings of the 
participants in a positive way. That we measured perception of behaviour and not 
observed behaviour might raise questions too. Although this study would have benefitted 
from aggregation to team level and matching of respondents, aggregation to team 
level and matching is difficult as often OT teams are ad-hoc and turnover in OT is high 
(Makary, Sexton et al. 2006). Even if teams are stable, team members work in different 
shifts, 24/7 and rarely work with the same team members. Therefore, it is important to 
feel safe and comfortable independent of team composition. Although generalising the 
conclusions is difficult, the results and the lessons learnt provide other hospitals with 
valuable information for implementation of similar procedures.
By now a time out procedure and debriefing are mandatory in the Netherlands, but 
are not always performed as a team procedure. A time out procedure and debriefing 
can also be limited to (double) checks by one or two disciplines. Although this ensures 
that all information, documents and instruments are available and working, it is often 
perceived as a ‘tick box procedure’ (Walker, Reshamwalla et al. 2012) and does not 
improve communication among all team members. A time out procedure as such is 
not enough to ensure patient safety. Research in other areas (e.g. hand hygiene), has 
shown that implementation of simple safety guidelines, rules or procedures is difficult 
(Erasmus, Daha et al. 2010). The time out procedure and debriefing as described in this 
study are not a cookbook recipe, but a team procedure, adapted to the specific local 
context (patient, surgical intervention or organisation) to exchange critical information 
with all team members in a structured way to provide safe care. During the design and 
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implementation process of TOPplus, teams also received feedback on the registered 
data on a regular basis, which supported team reflection. Our research shows that there 
is room for improvement. In conclusion, the team approach and the clear structure of 
exchanging information in TOPplus encourages team members to ask for additional 
information, to speak up and to discuss problems as a team.
To gather evidence on sustainability, it is advised to measure a combination of outcome 
measures over a longer period of time: team members’ perception of communication, 
changes in the surgical care path at process, structure and system level and patient 
reported outcomes related to medical conditions.
Future research should focus on projects where team interventions and safety pro-
cedures to improve teamwork and communication are combined with an additional 
team intervention, e.g. the introduction of dedicated teams. Dedicated teams are teams 
that stay ‘fixed’ during the day, where team members work together during different 
interventions and creates opportunities to work and learn together to build a safe 
work environment for patients and professionals (Walker, Reshamwalla et al. 2012). A 
combined approach might reinforce the effect on team performance, improve sustain-
ability and lead to continuous learning and improvement (Edmondson, 2004; Stepaniak, 
Vrijland, de Quelerij, de Vries, & Heij, 2010; Weaver et al., 2010). Learning collectively 
and taking appropriate action to structurally improve care processes, including changing 
policies and procedures, create a clinical microsystem where team members work 
together to improve patient safety now and in the future (Helmreich, Merritt, & Wilhelm, 
1999; Mohr, Batalden, & Barach, 2004).
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8.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, patient safety has been one of the main priorities in health care 
organisations (Shekelle et al., 2011). Patient safety focuses on reducing hazards and 
risks of injury or harm to patients (Emanuel et al., 2008). Reason (1995) was one of the 
first to acknowledge the importance of looking at health care from a systems perspective 
in relation to patient safety. He argues that errors at the ‘sharp end’ of the health care 
organisation, more specifically the physician-, nurse-patient interaction, might be the 
result of flaws somewhere else in previous steps in the care process. In other words, 
active human failures are not the main cause, as hazards for patient safety are often 
embedded in the process and structure of health care delivery. Identifying these so-
called latent failures or system errors is one of the key issues in improving patient safety 
(Reason, 1995). However, in the dynamic and complex setting of healthcare conditions 
change over time, which makes identification of latent failures not a one-time effort but 
a continuous process (Hofinger, 2009).
Although most errors are inconsequential, some might mature in significant adverse 
events. System flaws such as deficient reporting systems, low quality of communication, 
or inconsistencies in postoperative recovery instructions might result in an adverse 
event and unavailability of patient information in cancelation of surgery and unnecessary 
readmissions (Croskerry, 2000). Especially patients hospitalised for a surgical interven-
tion are subject to harm (Bruijne de et al, 2007; Cuschieri, 2006; Kohn, 2000). Research 
shows that almost half of the incidents occur in the operating theatre (OT) and 70% 
of these are caused by inadequate communication (Cuschieri, 2006; Mills et al, 2008). 
In a study in 6 hospitals, 149 errors were registered during 650 surgical interventions. 
Eighteen of these errors were so-called ‘risk-sensitive events’ and cause harm to patients 
if undetected (Wauben et al., 2010).
As human errors are inevitable, organisational systems should have defences, barriers 
and safeguards in place to detect failures and mitigate their effects before harm is done 
(Reason, 2000).  According to Cartey et al (2001), two kinds of measures are necessary, 
viz. reactive and proactive measures (Carthey et al, 2001). Reactive measures to ‘detect 
and correct’ errors before harm is done and proactive measures to prevent errors 
from occurring by anticipating what might go wrong and have the right procedures in 
place to act immediately and adequately, e.g. extra material or a different protocol in 
case complications do occur (Carthey et al., 2001). Studies presenting research on 
interventions based on a systems approach and which are more process-oriented show 
positive results in improving patient care (Carroll et al, 2012; Espinosa et al, 1997; Nelson 
et al., 2002). Even small interventions like structured handovers or the introduction of 
ward rounds improve communication and thus team effectiveness (Dutton et al., 2003; 
Graham et al., 2013; Halm, 2013; Montague et al, 2004).
To reduce errors in the operating theatre a Time Out Procedure (TOP) and a Debriefing 
(plus) were developed and implemented, based on the concept of Crew Resource 
Management (CRM) (Makary et al., 2006). CRM is a management concept developed and 
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successfully used in the airline industry to reduce errors due to failures of communication, 
decision-making, leadership and teamwork (Helmreich, 2000).
To facilitate design and implementation of TOPplus and engage all professionals 
involved to adapt TOPplus to the local context, we developed a new model for imple-
mentation: Adaptive Design. Adaptive Design combines methods and strategies from 
Participatory Design to structure the design process and Experiential Learning to 
structure and support the team learning process. Adaptive Design includes three or more 
iterative cycles, each consisting of four steps in which professionals designed, tested, 
evaluated and learned and redesigned the TOPplus procedure to improve usability and 
adoption. In each cycle, data were gathered to adapt TOPplus to the professionals’ own 
local context, which in most hospitals also varied between departments or disciplines.
The objective of TOPplus is to improve communication and teamwork to timely detect 
and correct errors and to prevent errors from occurring in the future. The exchange 
of information in the time out procedure and the discussion in the debriefing should 
also raise awareness and questions about the underlying causes of errors. Teams 
are expected to be able to differentiate between errors that occur because of wrong 
behaviour (active failures) or errors with a more structural character because of faulty 
processes and procedures (latent failures) (Reason, 2005). Information gathered during 
the debriefing might thus become the trigger for further exploration. This will reveal the 
interdependence between the team members, the teams and the daily care process of 
the surgical patient in the clinical microsystem, which in turn is embedded in the larger 
healthcare system. To explore causes of errors detected in OT improves multidisciplinary 
teamwork across disciplinary boundaries. To get engaged in a double-loop learning 
process and learn as a team, active participation of all team members with TOP-
plus is paramount to effectively improve patient safety. Creating awareness about the 
consequences of errors earlier in the surgical care process among all involved, might 
result in improvements in procedures and systems at the structural level of the health 
care organisation. If improvements are embedded in the structures of the health care 
organisation, initiatives may become more sustainable and improve patient safety in a 
more fundamental way and longer lasting (Hovlid et al, 2012).
The aim of the multi-site study was to explore the effects of TOPplus in OT on daily 
work processes at operational level and possible effects on procedures and systems at 
structural level of the organisation. It is expected that the introduction of TOPplus leads 
to process improvement in OT to reduce preventable errors by learning as a team, but 
also improves team learning across disciplinary boundaries and leads to improvements 
at structural level (Bogner, 2003; Kolb, 1984; Pilemalm & Timpka, 2008).
8.2 Methods
Design
The study was designed as an exploratory multi-site study using semi-structured 
interviews. In total fourteen Dutch hospitals participated in the TOPplus study to de-
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sign and implement TOPplus in OT to improve the perception of communication and 
teamwork between OT-team members. The effect of TOPplus on changes in processes 
at operational or structural level was studied in six of the participating hospitals: two 
university hospitals, two teaching hospitals and two general hospitals, thus representing 
the three hospital types in the TOPplus study.
Operationalisation
To operationalise the difference between the process and structural level, the Clinical 
Microsystems (CMS) Framework was used which looks at healthcare organisations 
from a systems perspective. All characteristics of the CMS were related to either the 
process or the structural level (see table 8.1). This Framework was used because it has 
a special focus on patient safety and includes the clinical unit where the actual care 
is delivered, the so-called Clinical Micro-System (CMS) and the organisational system 
that supports and surrounds it (Battles, 2006; Mohr, Batalden, & Barach, 2004). Also, 
the CMS framework has been used successfully within different health care settings to 
measure the results of Patient Safety Practices (PSPs) at different system levels (Nelson 
et al., 2008).
The topic list for the semi-structured interviews was developed by relating the char-
acteristics of the CMS to relevant aspects for the Operating Theatre (see table 8.2). 
Additional topics were added to identify to what extent TOPplus was used as intended 
in the different settings, viz. engaging all team members actively in a team dialogue, 
information was gathered on the actual usage of TOPplus in OT and adherence to the 
TOPplus-protocol. At the end of each interview, team members were asked which 
characteristics of TOPplus were most helpful in facilitating team discussions. As a 
result, the topic list included questions on TOPplus as a daily routine procedure (when, 
with whom and how) and questions related to the impact of TOPplus at process and at 
structural level (where, what and how) (see Table 8.2).
Data Collection
In each of the six hospitals, data were gathered through semi-structured interviews, 
using the topic list to identify possible changes in clinical processes and in organisational 
structures. As effects might be found throughout the whole surgical process, members 
of OT-teams as well as members of the management and support staff (as informed 
observers) were interviewed. In total 55 interviews were carried out: 8 surgeons, 9 anaes-
thesiologists, 12 OT-nurses, 11 nurse anaesthetists, 2 perfusionists, 6 administrative staff 
members quality, safety and innovation, 6 OT-managers and 1 manager patient care (see 
Table 8.3). Most hospitals were represented by at least one surgeon, anaesthesiologist, 
scrub/circulating nurse, nurse anaesthetist, OT manager, administrative staff member 
and if possible a senior manager.
Through semi-structured interviews, information was gathered on changes in the 
surgical care process, including the pre- and post-operative pathway and on changes 
in support systems or structures across disciplinary boundaries. Additional general 
information included hospital size, organisational structure, quality indicators, possible 
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accreditation and hospital policies related to quality and safety. The interviews were 
conducted in duo’s, with one of the main researchers (CD or LW) and a student assistant 
present or in case a student assistant was not available, the two main researchers. All 
interviews were recorded.
Table 8.1 | Clinical Microsystems Framework (Mohr et al., 2004) related to critical elements of structure and 
process in a healthcare system (Battles, 2006)
Process & 
Structure 
Framework
(Battles, 2006)
Clinical Microsystem 
Characteristics
(Mohr et al, 2004)
CMS definitions
Process Process Improvement An atmosphere for learning and redesign is supported by the 
continuous monitoring of care, use of benchmarking, frequent tests of 
change and a staff that has been empowered to innovate
Process Information and 
Information Technology
Information is THE connector – staff to patients, staff to staff, needs 
with actions to meet needs
Technology facilitates effective communication and multiple formal 
and informal channels are used to keep everyone informed all the time, 
listen to everyone’s ideas and ensure that everyone is connected on 
important topics
Process Performance Results Performance focuses on patient outcomes, avoidable costs, 
streamlining delivery, using data feedback, promoting positive 
competition and frank discussions about performance
Structure Organisational Support If a practice is part of a larger healthcare system, the larger organisation 
looks for ways to support the work of the practice and other 
microsystems
Structure Patient Focus The primary concern is to meet all patient needs – caring, listening, 
educating and responding to special requests, innovating to meet 
patient needs and smooth service flow
Structure Community and Market 
Focus
The practice is a resource for the community, the community is a 
resource to the practice; the practice establishes excellent innovative 
relationships with the community
Structure Leadership The role of leaders to balance setting and reaching collective goals, 
empower individual autonomy and accountability, through building 
knowledge, respectful action, reviewing and reflecting
Structure Education and Training All CMS-practices have responsibility for ongoing education and 
training of staff and for aligning daily work roles with training 
competencies
Academic CMS have the traditional responsibility of training students
Structure Staff focus There is selective hiring of the right kind of people
The orientation process is designed to fully integrate new staff into 
culture and work roles
Expectations of staff are high regarding performance, continuing 
education, professional growth and networking
Structure Interdependence The interaction of staff is characterized by trust, collaboration, 
willingness to help each other, appreciation of complementary roles, 
respect and recognition that all contribute individually to a shared 
purpose
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Table 8.2 | Topic list effect of TOPplus on process and structure level of the healthcare system
Process & 
Structure 
Framework
(Battles, 2006)
Clinical Microsystem 
Characteristics
(Mohr et al, 2004)
Interview topics
Process Process Improvement - Improvements in the peri-operative procedure
-  Changes in handovers pre- and postoperatively in the operating 
theatre with admission and discharge
-  New processes to prevent incidents in OT, e.g. extra checks on 
material and instruments, air-way management
Process Information and 
Information Technology
-  Registration of incidents in e.g. patient records or registration 
systems in OT
- Linking registration of incidents in OT to hospital reporting systems
-  Adaptation or development of digital reporting systems, local or 
hospital-wide
Process Performance Results Work processes adapted because of the introduction of TOPplus:
- Influence on the number or the kind of incidents
-  In the surgical pathway, including the pre- and postoperative 
surgical pathway from admission to discharge
-  With other minimal invasive interventions, e.g. interventions 
cardiology
-  Any other adaptations/changes in processes because of TOPplus, 
e.g. streamlining the process with the laboratory
-  Any other process changes to prevent incidents or streamline 
patient flow (assigning tasks and responsibilities)
Structure Organisational Support - Facilitators and that helped with implementation
- Support of the leadership (senior managers and board)
Structure Patient Focus - Active participation of patients in the TOPplus procedure
- Engaging patient in TOPplus
- Informing patients about TOPplus (verbally, written, flyers)
Structure Community and Market 
Focus
-  Information sharing or collaboration with external partners ( e.g. 
other healthcare providers of Patient Associations)
-  Publications in local or regional journals/magazines or any other 
public channels
Structure Leadership • Influence of TOPplus on chances in leadership style
•  Positive reinforcement to discuss remarks or suggestions for 
improvement
•  Influence of TOPplus on improved shared decision-making and 
shared goals
Structure Education and Training - Information to new employees
- Instructing/training new employees on the job
-
Structure Staff focus - Roles and responsibilities redefined in functional profiles
- Positive feedback to employees about results
- Common objectives, shared goals defined
Structure Interdependence -  Incidents and actions for improvement on agenda of regular team 
meetings
- Structural collaboration with other disciplines and departments
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Data analysis
The interviews were transcribed verbatim and first coded thematically by the two main 
authors (CD and LW) using the characteristics of the CMS framework and the topics 
from the topic list. An excel database was developed to link each relevant quote to 
a specific theme/topic. The authors started by analysing 20 interviews together, to 
esthablish a common frame of reference. The remaining 35 interviews were divided 
between the two authors. Afterwards both authors crosschecked the database. Then 
open codes were added based on the data, by both authors together. This involved a 
more detailed categorisation of the effects of the TOPplus. The final step was to see 
how these categories were related to either the process or the structural level or both. 
For instance, information on registration of incidents might only take place at process 
level. Especially when the registration of the incidents is not integrated in a reporting 
system as part of a larger safety management system, the information will be lost. This 
step was carried out together by both authors.
8.4 Results
The results will be presented in three different sections. Section 1 is about the actual 
usage of TOPplus in the operating theatre which includes: a) implementation of TOPplus 
with every surgical procedure, b) compliance to the TOPplus protocol: dialogue-based 
and participation of all team members, c) registration of TOPplus (written or digital) in 
existing patient records or in other reporting systems. Section two presents the changes 
that were made at process level as a result of the TOPplus: a) the clinical micro-systems 
viz. the organisational front line units, b) procedures, documents and systems that shape 
and enhance the process of daily care delivery (e.g. patient records, administrative 
Table 8.3 | Study population: Hospitals and participants per discipline
Interviewees Hospitals
A
Univ.
Hospital
B
U.H.
C
Teach.
Hospital
D
T.H
E
General
Hospital
F
G.H
Total
Surgeon 2 1 1 1 1 2 8
Anaesthesiologist 2 1 2 2 1 1 9
Scrub Nurse/
Circulating Nurse
2 2 2 2 2 2 12
Nurse Anaesthetist 2 2 2 2 2 2 11
Perfusionist - 2 - - 2
Administrative staff
Quality-Safety-Innovation
1 1 1 1 1 1 6
OT manager 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
Manager Patient Care 1 1
Total 10 10 9 10 8 8 55
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systems or incident registration systems) and c) the clinical work systems where profes-
sionals interact and work as a team and d) the patient. Section 3 describes the changes 
that have been made at the structural level: a) the macro organisation (policies, systems 
and procedures) that influences all other structures and processes in the health care 
system, b) the educational system for healthcare professionals and newly hired ones 
and c) the built or physical environment that surrounds the professionals (Battles, 2006).
Implementation and usage
Usage of TOPplus was verified to make sure that TOPplus was performed as a dialogue-
based team procedure and with every surgical intervention and results could be related to 
TOPplus. In all six hospitals the TOP was adopted as a daily routine procedure, performed 
with the whole team present in most hospitals, with all surgical interventions and as 
intended, dialogue-based according to the TOPplus-protocol. In three hospitals, several 
interviewees added that although all team members were present, sometimes only the 
surgeon and the anaesthesiologists were actively involved in exchanging information. 
According to one of the surgeons: “Usually the surgeon and the anaesthesiologist or 
nurse anaesthetist. Usually there is a circulating nurse present, but he or she does 
not actively participate in the procedure.” The debriefing was accepted as a routine 
procedure, but in most hospitals not with every surgical intervention and not with all 
team members present. In the teaching and general hospitals the nurse anaesthetist 
often replaced the anaesthesiologist, who was preparing the next patient for surgery. 
In all but one hospital TOPplus was registered: in most hospitals with a tick box in one 
of the electronic reporting systems used in OT and in one hospital in regular medical, 
nursing, or patient records. Sometimes the incidents mentioned in the debriefing were 
registered as well. No large differences were found between hospitals. Some interviewees 
mentioned that in case of emergencies the TOP was not performed or only the most 
critical information was double-checked: “In a digital anaesthesiology reporting system 
we register if the time out procedure and the debriefing are performed and problems/
incidents that occurred intra-operatively are registered in special pre-programmed fields.” 
(nurse manager) The evidence gathered in every iterative cycle during the implementation 
and the team discussions that followed, triggered discussions with other disciplines and 
departments. The discussion about the problems encountered in OT deepened insight 
and showed the interdependency and interrelatedness with other departments, leading 
to changes at process level.
Changes at process level
At process level, several improvement initiatives were mentioned. In all six hospitals, 
implementation of TOPplus resulted in an improved structured handover between the 
clinical unit and the OT-team and in the introduction of a checklist covering all handovers 
in the surgical pathway from admission to discharge. The ability to gradually adapt the 
procedure to the local context, helped to make TOPplus a meaningful improvement. 
According to one of the anaesthesiologists: “Without the TOP procedure, I won’t 
start any anaesthetic procedure.” Results were also found in registration of TOPplus. 
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Existing electronic systems e.g. systems to document information on the surgical 
intervention (operative notes), or separate reporting systems were adapted to register 
TOPplus. To register more specific information, such as instruments missing or defect, 
or communication failures, in some hospitals additional item sections were added to the 
electronic system. In two other hospitals, regular team meetings were used to discuss 
the information derived from the debriefing. One of the nurse anaesthetists elucidated 
the procedure as follows: “Structural incidents and possible actions for improvement 
are discussed in team meetings. The first few months TOPplus was discussed with 
every team meeting.” In two hospitals, one of the team members was made responsible 
to check all technical equipment and material in the operating theatre (e.g. screens, 
OT-table, air management systems) before the start of the daily OT-program. Other 
team members would double-check instruments (OT-nets) and material to be used in 
the elective surgical procedures of that day. One of the nurse anaesthetists mentioned 
that during the team discussion it was decided to work with dedicated teams in one of 
two operating theatres that were primarily used by one or two surgical disciplines. As it 
was one of the initiatives directly related to the feedback on incidents registered in the 
debriefing, they started a research project to evaluate the introduction of the dedicated 
teams. At the time of the interview, the first results were visible. He further explained that 
each of these operating theatres has a fixed team that discusses the surgical program, 
the patients and the surgical interventions for that day, before the start of the program 
with all team members present. During the day, the team performs TOPplus with every 
surgical intervention and takes coffee breaks and lunches together. Responsibility for 
the whole program is shared as a team. “In my opinion, the largest gain is the increased 
awareness and shared responsibility towards the patient’s safety. We used to have 
separate teams of OT-nurses and nurse anaesthetists, but more and more we work as 
one team.” (nurse anaesthetist)
Results were also reported in improved collaboration with other departments. Han-
dovers between the surgical and the clinical department were restructured. Items were 
added to improve safety and detect errors and tasks and responsibilities clarified and 
assigned to the team members involved. In one hospital, new arrangements were set up 
with one of the facility departments to improve process of sterility assurance. “Recently 
one of the team members of the Sterile Processing Department was made responsible 
for processing all our orders”, one of the OT-nurses explained.
Changes at structure level
Results at structure level included not only changes in the educational system and (re)
allocating tasks and responsibilities among the professionals involved in surgical care, 
but also changes in procedures to improve patient information. In two hospitals, patients 
were actively engaged in the TOPplus procedure by stating their name, date of birth 
and possible allergies. In most hospitals, the patients received oral information about 
TOPplus. In some cases information was provided on the website or in a brochure with 
general information about the surgical procedure. Communication about TOPplus by a 
publication in the hospital magazine was found in most hospitals, but very few initiatives 
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were found to inform associated health care providers about TOPplus, e.g. general 
physicians. Two hospitals published an article in a local newspaper.
In three hospitals, communication and teamwork were added as a separate non-
technical skill to the functional profile and used when hiring and assessing new em-
ployees. According to one of the nurse anaesthetists: “When hiring new employees 
who will join the team, I will ask probing questions about these skills. Although there 
is a shortage of specialised nurses, you want to maintain quality.” In some hospitals, 
communication skills were integrated in clinical educational or training sessions. In all 
hospitals, new employees received information and instruction on TOPplus. One of the 
surgeons explained: “We are taking our whole staff to one of the oldest attraction parks, 
to train communication skills.”
Few changes were found in the leadership role. OT-managers would encourage OT 
team members to take initiative and speak up and team leaders or one of the team 
members would take the leadership role. “Especially (name) the OT manager, but also 
the team leaders from the OT-nurses and nurse anaesthetists and the staff member on 
quality, continually emphasised the essence of TOPplus.” (perfusionist)
Visible and active support of the managers at strategic level was lacking in most 
hospitals. As one of the surgeons stated: “I don’t think we received any support from 
the organisation, no certainly not.” According to one of the nurse anaesthetists: “I do 
think that they (the organisation) find it important, but I never experienced any support.” 
In two hospitals, interviewees were positive about the leadership role. “A committee on 
policymaking, presided by the hospital board is supervising the project.” (staff member) 
In one of the hospitals, the hospital board decided to sanction negative behaviour. If staff 
members refused to comply to the TOPplus procedure, refusal resulted in a yellow card 
and the next time in a red card. In case of a red card, they had to give an explanation for 
their behaviour to the hospital board. Almost all interviewees saw improved teamwork 
and team spirit as a result directly related to the introduction of TOPplus. They valued 
taking responsibility as a team, being well informed about the surgical procedure and 
being more aware of each other’s contribution to the surgical process. In one hospital, 
team members mentioned that the introduction of TOPplus also smoothened the flow 
of the surgical process during the day. According to one of the nurse anaesthetists: 
“Team members report errors immediately and act adequately to solve the problem, 
which shortens the delay in the pre-operative process. It has streamlined and structured 
the process, which in turn has shortened the whole process.” And, “Absence or delay 
of one of the team members, a common problem in OT, hardly ever occurs anymore.”
When asked which characteristics of TOPplus facilitated team discussion, the inter-
viewees most valued by contextualisation, i.e. the possibility to adapt TOPplus to their 
own clinical practice step by step (n=33). Twenty-nine interviewees (n=29) mentioned 
the positive influence of the poster in A1 format on the wall of every OT. The poster 
showed all questions indicating roles and responsibilities for each team member, thus 
engaging all team members to participate in the discussion. One of the scrub nurses 
emphasised the importance of the poster as follows: “A poster that large puts you right 
on the spot and really helps. It is hanging there and you can’t get around it.” The time 
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out procedure, performed with the whole team also created a ‘formal’ moment to ask 
for some more explanation about certain subjects. Some interviewees (n=19) mentioned 
the importance of having one of the team members as “the clinical champion” who 
would encourage discussion and could be one of the medical specialists but also one 
of the OT-nurses. “It does help if one of the medical specialists encourages other staff 
members, but most of the support came from one of our own OT-nurses, who is also 
team leader.” (scrub nurse)
All in all, the results show that the introduction of TOPplus not only helped to timely 
detect and correct errors, but also stimulated improvements at process and at structural 
level to prevent errors from reoccurring.
8.5 Conclusion and discussion
In all six hospitals, the time out procedure was implemented as a routine procedure; 
with the necessary adaptations to make it fit the local context. The use of the Adaptive 
Design approach in which each team member participated in adaptation and adoption 
seemed to be successful as an implementation strategy. However, the debriefing was 
not fully implemented. Although each hospital has implemented the debriefing in OT, it is 
not used during each surgical intervention or during each type of surgery. Introducing the 
debriefing seems more complicated because it has a bigger impact on OT processes, as 
not all OT members are always present throughout the end of the surgical intervention. 
For example, the anaesthesiologist usually leaves before wound closure to prepare 
the next patient for surgery and sometimes the staff surgeon leaves the closure of the 
wound to the resident.
Overall, it can be concluded that the implementation of TOPplus has resulted in 
both process and structural improvements in all six participating hospitals. However, 
improvement initiatives at process and structural level that included more departments 
and disciplines and thus more teams varied between hospitals.
Subjects for discussion
Adaptive Design and the learning process
The time out procedure is first of all introduced as a way to improve single-loop team 
learning in OT, by helping teams to detect and correct mistakes just before the surgical 
intervention to prevent harm. However, combined with a registration system and the 
introduction of moments for team reflection as part of the implementation strategy, it 
evolved into a tool that also stimulates double-loop team learning. It helped OT teams 
to prevent mistakes from occurring by identifying and correcting underlying causes. The 
registration of the mistakes identified during the time-out procedure also helped them 
convince others, that changes in procedures and structures were required. Yet, teams 
were not always successful in convincing others to participate. Some changes that 
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needed to be made, such a digital registration system integrated in a safety management 
system hospital wide, also require management support and budget, which are not 
always available.
The introduction of TOPplus in OT as a team intervention triggered discussions 
between professionals in those frontline units that were part of the care trajectory of 
the surgical patient, which starts with the clinical unit where patients were admitted and 
prepared for OT. In all six hospitals, the effect of TOPplus was visible organisation-wide, 
at operational process level and in processes and procedures at the structural level of 
the hospital organisation. Using the Adaptive Design methodology as an implementation 
strategy helped to structure the learning process and made adaptation and adoption 
step by step a natural process. The iterative cycles made it possible to adapt the 
implementation process to the learning process of the professionals involved and focus 
on problems they encountered.
The discussions between team members helped to gain insight in the interrelatedness 
and interdependency not only between team members, but also with other disciplines 
and other departments. The first discussion between team members concerned their 
own processes and functioning, which resulted in actions to monitor the safety of the 
patient while in the OT-department. Actions were diverse and ranged from introduction 
of extra checks on material and instruments and improved post-operative instructions 
to prevent errors, to assigning tasks and responsibilities to certain team members. As 
team members gained a more accurate and deeper understanding of the problem, 
the next step was the discussion with the clinical team that prepared and delivered 
the patient to the OT-department. This discussion resulted in restructured handovers 
and in a checklist for the surgical patient covering the whole surgical pathway and 
introduced hospital-wide in all hospitals. The implementation of the checklist, including 
the stopping rules with critical handovers hospital-wide, was supported by policies to 
stimulate adherence to the stopping rules. The policies included providing information 
about the content and the aim of TOPplus to new employees and in one of the hospitals 
also sanctions if professionals refused to comply.
The open and flexible character of both TOPplus and the Adaptive Design meth-
odologies used, allowed the researchers to monitor and anticipate the needs of the 
professionals and to take more time for the team discussion. If needed, the researchers 
performed extra analyses on the data gathered, or added extra iterative cycles to pilot 
improvement actions to experiment and learn. In one hospital, data were analysed to 
explore if performing the time out procedure before induction could prevent errors. The 
pilots focused on specific problems and failures to design actions for improvement that 
would fit the local context of that hospital. The focus on their own problems deepened 
the team learning process in a natural way, experimenting and learning while working 
and with all disciplines involved. This continuous learning process improved adaptation 
and stimulated initiatives across departmental boundaries, as shown in this study. The 
system approach and process orientation used in TOPplus encouraged multi-disciplinary 
discussions, gradually involving more disciplines and in the end produced a positive 
“ripple” effect throughout the whole organisation (Waring et al, 2006).
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The role of board members and senior managers
In all hospitals many different professional disciplines, managers and support staff be-
came involved and created productive partnerships, but the managers at strategic level 
and hospital board members were mostly absent. There was no doubt that the hospital 
board approved of the TOPplus project, but very few of them were visibly involved. 
Only in two hospitals, the interviewees were positive about the board’s leadership role. 
Managers at strategic level and members of hospital boards should take an important 
role in patient safety initiatives. They can oversee the whole project and support and 
guide it by e.g. developing vision and strategy, setting aims related to quality and safety 
and communicate these to all involved. One of the aims should focus on the creation 
of continuous learning opportunities for all concerned, to fill the gap in knowledge and 
skills of patient safety issues, (Conway, 2008).
Process-orientation and reporting systems
The TOPplus study showed the importance of a system and process-oriented approach. 
At the start of the project, it was expected that TOPplus would improve communication 
and teamwork, but no assumptions could be formulated on the extended effect of TOP-
plus across the organisation. In many hospitals, the traditional functional organisational 
structure is still the guiding principal and often a barrier for real change (Leape et al., 
2009). Recently more and more hospitals are moving away from this structure to a 
more patient-centred organisational structure. In patient-centred hospitals, the guiding 
principle for the organisational structure is process orientation where processes and 
departments are organised around care processes (Vos et al., 2011). Process orientation 
improves the coordination of patient care and improves fact-based learning from incident 
reporting systems. Reporting systems with a focus on reporting adverse events produce 
outcome information, which contributes to external reporting on indicators but does not 
solve process or system failures. Voluntary reporting systems, like TOPplus, focus on 
reporting incidents and errors and provide process-information that helps to analyse the 
problem, assess the risks and design actions to prevent errors from occurring (Nuckols 
et al, 2009). At the same time, the focus on the process “How and why did it happen” 
contributes to the creation of a blame-free, non-punitive culture which is the foundation 
for patient safety (Wolf and Hughes, 2008).
Voluntary reporting systems, as an integral part of improvement initiatives, produce a 
large amount of information. Evidence-based knowledge related to processes contrib-
utes to the creation of evidence-based practices, by monitoring how implementation 
takes place and to differentiate between context-related elements and elements that 
are generalisable (Cuschieri, 2006). Studies similar to TOPplus that include the Adaptive 
Design methodology, gathering evidence in iterative cycles to experiment and learn, 
provide an opportunity to build a coherent body of knowledge that is evidence-based, 
valid for practitioners and researchers and scientifically justifiable. When we are able to 
combine efforts from multidisciplinary teams with experts from different backgrounds, 
different health care fields and different scientific domains, we might be able to oversee 
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the whole healthcare chain. Thus, deepen our understanding about its interrelatedness 
and interdependency and improve implementation of evidence-based practices.
Limitations and final conclusion
One of the limitations of the study was the fact that the interviews were conducted in 
just six hospitals and only in the Netherlands. However, they do represent the three 
main types of hospitals. Another limitation is the role of the two main researchers, who 
were both researcher and project advisor and one of them (CD) project manager at 
the university hospitals. To prevent bias a rigorous theoretical framework was used. If 
results are generalisable cannot be concluded from this study. However, it seems that 
most findings are not so much related to the characteristics of specific hospitals, but 
to the multi-professional character of operating theatres, which are embedded in larger 
organisational systems.
The TOPplus study showed how individual learning can be changed to team learning 
and single-loop learning cycles to double-loop learning cycles to change supporting 
procedures, structures and sometimes even organisational policies. The question 
remains if the Adaptive Design methodology also provides a structure that invites profes-
sionals to get engaged in a continuous learning process, in a triple-loop or higher-order 
learning process and a continuous strive for excellence.
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9.1 Review and general conclusions
The overall aim of this thesis was to find an answer to the question: How to design and 
implement a team intervention to improve communication and teamwork in the operating 
theatre? Thereby building on the theoretical notion that improved communication and 
teamwork are strong predictors for a positive patient safety culture (El-Jardali, Sheikh 
et al. 2014). A positive patient safety culture creates a positive non-punitive climate to 
discuss errors and encourage team learning, without being hindered by hierarchical 
structures and disciplinary boundaries and by biases within the health-care system 
(Leape, Berwick et al. 2009). Patient safety needs rules, regulations and measurement 
systems to assure safe care, but also a culture of trust, reporting, transparency and 
discipline. In a blame-free culture errors are perceived as an opportunity to learn as a 
team and take appropriate action to prevent errors from recurring (Hutchinson, Young et 
al. 2009). However, in many health-care organisations the functional structure based on 
medical disciplines is counterproductive to openness and trust. Although organisational 
culture is hard to change, it can be transformed under the right circumstances and by 
the right initiatives (Schein 1999, Hudson 2001, Schein 2002).
To gain more insight in existing evidence and scientific arguments for the decision to 
use implementation of a time out procedure and debriefing as a team intervention, one 
of the authors joined a systematic review study. In the study, the research team focused 
on team interventions to improve team effectiveness. (Chapter 2).
Little scientific evidence was found at a high quality level (Grade 1 or 2), but a few stud-
ies showed some evidence with indications that team interventions based on concepts 
such as Crew Resource Management (CRM) improve communication and teamwork. 
The latter also contribute to the creation of an open and blame-free environment. CRM, 
successfully used in aviation, is a management and not only a philosophical concept that 
also includes processes and procedures to “live” safety as a team. CRM requires work 
processes that support team reflection and discussion and creates an open atmosphere 
where team members can exchange critical information, speak up and voice concerns. 
Briefings, time out procedures and debriefings were found to be promising procedures to 
improve communication and teamwork that are essential team skills to improve patient 
safety (Kosnik, Brown et al. 2007). A time out procedure is a double check and a final 
step in a series of checks in the preoperative process just before surgery. In this study 
the time out procedure (TOP) was combined with the debriefing (plus) and designed as 
a dialogue-based team procedure, to be performed with the whole team present. The 
purpose of the time out procedure is to timely detect and correct errors and to exchange 
and discuss critical information about the patient and the surgical procedure prior to 
the surgical intervention. In the debriefing the team reflects on the surgical procedure, 
discusses and registers errors and defines postoperative orders for safe patient handoff 
to the recovery.
After identifying the appropriate intervention the next challenge was to find a suc-
cessful design and implementation strategy for TOPplus and turn these procedures, 
often perceived as a tick box exercise, into meaningful improvements and evaluate the 
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outcomes on patient safety practices in the operating theatre. To measure the influence 
on perception of communication and teamwork of surgical team members, preceding 
and following introduction of TOPplus, a questionnaire was developed (Chapter 3). In a 
study in five hospitals, prior to implementation of TOPplus, the results of the question-
naire showed significant differences in perception among all surgical team members. 
The largest discrepancies in perception were found between the surgeons and the 
other team members. Surgeons were significantly more positive about communication 
and information gathering than other team members, which might indicate different 
levels of situation awareness among all team members. Shared situation awareness 
is an important precondition to anticipate unforeseen situations peroperatively and 
provides safe care. Almost all team members rated routine briefings and debriefings as 
inadequate, but the lowest ratings were found for anaesthesiologists, nurse anaesthetists 
and OT-nurses. In the ratings of the fifteen hospitals that ultimately participated in the 
project, the differences in perception between team members and high and low ratings 
were similar (Chapter 7). These results showed that there was room for improvement.
To identify an appropriate design and implementation strategy for TOPplus a pilot 
study was carried out. With a small team of medical and scientific experts a prototype 
of a time out procedure and debriefing was developed and tested on design and content 
(Chapter 4). The first design resulted in a combined Time Out Procedure (TOP) and 
Debriefing (plus), a structured communication protocol, which included all items that 
are critical to provide safe care. TOPplus was designed as a multidisciplinary procedure 
to discuss all items as a team, with all team members directly involved in the surgical 
intervention. Questions and answers were assigned to specific team members. TOPplus 
was visualised in a large poster (A1-format) and colour-coded, each colour representing 
one of the professional disciplines, i.e. the surgeon, the anaesthesiologist, the operating 
theatre nurses (circulating nurse and scrub nurse) and the nurse anaesthetist. The 
poster also presented the debriefing, which in the prototype included only two items: a 
question to discuss details and a summary. In the summary one of the team members 
would recapitulate the items the whole team agreed upon to be registered in a separate 
document. From the start of the project the presence of the whole team with the time 
out procedure and the debriefing appeared to be problematic. To exchange critical 
information about the patient and the procedure is vital for safe surgery. However, to be 
present in the operating theatre early in the morning with the first time out procedure 
appeared to be problematic and created resistance. It posed a problem especially for the 
surgical discipline as it interfered with the long existing daily routine of patient handover. 
Following a discussion it was decided that the resident could replace the surgeon, 
provided he or she was directly involved in the surgical intervention.
In a pilot in five hospitals, the TOPplus prototype was tested during hundred surgical 
interventions and incidents that occurred were discussed and registered (Chapter 5). 
Using Participatory Design (PD), a design method that originates from Industrial Design 
Engineering to engage end-users in the design process, all team members were encour-
aged to participate in the design and implementation process and to provide feedback 
on the content and the process of TOPplus. The results of the pilot provided relevant 
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information on the content and the usability of both time out procedure and debriefing 
and on the importance of using PD to engage professionals in the design and evaluation 
process. The registration of incidents during the pilot phase increased awareness of team 
members about errors that occurred during surgery and reduced resistance. Inviting 
professionals to participate and provide feedback supported the discussion among 
team members and improved adaptation to the local context. Two topics were found 
to be important to further develop and implement TOPplus: the presence of the whole 
team with both time out procedure and debriefing and the adaptation of TOPplus to the 
local context. The latter made it necessary to include more professionals in the design 
process to address specific critical items, that are related to the patient, to the surgical 
intervention, or to the physical work environment. Depending on the complexity and 
diversity of the local context teams needed more time for reflection and discussion and 
to experiment and learn as a team.
To put more emphasis on the learning aspects Participatory Design was combined 
with Experiential Learning as an implementation strategy, which resulted in a new model 
with iterative design cycles called Adaptive Design (Chapter 6). Experiential Learning 
emphasises the team learning process in iterative cycles (Plan-Do-Study-Act) to create 
and recreate knowledge based on experience. Each cycle includes four iterations, i.e. 
design, apply, evaluate and reflect and redesign. With each cycle more professionals 
were included in the design and redesign process to adjust TOPplus to their local context. 
If needed, extra cycles were added to focus on specific multidisciplinary processes 
across departments and disciplinary boundaries. Applying Adaptive Design created and 
more time and more moments to reflect as a team, to detect and correct errors before 
harm is done and prevent errors from recurring. Thus creating learning cycles leading 
from single-loop learning (detection and correction) to double-loop learning (prevention).
To measure if implementation of TOPplus improved perception of nontechnical skills 
of surgical team members a pre- and post-study was carried out in fifteen hospitals 
(Chapter 7). The questionnaire “Communication & Teamwork in the Operating Theatre” 
was distributed preceding introduction of TOPplus (T0) and following its final implementa-
tion hospital-wide in all operating theatres of each participating hospitals (T1). The second 
measurement showed significant improvements in communication and decision-making 
with all surgical team members and most team members rated execution of pre- and 
postoperative briefings and debriefings significantly higher. Implementation of TOPplus, 
with active participation of all team members in several design and redesign cycles, 
showed to have a positive effect on team members’ perception of communication and 
teamwork. Discussing problems encountered in the operating theatre as a team initiated 
the dialogue with other disciplines and departments, leading to improvements pre- and 
postoperatively in the surgical pathway.
To explore the effects of TOPplus across the functional departmental boundaries 
and the disciplinary silos within the hospital system, a multi-site study was carried 
out in six of the participating hospitals, using semi-structured interviews based on the 
framework of the Clinical Micro System (Chapter 8). The clinical microsystem (CMS) 
represents the clinical unit with its processes where the actual care is delivered and 
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professionals of different disciplines provide care to a defined group of patients. The 
CMS also includes all supporting staff and the necessary technology and information 
to support the process of health-care delivery. The CMS framework provides a practical 
tool to look at health-care delivery and at organisational learning, thus including the 
process and structure level of the health-care system. The results showed improvements 
at both levels in all six hospitals. At process level, improvements found in all hospitals 
included extra checks on materials and instruments, improved multidisciplinary patient 
handovers and the development of a multidisciplinary checklist following the surgical 
patient from admission to discharge. Improvements at structural level were diverse, 
ranging from clarification of tasks and responsibilities for each surgical team member 
and improved registration and reporting systems, to extra educational activities for team 
members. In some hospitals new employees would receive detailed information about 
the TOPplus process and its underlying principles. In one hospital discussion between 
team members resulted in establishing dedicated, fixed teams in specific surgical areas 
such as minimal invasive surgery.
Overall, the whole stepwise process of design, test and evaluation, redesign and 
implementation of TOPplus, gradually engaging more professionals and disciplines in the 
project, improved communication and teamwork among team members and facilitated its 
adaptation and adoption. It also enhanced the team learning process to improve patient 
safety in a more sustainable way through improvements in the supporting structures 
of the hospital system, e.g. team training or installing incident reporting systems. All 
fifteen hospitals implemented TOPplus in every operating theatre in the hospital. Over 
the last two years, the researchers received and are still receiving, requests to redesign 
the poster or design a new poster for other disciplines, e.g. intervention radiology, 
intervention cardiology, psychiatry and very recently obstetrics.
9.2 Discussion
This research project was based on the hypothesis that the best learning opportunities 
are in and around the workplace. More than ever teams need time to reflect and react 
while working to anticipate unexpected changes in the complex and dynamic work 
environment of health-care delivery. Although health care has improved immensely in 
treating patients with the introduction of innovative procedures and new medication, 
this has also increased the number of disciplines involved and the risk of errors, which 
can be human or system related. In contrast to human failures, which are inevitable and 
difficult to manage, system or organisational failures are to some extent manageable. 
Errors can be reduced by redesigning organisational processes and by designing in 
barriers to prevent errors from occurring. To improve processes and procedures in a 
more sustainable way teams need time to reflect, experiment and learn. However, team 
learning requires a certain attitude from individual professionals, teams and organisa-
tions. It requires individual leadership based on expertise and knowledge and not on 
hierarchical function and depends on mutual trust and respect between team members. 
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Team learning also needs an organisational environment and structure that supports 
and encourages team learning. In most hospitals, however, the focus is on improving 
efficiency, reducing costs and gathering information for external reporting systems. 
That is why this study focuses on process improvement to prevent errors and at the 
same time on improvement of communication and teamwork between team members 
as a precondition for team learning to improve patient safety. In this paragraph, we will 
discuss the lessons learned about implementing innovations and iterative learning by 
professionals in daily practice adapting and adopting TOPplus, facilitated through the 
use of methods from participatory action research.
9.2.1 Adaptive Design as a participatory and iterative research design
The slow progress in patient safety is to a certain extent due to the persistence of 
hierarchical structures and poor communication and teamwork, but also to the lack of 
high-quality evidence of successful implementation of patient safety practices (Riesen-
berg, Leitzsch et al. 2010). Most studies present low-grade evidence and provide only an 
overview of the intervention and its results. Often, outcomes, anticipated or unintentional, 
are not explained and a detailed description of the context and its influence on the design 
and implementation process is lacking (Leape, Berwick et al. 2009, Shekelle, Pronovost 
et al. 2011). Participation of professionals in the identification of relevant problems and 
in the design and implementation process is essential. The complexity and diversity of 
the organisational context in health-care require different research designs and methods 
to capture the process of design and implementation of patient safety practices. This 
study demonstrates that theoretical insights from social sciences, system design or 
human factor theory provide a better understanding of human and organisational factors 
involved. The multidisciplinary perspective in this study improved the research process 
by providing directions and instruments to design, select, evaluate and redesign patient 
safety practices.
This study presented several methodological challenges to be solved and it was 
expected that over time during the study problems would emerge that were not quite 
predictable. Questions or problems that emerged might call for additional iterative cycles, 
additional research questions or the use of a different instrument to gather data. Building 
upon the principles of Participatory Action Research we developed Adaptive Design 
(see Chapter 6), as our own research method to introduce and implement TOPplus. 
Adaptive Design can be characterised by ‘research in action’, it is participative (engaging 
participants in the research activities) and runs parallel alongside actions to improve 
processes. It requires close collaboration between participants, in this study medical 
professionals and scientific experts and a combination of different theoretical domains 
if necessary. This enabled us to adapt the sequence or the number of steps to broaden 
the scope of the study. It also created the possibility to add extra cycles or additional 
instruments whenever suitable to support the communication in the multidisciplinary 
teams in the surgical pathway across disciplinary and organisational boundaries. Learn-
ing to improve safety in health-care practices needs to take place within this complex 
system and with participation of all involved. In order to improve sustainability learning 
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also needs to take place at three levels, i.e. individual, team and organisational (Freeth 
and Reeves 2004).
In a study like this, with an open and exploratory character, the steps in the research 
process are not as well defined and prescriptive as in quantitative studies, e.g. ran-
domised controlled studies. It requires a flexible and open attitude from the researchers. 
Based on the results of each step, extra pilots were introduced and new research 
questions emerged. If required, a research method was introduced different from the one 
initially planned for in the research proposal. Adaptive Design proved to be an appropriate 
and useful method for the implementation of TOPplus. It empowered professionals in 
adjusting their work environment to meet their needs. It supported shared decision-
making grounded in their daily work environment and adoption of TOPplus as their own 
innovation in their own practice. For the researchers it provided a structure to deepen 
their insight in and learn more about specific contextual aspects in relation to TOPplus. 
The evidence gathered in this study was not only valid for participants, but at the same 
time justifiable as a scientific result. Benefitting from a multidisciplinary theoretical basis, 
we feel that this research design has helped to obtain improved scientific results and 
gain better insights into the nature of change.
As a research method Participatory Action Research is sometimes criticised. The criti-
cism concerns among others the unclear research goals, the single case approach and 
the instruments used, which might all influence the objectivity of results. (Munn-Giddings, 
Hart et al. 2005). To prevent problems related to the objectivity and the scientific validity 
of results, Adaptive Design includes rigor in methods used and preferably more cases or 
sites to compare results. With TOPplus the goal of the study was clear: implementation 
of a team intervention to improve communication and teamwork between surgical team 
members in the operating theatres. To make results between hospitals comparable, 
the intervention, the evaluation forms, questionnaire and topic list were identical and 
used in all fifteen hospitals. The questionnaire was based on validated instruments and 
analysed with statistically valid methods.
The criticism also concerns the hierarchical power within organisations, which might 
inhibit active participation of low ranking participants. As hierarchical barriers were 
identified as one of the underlying causes of poor communication and teamwork, special 
attention was paid to include everyone involved. All professionals and support staff 
directly involved in the surgical procedure were included, irrespective of hierarchical or 
functional status and provided input, verbally in meetings or written by means of the 
questionnaire and received the same reports with feedback. This study shows that active 
engagement of all involved is important and leads to improvement at process level and 
structural level. To include just a small team of professionals might limit the results of the 
innovation to certain processes or structural levels within the health-care organisation 
(Kahn and Chovanec 2010). Although, the success of Adaptive Design can certainly be 
contributed to the simplicity and adaptability of the TOPplus procedure, but the main 
reason for that success can be found in the method itself.
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9.2.2 Learning to improve safety
Learning to improve safety in health-care practices needs to take place within that 
practice and with participation of all involved (Freeth and Reeves 2004). The main chal-
lenge in this study was to overcome the resistance to change and engage professionals 
in the discussion about errors and how to improve safety. There is a widespread belief 
that health care professionals should be infallible and are supposed to perform at a 
high level of professional competence, no matter what circumstances. Errors are often 
perceived as individual failures or incompetence and difficult to discuss as a team, thus 
creating a culture of “blaming and shaming”. This hinders the ability to learn, individually, 
as a team and as an organisation. Our research demonstrated that Adaptive Design and 
TOPplus helped to overcome this barrier.
To improve patient safety through process improvement involves organisational 
learning and in this study it involved team learning. To prevent errors in the preopera-
tive process team members needed to get engaged in a learning process to discuss 
errors detected in the time out procedure before surgery and to take action. However, 
introducing this kind of learning in health-care is difficult, especially because learning is 
closely tied to professional education and the professional discipline. During the forma-
tive years in professional education, but also with continuing education as practicing 
professionals, formal learning often occurs outside the work environment. Learning is 
mostly an individual process, with a focus on technical skills and not always directly 
transferrable to their daily complex and dynamic multidisciplinary work environment. 
As a result, health-care professionals do not learn to communicate and collaborate 
with professionals from other disciplines and do not develop a common language to 
solve problems at team or organisational level. However, in daily practice professionals 
from different disciplines work together in teams to provide care to individual patients. 
Problems encountered while working need quick and adequate solutions. This kind of 
learning, defined as single-loop learning, meaning reflection in action, is adequate to 
solve these problems and correct errors before harm is done, but not enough for sustain-
able improvement. Problems encountered often need multidisciplinary solutions, in other 
words, team learning. To prevent errors from recurring in the future team members need 
more time for reflection and discuss the problems in depth as a team to find adequate 
and creative long-term solutions. Therefore, a different type of learning is required.
The monodisciplinary character of professional education also affects the work envi-
ronment of health care organisations. Departmental boundaries are defined by medical 
disciplines and create monodisciplinary silos with monodisciplinary work processes, 
which means that professionals not only learn in silos but also work in silos. The first 
cycle in the TOPplus study, testing the prototype on content and usability, helped to 
overcome barriers to change. The insight gained in errors created a sense of urgency 
and awareness about the multidisciplinary character of work processes in the operating 
theatre and the interdependency between team members. The structured feedback on 
the incidence, the nature of errors that occurred and the simplicity of the procedure 
stimulated discussion with the whole team. For instance, with respect to missing patient 
verification, the operating theatre team members clarified tasks and responsibilities to 
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restructure the patient handover, by adding a specific item on patient identification or 
making the ward nurse present at the handover responsible for the pre-operative checks 
carried out on the clinical ward. The results of the second cycle showed an immediate 
decrease in the number of patients admitted to the operating theatre without patient 
identification and thus the chance of wrong patient errors. The whole process decreased 
the resistance to report and discuss errors and improved collaboration with the clinical 
ward team.
Solutions often included changing multidisciplinary processes and collaboration with 
different professionals and departments at all levels throughout the whole system. In 
other words, identifying sustainable solutions requires double-loop learning, i.e. reflection 
on how processes are organised and interrelated or reflection on action (Schon 1984). 
Our data, gathered in the iterative cycles, showed that most errors were neither related 
to individual failures nor to violations, but to system failures in the health care delivery 
process. They were also not incidental but errors with a more structural character. 
This made it easier for professionals to discuss these errors, to speak up and voice 
concerns. It opened up the team discussion to find solutions, decreased hierarchical 
and disciplinary barriers and improved good communication and teamwork. The positive 
results from the iterative cycles also initiated a discussion with technical experts from 
the IT department to develop an adequate registration and reporting system. This makes 
it easier to capture near misses and not only decreases errors but also helps to create 
an open and blame-free culture as a precondition to learn from errors as a team and 
improve patient safety (Firth-Cozens 2001, Edmondson 2004).
The introduction of TOPplus, accompanied with Adaptive Design methods, helped 
to create a supportive work environment and, being dialogue-based, contributed in 
a natural way to the creation of an open and blame-free culture. In most hospitals, 
the whole process of fully implementing TOPplus took one to two years and in some 
hospitals even longer. Even professionals that strongly opposed the project admitted 
that it did help to improve their surgical process. As one surgeon commented: “It does 
not feel safe anymore to perform surgery without doing the time out first!” It took a lot 
of energy and perseverance of each team that initiated the discussion around patient 
safety, but as Hudson (2001) stated:
”The road to safety may seem long and hard and appear to wind, but the destination 
makes it well worthwhile” (Hudson 2001).
9.3 Limitations
Because of its flexible and open character, Adaptive Design is a useful research method 
for studies in a dynamic and complex environment with a large variety in contextual as-
pects that might influence the objectives of the study and the research methods used. For 
the TOPplus study Adaptive Design appeared to be a valuable and appropriate method 
to apply. During the TOPplus project, however, there were some limitations related to the 
role of the researcher and to the exploratory character of the study that made it difficult 
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to be specific in terms of outcomes. Questions were also raised about the influence of 
cultural differences on the method or the instruments used and, consequently on the 
validity and effectiveness of Adaptive Design in different organisational cultures. In some 
cases where hierarchical differences are prominent, the participation of professionals 
might be limited to a small group of ‘preferred’ professionals.
The dual role of the researcher in Adaptive design, i.e. working as a researcher but 
also being actively involved in the implementation process, might raise questions about 
the validity of the research process. One of the researchers was also responsible for 
the implementation of TOPplus in the operating rooms in the four university hospitals 
in this study. To safeguard the objectivity of the study, however, the researchers used 
validated questionnaires and introduced a number of cross-checks. Four independent 
researchers cross-checked the data related to incidents and member checks were 
done with all professionals that participated in the study, each of whom received full 
reports with detailed information. In addition, the two researchers that carried out the 
study had a different scientific background, viz. one with a background in Industrial 
Design Engineering and the author of this thesis in Nursing and Organisational Learning. 
Inclusion of more organisations in the TOPplus study also helped to reduce the risk of 
becoming subjective and increased the scientific validity of results. All hospitals were 
required to follow the research protocol and monitor the inclusion criteria. As a result, 
one hospital was excluded from the study because the questionnaire was distributed 
too late, following the introduction of TOPplus and not before as required.
The second limitation is that some uncertainty about the outcomes remains. The 
study clearly showed that, according to the respondents, the introduction of TOPplus 
improved communication. It also showed how improvements were made to prevent 
incidents from recurring and how the use of Adaptive Design seems to have stimulated 
the implementation process. However, statistical evidence about the effects of the 
implementation of TOPplus on the number of incidents is still lacking. This is mainly 
related to the fact that measuring incidents is problematic, because it depends on the 
willingness of professionals to report these. This willingness only improves when safety 
awareness improves and a blame-free culture exists.
The question remains about the ability to generalise our findings. A different organi-
sational culture but also cross-national cultural differences might be of influence on the 
effectiveness of action research. Cross-national cultural differences become visible in 
cultural traits and are far deeper ingrained in individual or group behaviour and thus 
also deeply ingrained in organisational behaviour. Differences as power distance, 
individualism versus collectivism, or being more competitive versus being focused on 
harmonisation need to be taken into consideration when choosing a specific research 
method and the instruments used. Despite these arguments, Adaptive Design might still 
be a valuable research method to use. In studies that focus on change and continuous 
improvement like TOPplus methods like Adaptive Design that combine quantitative with 
qualitative research methods, that are more formative and evaluative, are appropriate 
and valuable (Ovretveit 2009).
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9.4 Perspectives for clinical practice
The TOPplus study demonstrates that a multifactor approach, using implementation 
strategies that address clinical processes as well as behavioural aspects, helps to 
overcome resistance and increases adoption of patient safety initiatives. This study also 
shows that the implementation strategy should focus on creating learning opportunities, 
learning as a team, discussing problems encountered and improving shared decision-
making.
At the start of the implementation process, it is important to address the scope of a 
problem within the local context. How serious is the problem, how many times does 
it occur and what are the consequences? Gathering concrete evidence about the 
frequency and the nature of the problem helps to adapt the intervention and to overcome 
resistance. One of the reasons this study focused on the operating theatre was the 
availability of scientific evidence about preventable errors (Bleich 2005, Langelaan, de 
Bruijne et al. 2013). The first step in the TOPplus study was to gather evidence about 
incidents in each of the participating hospitals to gain insight in the local situation. Even 
within the same location, with every new discipline or team, it might be necessary to 
repeat this first step.
The use of a systems approach helps to adapt the intervention by identifying its 
interrelatedness with other care processes. The experience of the team members in 
contextualisation using Adaptive Design methods reduces most barriers for implementa-
tion of patient safety initiatives. The objective of TOPplus was to implement a team 
intervention in the operating theatre to improve patient safety. As many errors identified 
in the operating theatre result from process or system failures in the pre-operative 
trajectory, a systems approach was required. In addition to discussing system failures, 
it initiated the discussion about so-called defences in the surgical pathway to prevent 
human failures. In the TOPplus study, this concerned the introduction of so-called 
“stopping rules” at critical patient handovers in the surgical pathway. Using a systems 
approach and Adaptive Design methods put the focus of the study on individual and 
team responsibilities and not on hierarchies. The challenge is to shift from “who did it” 
to “how did it happen”(Walton 2006).
Time should be spent to discuss the objective of the project and inform teams about the 
methods used in Adaptive Design. Professionals need the assurance that the information 
they provide is paramount for decision-making and in adapting the innovation to their 
clinical practice. During the TOPplus project much time was spent on team meetings. 
Team members then discussed the results between the iterative cycles to redesign 
TOPplus and improve usability within their specific context. Extra team meetings need 
to be organised or extra cycles added, whenever necessary.
The last perspective for clinical practice concerns professional education. To create 
awareness about the multidisciplinary character of health care services delivery and 
the interdependency between team members, it is recommended to introduce inter-
professional education in the initial curricula of health-care professionals. Socialisation 
processes acquired during the early years of professional education have a strong 
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influence on individual behaviour later in professional practice. Therefore, it is recom-
mended to design and to introduce multidisciplinary educational activities in the initial 
curricula. Patient safety is a current and interesting subject to explore for these activities. 
In addition, multi-professional educational activities should also be organised within 
clinical practice. It is important to learn and continue to learn and therefore educate and 
train professionals and support staff, including care managers and governors. Education 
and training should include patient safety issues and protocols professionals can use to 
prevent errors and instruments or tools to analyse near misses and errors, to learn from.
Although the TOPplus study has not produced all the results we expected, it did initiate 
the first step in a process to change the organisational culture. A change from a culture 
where hierarchal functions are dominant and errors are perceived as individual failures 
to a culture of openness, where reporting near misses and errors is routine and learning 
from errors is valued and rewarded (Firth-Cozens 2001, Edmondson 2011). A process 
like that, requiring a change in procedures and a change in behaviour, will take a lot of 
time, energy and perseverance from all involved, throughout the whole organisation. This 
leads us to the last subject in discussing future perspectives: health-care governance.
A subject that has not been addressed in the TOPplus study and now very topical, is 
health-care governance and the role of board members and Chief Executive Officers 
(CEO’s) in relation to quality and safety. Improvement in quality and safety needs to take 
place at all four interrelated levels of the health-care organisation: individual, team and 
organisational and external stakeholders. TOPplus was limited to the individual and team 
level of the organisation, but to realise real and sustainable change the strategic organi-
sational level should be actively involved. Hospital board members and CEOs should 
take responsibility and play an active role in major improvement programmes addressing 
quality and safety. Active leadership, such as executive leadership walk rounds and 
providing resources (e.g. IT-support, material or extra educational activities on patient 
safety issues for all involved) improve quality and safety and reinforce implementation 
of patient safety practices. Although participation of board members is highly recom-
mended by national and international institutions on patient safety, our study showed 
that in many cases active participation is lacking. According to Conway (2008), problems 
identified impeding board members’ engagement were: illiteracy on quality and safety, 
the absence of an agenda to improve quality and safety and accountability (Conway 
2008). Moreover, in many health-care organisations a long-term vision and strategy are 
lacking because of budgetary problems most hospitals are facing (Bodenheimer and 
Fernandez 2005). Strategies to improve engagement should focus on these subjects and 
gather evidence on the impact of governance on quality and safety at organisational level. 
More and better-structured information is needed to design evidence-based strategies 
and systems and CEOs and board members should expand their expertise to use these 
to reinforce patient safety initiatives (Millar, Mannion et al. 2013). In this respect, the 
role of CEOs and hospital boards in relation to patient safety issues is still an immature 
research field and needs a distinctive body of knowledge and a methodology that is 
suitable for this domain. Governing institutions outside the hospital organisations, like 
quality assurance institutions or national inspectorates, should change their role from 
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prescriptive and corrective to monitoring the results and supporting implementation of 
best practices. They should also develop evidence-based multidisciplinary guidelines 
with professional organisations and reinforce structural reporting, not to design ranking 
systems, but to create a learning environment, stimulate the exchange of best practices 
between hospitals and encourage a continuous endeavour for excellence.
9.5 Perspectives for research
Future research should focus on improvement initiatives that aim to design and imple-
ment multidisciplinary processes to improve quality and safety. Similar to TOPplus, 
these projects should also support the creation of a non-punitive culture and a learning 
environment. One of the subjects most discussed in the TOPplus study were the 
pre- and postoperative handovers in the surgical pathway. Although improvements 
were introduced, scientific evidence about the results and the essential components of 
handovers is still lacking (Cheung, Kelly et al. 2009, Manser, Foster et al. 2013). Questions 
to be addressed include among others which elements are crucial for patient safety to 
make the handover effective and efficient, what would be the best moment in the surgical 
pathway to discuss these items and who should be involved?
An interesting subject to focus on is the daily ward round, when a multidisciplinary team 
visits the patient and discusses the patient’s condition, laboratory results and possible 
actions to review and plan patient care. Ward rounds are complex multidisciplinary 
clinical activities to provide safe care for patients and require effective communication 
between team members. Like TOPplus, ward rounds provide an excellent opportunity 
to learn as a team and include patients in the discussion. Similar to handovers, research 
should focus on the structure of the ward round and how it can be improved. What 
should be discussed, who should be involved and what are the responsibilities of each 
team member (Mohan and Caldwell 2013)?.
TOPplus includes a time out procedure and a debriefing. Our research shows that 
by now the time out procedure is introduced as a daily routine procedure and mostly 
performed as designed, with the whole team. However, the debriefing part of TOPplus 
needs more attention. A follow-up study in five hospitals showed that the low compliance 
was mainly caused by lack of attention of the surgical team, lack of time and lack of 
feedback on actions taken and results. Suggestions to improve compliance and make 
the debriefing meaningful were the following: adaptation of the timing of the debriefing 
following termination of anaesthetic procedure and assign responsibility for certain 
subjects (surgical, anaesthetic, instruments and material) to individual team members. 
Research on performance and compliance following introduction of these improvement 
measures will provide useful information about which item contributes most to improving 
effectiveness of the debriefing.
Another subject that requires further research is related to the feedback on the results 
following each iterative cycle in the Adaptive Design model. Not only because the 
debriefing lacked feedback, but also to find out if different forms of feedback improve 
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compliance and lead to more improvement actions. With TOPplus the feedback was 
provided following every cycle that differed in length between hospitals. Some hospitals 
were productive in their decision-making process and quickly entered the next cycle, 
however, in some hospitals each cycle would take more time. The next step in the 
TOPplus study could be the introduction of a feedback cycle every two or four weeks, 
studying the effect on shared decision-making and adoption. A stepped wedge design 
would provide an appropriate research design to include more sites at different time 
intervals, gathering insight in contextual aspects that are specific in a certain context 
and those that can be generalised (Brown, Young et al. 2014, Guzman, Fitzgerald et 
al. 2014). Gradually more articles are published in high impact medical journals that 
question the applicability and effectiveness of RCTs and promote innovative qualitative 
research methods that focus on quality improvement, learning and change (Bate and 
Robert 2006, Tunis, Benner et al. 2010).
Last but not least, an important and actual subject to explore is patient engagement. 
What is the role of the patient in patient safety initiatives? Handovers and ward rounds 
provide an excellent opportunity to study the role of the patient in clinical activities as 
well as in research projects. Active engagement of the patient in safety practices and 
active engagement as a partner and stakeholder in research projects might lead to 
improved outcomes, not only for the patient but also for the health-care organisation 
(Berger, Flickinger et al. 2014). Patients are getting more and more involved in shared 
decision-making and redesigning health-care delivery, already pointing to a future role of 
the patient as a member of his own care team, possibly even with specific responsibilities 
for his own treatment process. Laws are issued to safeguard patient information and 
informed consent and national and international patient organisations are involved in 
the development of policies and guidelines to improve health-care delivery. However, 
scientific evidence on patient participation, on how to involve patients and identification 
of valid measurable results is lacking and very much needed (Domecq, Prutsky et al. 
2014).
To conclude this discussion, based on the results of this study it is strongly advised to 
use a multifactor approach in studies addressing design and implementation of Patient 
Safety Practices. This implies the combination of research methods from different 
theoretical domains, e.g. health-care technology and behavioural sciences, composing 
a multidisciplinary research team and using the Adaptive Design methodology and 
strategies to support, structure and monitor the implementation process.
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Since the publication of the Institute of Medicine study “To Err is Human” ten years ago, 
followed by “Crossing the Quality Chasm” two years later, patient safety has become a 
concern for all involved: patients, healthcare professionals and healthcare organizations. 
Over the last ten years, significant improvements were made and many innovative 
initiatives resulted in improved patient safety. However, research shows that preventable 
medical errors, also called Adverse Events (AEs) still occur. Causes of errors are diverse 
and range from technical and organizational factors, to human and patient factors. In 
many health care studies on patient safety, human factors e.g. communication and 
teamwork, are identified as the main contributors to the causation of AEs. A significant 
part of AEs is found in acute care hospitals and most of these errors in surgery and more 
specifically in the Operating Theatre (OT). Errors as wrong patient, wrong procedure and 
wrong site, often result in severe consequences for patients. To improve communication 
and teamwork and decrease the number of errors and prevent errors from occurring is 
one of the biggest challenges in OT.
Research on patient safety in surgical care shows four areas that complicate imple-
mentation of patient safety initiatives: 1) the complex and dynamic character of surgical 
care, which makes processes in OT difficult to manage and vulnerable to human error, 2) 
the professional silos and independent medical departments that make team cohesion 
and information-sharing at system level, across disciplines and departments difficult, 
3) the organizational culture that needs to change from a punitive “blame and shame 
culture”, to a “safe culture”, without hierarchical barriers, where errors are perceived as 
opportunities to learn from and 4) the ability to learn as a team.
This thesis focuses on a Time Out Procedure (TOP) and debriefing (plus) to improve 
communication and teamwork of multi-disciplinary teams in the operating theatre (OT) 
to enhance patient safety. In a time out procedure critical items related to the patient 
or the surgical intervention are double checked to prevent errors from occurring. In the 
debriefing incidents or complications are discussed to prevent errors from occurring 
post operatively.
A basic multidisciplinary surgical team includes at least five team members: the 
surgeon, the anaesthesiologist, the scrub nurse, the circulating nurse and the nurse 
anaesthetist.
The overall research question of this thesis was: How to design and implement a time 
out procedure and debriefing to improve communication and teamwork in the operating 
theatre?
Chapter 2 shows the results of a systematic review of team interventions, which con-
firmed the relevance of studying the time out procedure. The results of this review 
show that although many articles were found that described interventions to improve 
team performance, most of these articles presented very poor scientific evidence. The 
interventions described included tools, training activities and organizational interven-
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tions. Although most studies presented an association between the intervention and 
non-technical skills, the evidence was weak. However, for teams in acute care there 
is growing evidence that communication and coordination skills in complex medical 
departments can be improved by simulation training and training activities based on 
the concept of Crew Research Management. Yet, the specific circumstances of a team 
should be diagnosed before and adapt the intervention to the local context.
Chapter 3 presents the results of a questionnaire measuring the perception of OT team 
members regarding communication and teamwork, before introduction of TOPplus 
in OT. A pre-study in several hospitals confirmed the need for introducing TOPplus in 
OT. Differences in perceptions were measured between surgeons, OT-nurses (scrub 
nurses and circulating nurses), nurse anaesthetists and anaesthesiologists. The largest 
differences were found in communication, especially for surgeons compared to all other 
team members. All team members differed in perception of teamwork, whereas for situ-
ation awareness again the surgeons were far more positive compared to all other team 
members. Differences were also found for OT nurses compared to nurse anaesthetists 
and anaesthesiologists. Moreover, most team members rated briefings and debriefings 
as inadequate. OT teams are ad hoc, often changing in composition and very rarely meet 
as a team before surgery. Adequate briefings and debriefings provide team members 
with actual and necessary information to anticipate possible complications.
Chapter 4 describes the design of this prototype and the underlying rationale. To be 
able to successfully introduce TOPplus in OT, the first step that needed to be taken was 
the development of a prototype. Improvement of communication, situation awareness 
and teamwork helps individual team members to make the transition from autonomous 
professional to team player and achieve safe care. To reduce the incidence of errors and 
to minimize the consequences of those that do occur, teams should use all available 
data to understand the causes of errors and take appropriate actions. As actions might 
also include changing policies and procedures, a system approach is required to make 
linkages between other departments seamless, timely, efficient and reliable. TOPplus is 
dialogue-based to reduce hierarchical barriers and engage OT team members in double-
loop learning to critically reflect on and improve organizational practices. TOPplus was 
piloted at three hospital locations. A poster was developed to support the dialogue 
between OT team members and tested on usability. OT team members were invited 
to provide feedback on the layout and structure of the poster and on the content and 
structure of TOPplus. Most professionals perceived TOPplus and the strategy used for 
implementation as very positive. They especially valued the ability to adapt the poster 
to their local context, by adding, rephrasing or deleting questions, or changing team 
members asking or answering questions. The precise moment to perform the time out 
and the consequences for the number of questions asked, are still open to discussion.
Chapter 5 describes the design and implementation of TOPplus in five hospitals. The 
final step, in introducing the TOPplus in OT, was the development and testing of an 
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implementation strategy to improve adaptation to the local context and adoption by all 
involved. Participatory Design (PD), a theory developed in Industrial Design Engineering, 
was used as a strategy to engage professionals from different disciplines in the design 
and implementation process. Developing TOPplus with a multidisciplinary design-expert-
team and a multidisciplinary local hospital-expert-team, providing frequent feedback 
and adapting it to the local context, proved to be valuable and was much appreciated 
by professionals. Although TOPplus reduced resistance and improved adaptation, it 
was insufficient to fully implement TOPplus in all hospitals. The study in five hospitals 
showed that for full implementation teams needed more time to reflect on errors, discuss 
possible actions and experiment and learn. In some hospitals, contextual differences 
between but also within surgical disciplines were far greater than expected and adequate 
adaptations to improve adoption required more time.
Chapter 6 describes how participatory design and experiential learning were combined 
in a new model called Adaptive Design. It also presents a detailed description of the 
use of Adaptive Design in implementation processes where the local context requires 
tailor-made solutions. To put more emphasis on the team learning process and to create 
more time to experiment and learn as a team, PD was complemented with Experiential 
Learning (EL), which resulted in a new model called Adaptive Design (AD). The aim of 
the study was to find out if Adaptive Design would support a team learning process to 
structure and monitor the design and implementation process of TOPplus. The results 
show that teams in each hospital were able to adapt TOPplus to their own needs and 
context. The iterative process of redesigning, experimenting and learning stimulated 
engagement of professionals, improved adaptation and facilitated adoption. Adaptive 
Design creates the possibility to add extra iterative cycles, depending on the complexity 
of the local context, without losing the fundamental objective of TOPplus.
Chapter 7 presents the results of this pre-post study to measure the effect of design and 
implementation of TOPplus on improved perception of communication and teamwork 
between OT team members. The results of the introduction of TOPplus were measured 
by performing a pre-post study in all participating hospitals. T0 resulted in an overall 
response rate of 44%(n=725) and T1 in 36% (n=554). At T1 all disciplines showed 
significant higher ratings in non-technical skills, especially in Communication and 
Decision-making. Exchanging critical information about the patient and the surgical 
procedure pre-operatively improves situation awareness and encourages speaking-up 
intra-operatively. Most significant improvements were found for OT nurses, the least 
for nurse anaesthetists. To gather evidence on sustainable effects, it is recommended 
to repeat measurements over a longer period of time and to include a combination of 
process outcome measures, or patient reported outcomes. Furthermore, a combined 
approach of safety procedures and team interventions might reinforce the effect on 
team performance.
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Chapter 8 describes the results of a multi-site study to explore the effect of TOPplus. The 
aim of introducing TOPplus was not only to improve teamwork in OT, but also to improve 
processes elsewhere in the surgical pathway to prevent errors from occurring in the 
future. It was expected that TOPplus would not only lead to process improvement in OT, 
but would also improve team learning across disciplinary and departmental boundaries. 
To identify improvements in processes or supporting organisational structures, the Clini-
cal Micro Systems (CMS) framework was used. The CMS-framework looks at health care 
from a systems perspective and is defined as: the combination of a small group of people 
who work together on a regular basis, or come together as needed around the patient, 
to provide care to a small well-defined group of patients. A CMS includes administrative 
and management support, information and information technology and is embedded in 
the processes and structures of a larger organizational system. For this study, it provided 
a framework for the interviews and to analyse results at process and structure level. In 
six hospitals, 55 semi-structured interviews were carried out involving professionals 
from different disciplines. TOPplus was adopted as a daily routine procedure, adapted 
to the local context, but not always with the whole team present. In all six hospitals, the 
effects of TOPplus were visible organization-wide, at process and structure level. The 
team discussions helped to gain insight in the interrelatedness and interdependency 
not only between team members, but also with other disciplines and departments. This 
study showed the importance of a process-oriented and a system approach and how 
individual learning can be changed to team learning and from single-loop learning cycles 
to double-loop learning cycles.
In Chapter 9 all research findings are recapitulated and discussed. The advantages 
of using Adaptive Design as a design and implementation strategy in combination 
with Participatory Action Research as research method are discussed. The necessity 
of learning on the job as a team is emphasized, preferably as an integrated part of 
daily work processes. Future perspectives for clinical practice and further research are 
discussed and recommendations given. For studies addressing patient safety practices, 
it is strongly recommended to use a multifactor approach, to combine research methods 
from different scientific domains and to include professionals from different scientific 
and healthcare disciplines.
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Sinds de publicatie van de Harvard Medical Practice studie van het Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) “To Err is Human”, twee jaar later gevolgd door “Crossing the Quality Chasm”, 
staat patiëntveiligheid bij patiënten, zorgprofessionals en ook zorgorganisaties, volop 
in de belangstelling. De laatste 10 jaar zijn al veel initiatieven ontplooid om de zorg 
aantoonbaar te verbeteren, maar onderzoek laat zien dat er nog veel medische fouten 
gemaakt worden en veel vermijdbare fouten voorkomen kunnen worden. De oorzaken 
voor medische fouten zijn divers en variëren van technische fouten en fouten die met de 
organisatie van zorg te maken hebben, tot patiënt gebonden en vooral menselijke fouten. 
In veel studies is aangetoond dat communicatie en teamwerk, of juist een gebrek daar-
aan, de oorzaak zijn van vermijdbare fouten. Een groot deel van de vermijdbare fouten 
vindt men in ziekenhuizen en vooral in de operatiekamers. Fouten als verkeerde patiënt, 
verkeerde procedure en verkeerde kant komen nog steeds voor en resulteren veelal in 
ernstige complicaties voor patiënten. Het verbeteren van communicatie en teamwerk 
en het reduceren van fouten zijn een grote uitdaging voor teams in de operatiekamer. 
Uit onderzoek blijkt dat er vier factoren zijn die de implementatie van initiatieven om de 
patiëntveiligheid te verbeteren bemoeilijken:
1) het complexe en dynamische karakter van operatieve interventies
2) de monodisciplinaire professionele silo’s en medische afdelingen, die teamcohesie 
en het uitwisselen van informatie bemoeilijken
3) de organisatiecultuur, die moet veranderen van een “blaming-and-shaming” cultuur, 
naar een veilige cultuur, zonder hiërarchische barrières, waar fouten worden gezien 
als een kans om van te leren en
4) het onvermogen om gezamenlijk als team te leren.
Dit proefschrift richt zich op het ontwerpen en implementeren van een time out 
procedure en debriefing in de operatiekamer om daarmee de communicatie en samen-
werking van multidisciplinaire teams in de operatiekamer te verbeteren en daardoor 
ook de patiëntveiligheid. Een time out procedure is een “double-check”  van kritische 
factoren, die te maken hebben met de patiënt of met de operatieve ingreep om fouten 
te voorkomen, voorafgaand aan de operatieve ingreep. In de debriefing bespreekt men 
incidenten of complicaties die zich tijdens de operatie hebben voorgedaan om fouten 
in het postoperatieve traject te voorkomen. Een basisteam voor een operatieve ingreep 
bestaat uit een operateur, twee OK-assistenten, een die assisteert tijdens de operatieve 
ingreep en een omloop, een anesthesioloog en een anesthesiemedewerker.
De centrale vraag van dit proefschrift luidt als volgt: Op welke manier kunnen we een time 
out procedure en debriefing ontwerpen en implementeren en daarmee de communicatie 
en samenwerking tussen teamleden en tussen teams in de operatiekamer verbeteren?
Hoofdstuk 2 presenteert de resultaten van een systematic review van teaminterventies, 
waarmee de relevantie om een time out procedure en debriefing als onderzoeksobject te 
nemen bevestigd werd. Ofschoon veel artikelen zijn gevonden met een beschrijving van 
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interventies om het functioneren van teams te verbeteren, lieten de meeste artikelen zeer 
weinig wetenschappelijk bewijs zien. Interventies waren o.a. instrumenten, trainingen 
en interventies gericht op de organisatie. Weliswaar is in een aantal artikelen een relatie 
gevonden tussen de interventie en de niet-technische vaardigheden, maar was er weinig 
bewijskracht. Ten aanzien van teams in de acute zorg is er echter in toenemende mate 
bewijs te vinden dat communicatie en samenwerking verbeterd kunnen worden door 
deelname aan simulaties of trainingsactiviteiten die gebaseerd zijn op het concept van 
Crew Resource Management (CRM). Het advies is wel om voorafgaand aan de interventie 
de actuele situatie in kaart te brengen.
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert de resultaten van een vragenlijst waarmee bij teamleden 
van operatiekamers de perceptie gemeten is van communicatie en teamwerk op de 
operatiekamer. Dit alles voorafgaand aan de introductie van een Time Out Procedure 
(TOP) in combinatie met een debriefing (plus). Een voorstudie in enkele ziekenhuizen 
bevestigde de noodzaak en het nut om procedures als TOPplus te introduceren. Verschil-
len in perceptie zijn gemeten bij operateurs, ok-assistenten, anesthesiemedewerkers 
en anesthesiologen. De grootste verschillen zijn gevonden in relatie tot communicatie. 
De perceptie van de operateurs was meer positief dan die van de andere teamleden. 
In relatie tot teamwerk verschilden alle groepen van elkaar, maar in relatie tot situation 
awareness scoorden de operateurs opnieuw veel hoger dan de andere teamleden. Er 
zijn ook verschillen gevonden in scores tussen de ok-assistenten vergeleken met die 
van de anesthesiemedewerkers en de anesthesiologen. Bovendien zijn briefings en 
debriefings door de meeste teamleden als onvoldoende beoordeeld. In de operatieka-
mers werken teams veelal niet in vaste samenstelling en hebben zij slechts incidenteel 
gezamenlijk overleg voorafgaand aan de ingreep. Door een goede briefing en debriefing 
zijn medewerkers in staat om de juiste maatregelen te nemen en in te spelen op mogelijke 
complicaties tijdens het per- of postoperatieve proces.
Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een beschrijving van het ontwerpen van het prototype van TOPplus 
en de basisbegrippen die daaraan ten grondslag liggen. Dit was de eerste stap in het 
proces om TOPplus op een goede manier in de operatiekamer te introduceren. Goede 
communicatie en teamwerk en goed op de hoogte zijn van alle bijzonderheden maken 
dat teamleden in staat zijn de transitie te maken van autonome professional naar 
teamspeler en gezamenlijk de patiëntveiligheid te verbeteren. Om fouten te voorkomen 
en zo goed mogelijk om te gaan met de consequenties van fouten die toch gebeu-
ren, moeten teams zo veel mogelijk informatie verzamelen om zicht te krijgen op de 
(mogelijke) oorzaken en dan adequaat te reageren. Omdat dit ook kan betekenen dat 
richtlijnen en procedures moeten veranderen, is een systeembenadering noodzakelijk 
om de verbinding/samenwerking met andere afdelingen naadloos, tijdig, efficiënt en 
betrouwbaar te kunnen organiseren. TOPplus is gericht op het versterken van de 
dialoog tussen teamleden om zo hiërarchische barrières te verminderen, teamleden te 
betrekken bij “double-loop” leren en samen te reflecteren op bestaande organisatorische 
processen en procedures en deze te verbeteren. In drie ziekenhuizen is met TOPplus 
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een pilot uitgevoerd om de bruikbaarheid te testen. Om de dialoog tussen de teamleden 
te ondersteunen is een poster ontwikkeld. Teamleden zijn uitgenodigd om feedback te 
geven op de inhoud, de structuur en de lay-out van zowel de procedure als de poster. 
TOPplus en de implementatiestrategie die gebruikt is, zijn door de meeste teamleden 
als zeer positief ervaren. Vooral de mogelijkheid om de poster aan te passen aan de 
eigen context door vragen te herformuleren, toe te voegen of te verwijderen, omdat 
deze vragen niets toevoegen, is door veel teamleden gewaardeerd. De discussie over 
het moment van de time out procedure en de gevolgen van het toevoegen van extra 
vragen (tijd) is nog niet afgerond.
Hoofdstuk 5 geeft een beschrijving van het ontwerp- en implementatieproces in vijf 
verschillende ziekenhuizen. Een van de laatste stappen in het onderzoek rond de 
introductie van TOPplus in de operatiekamer was het ontwerpen en toetsen van een 
implementatiestrategie om alle professionals te betrekken bij het aanpassen van de 
procedure en toepassen daarvan in de eigen situatie. Om dit te bereiken is gebruik 
gemaakt van Participatory Design dat binnen Industrieel Ontwerpen gebruikt wordt als 
methode om eindgebruikers te betrekken bij een ontwerp- en implementatieproces. Het 
werken met een multidisciplinair ontwerpteam en een multidisciplinair lokaal team van 
zorgprofessionals was nuttig en werd erg op prijs gesteld. Alhoewel met de introductie 
van TOPplus de weerstand onder professionals verminderde, was de tijd voor  experi-
menteren en leren nog onvoldoende voor acceptatie van TOPplus door alle professionals 
in alle ziekenhuizen. Met deze studie is aangetoond dat voor volledige acceptatie en 
gebruik van TOPplus, teams meer tijd nodig hebben om gezamenlijk te reflecteren, te 
experimenteren en te leren. In sommige ziekenhuizen was het verschil tussen disciplines 
te groot en te divers, waardoor een adequate aanpassing om TOPplus op een goede 
manier te gebruiken, meer tijd kostte.
Hoofdstuk 6 bevat een beschrijving van een nieuw model: “Adaptive Design”, waarin 
participatory design is samen gevoegd met experiential learning. Het hoofdstuk geeft 
ook een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de toepassing van “Adaptive Design” in im-
plementatieprocessen waar de lokale context om op maat gesneden oplossingen 
vraagt. Om meer nadruk te leggen op het gezamenlijke leerproces van teamleden en 
meer tijd te creëren om samen na te denken en te experimenteren, is participatory 
design aangevuld met experiential learning. Het doel van de studie was om te toetsen 
of “Adaptive Design” als implementatiestrategie geschikt was om het leerproces rond 
TOPplus te structureren en te monitoren. Uit de resultaten is te concluderen dat de 
teams op deze manier in staat waren om TOPplus aan te passen aan de eigen lokale 
context. Het iteratieve proces van herontwerp, experimenteren en leren stimuleerde de 
participatie van professionals, bevorderde aanpassen van de procedure en faciliteerde 
adoptie. “Adaptive Design” creëerde  de mogelijkheid om extra cycli toe te voegen, 
indien dat in verband met de complexiteit van de eigen context nodig was, zonder de 
basisdoelstelling van TOPplus te ondergraven.
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Hoofdstuk 7 presenteert de resultaten van een voor- en nastudie waarin het effect 
is gemeten van het ontwerpen en implementeren van TOPplus op de perceptie van 
communicatie en samenwerking van teamleden. De voor- en nastudie zijn uitgevoerd bij 
alle ziekenhuizen  (n=15) die aan de TOPplus-studie hebben meegedaan. De To gaf een 
respons van 40% (n=725) en in T1 een respons van 36% (n=554). In T1 is bij alle disciplines 
een verbetering te zien bij de niet-technische vaardigheden, vooral bij Communicatie en 
Besluitvorming. Het uitwisselen van kritische informatie over de patiënt of de operatieve 
ingreep bevordert dat teamleden tijdens de operatie opmerkingen durven te maken. 
De meest significante verbeteringen zijn gevonden bij de operatieassistenten, weinig 
verbetering is te zien bij de anesthesiemedewerkers. Om het effect op de langere termijn 
vast te kunnen stellen, is het aan te bevelen de metingen regelmatig te herhalen en 
aan te vullen met resultaten gekoppeld aan het zorgproces of aan patiënt-gerelateerde 
uitkomsten. Daarnaast zou een gecombineerde aanpak van een veiligheidsprocedure 
met een teaminterventie het effect op teamprestaties kunnen versterken.
Hoofdstuk 8 geeft een beschrijving van een multi-site studie, die is uitgevoerd om het 
effect te meten van TOPplus op het hele zorgproces. TOPplus was niet alleen bedoeld 
om de communicatie te verbeteren, maar ook om fouten in de toekomst te voorkomen 
door het aanpassen van processen in eerdere stadia van het zorgproces. De verwachting 
was dat TOPplus niet alleen de processen in de operatiekamer zou verbeteren, maar ook 
invloed zou uitoefenen op het leren van teams over de grenzen van afdelingen en die van 
medische disciplines heen. Om verbeteringen elders in het zorgproces van de operatieve 
patiënt te identificeren is het Clinical Micro-Systems (CMS) model gebruikt. Het CMS 
biedt een kader om vanuit de systeembenadering naar zorgprocessen te kijken en kan 
gedefinieerd worden als de combinatie van een kleine groep mensen, die op reguliere 
basis samenwerkt of, afhankelijk van de situatie van de patiënt, bij elkaar komt om voor 
een kleine, helder omschreven patiëntengroep de gewenste zorg te verlenen. Een CMS 
omvat ook de administratieve en technische functies, die zijn ingebed in de processen 
en structuren van de organisatie en nodig zijn om de dagelijkse zorgverlening te onder-
steunen. Voor deze studie vormde het CMS een mooi kader om gegevens te verzamelen 
en de resultaten op proces- en structuurniveau te analyseren. In zes ziekenhuizen, die 
aan de TOPplus-studie hebben meegedaan zijn 55 semigestructureerde interviews 
uitgevoerd, waarbij professionals van verschillende disciplines en ondersteunende 
stafdiensten betrokken waren. TOPplus is, aangepast aan de lokale context van de 
verschillende disciplines, geïmplementeerd als een dagelijkse procedure, maar niet 
altijd in aanwezigheid van het hele team. In de zes ziekenhuizen zijn naar aanleiding van 
TOPplus door de hele organisatie heen veranderingen gevonden zowel op proces- als 
op structuurniveau. De discussies tussen teamleden hielpen om inzicht te krijgen in de 
onderlinge relatie en afhankelijkheid tussen teamleden, maar ook met en tussen andere 
afdelingen. Deze studie benadrukt het belang van een proces- en systeemgerichte 
benadering en laat zien hoe individueel leren kan veranderen in teamleren en in cycli 
van “single-loop” leren naar cycli van “double-loop” leren.
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In hoofdstuk 9 zijn de onderzoeksresultaten kort samengevat en besproken. De voordelen 
van het gebruik van “Adaptive Design” als ontwerp- en implementatiestrategie in combi-
natie met Participatief Actie-onderzoek als onderzoeksmethode zijn toegelicht. Nadruk 
is gelegd op het belang van het leren als team op de werkplek, bij voorkeur als een 
routineprocedure die in de dagelijkse werkprocessen is ingebed. Mogelijke toekomstige 
ontwikkelingen zijn aangegeven, gevolgd door aanbevelingen voor de klinische praktijk 
en voor vervolgonderzoek. Het is zeer aan te bevelen om bij studies, die gericht zijn 
op patiëntveiligheid een multi-factor benadering te hanteren, onderzoeksmethoden uit 
verschillende theoretische domeinen te gebruiken en professionals vanuit verschillende 
wetenschappelijke en medische disciplines bij het onderzoek te betrekken.
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En eindelijk komt dan het moment voor het schrijven van een dankwoord. Lang heb ik 
er naar uitgekeken en opeens is het moment daar: HET ligt bij de drukker. “A Delicate 
Balance” is niet alleen de essentie van mijn proefschrift, maar was ook de essentie van 
mijn eigen leven tijdens het werken aan dit proefschrift. Zoeken naar een balans tussen 
werk en privé, terwijl werken aan een proefschrift natuurlijk mijn eigen keuze was! Maar 
regelmatig waren er momenten waarop ik het heel moeilijk vond om de juiste balans 
te vinden.
Zonder de hulp en ondersteuning van veel mensen was dit ook niet mogelijk geweest. 
Dus wordt het nu hoog tijd om iedereen te bedanken.
Promoveren als je er al een heel leven en een mooie carrière op hebt zitten, heeft zeker 
voordelen: je hebt veel ervaring en kunt soms zaken gemakkelijker relativeren. Maar 
het heeft ook een klein ‘nadeel’: je hebt in mijn geval, naast het gezin waarin je geboren 
bent, inmiddels een wederhelft, drie kinderen, waarvan twee met partners en twee 
schatten van kleinkinderen. Daarnaast heb je een trouwe groep vrienden die je al heel 
lang kent en die je door dik en dun gesteund hebben. Probeer dan maar eens de juiste 
balans te vinden.
Dus terug naar mijn dankwoord.
Allereerst natuurlijk dank aan mijn promotores Robbert Huijsman en Johan Lange.
Robbert, dank dat je mij als eerste de kans hebt gegeven om als onderzoeker aan de 
slag te gaan en dank in het vertrouwen dat je in mij had en wist dat ik de eindstreep zou 
halen. Ook toen het oorspronkelijke onderwerp waarop ik zou promoveren niet haalbaar 
bleek en we de bakens moesten verzetten. Ik had “natuurlijk” als verpleegkundige en 
zorgmanager veel kennis van de sector en een hele rugzak met ervaring, maar met 
het doen van onderzoek was ik nog een novice. Je hebt me het nodige bijgebracht, 
geleerd om scherp te zijn, de grote lijnen vast te houden en mijn associatieve brein 
wat in te tomen en alles goed te onderbouwen. En vooral, om dat laatste restje energie 
en denkkracht toch nog in dat artikel te stoppen om dat ene perspectief ook nog te 
belichten. Dank voor je constructieve feedback in de loop der jaren en zeker voor alle 
feedback en ondersteuning deze laatste weken.
Johan jouw vraag aan mij om eens mee te denken over CRM in de luchtvaart en hoe we 
deze benadering zouden kunnen gebruiken om de patiëntveiligheid op de OK te verbete-
ren, is dit mooie proefschrift geworden. Jouw nooit aflatend enthousiasme en vertrouwen 
in TOPplus en in de teams op de OK heeft het tot een succes gemaakt, waardoor niet 
alleen in het Erasmus MC, maar ook in veel andere ziekenhuizen patiëntveiligheid op de 
OK op de agenda is gezet. Bedankt voor alle feedback, naast een overleg, meestal aan 
het eind van de dag (om half 7 heeft Johan nog een gaatje in zijn agenda, dat is ook goed 
hoor!!) de groene, gele en rode markeringen in de concepten die ik in de mailbox weer 
terug kreeg en de vele onderwerpen die tijdens onze overleggen aan de orde kwamen. 
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Naast DE TOP en de wetenschap, natuurlijk veel Jazz, mooie exposities of, iets meer op 
afstand, een opbeurend mailtje als je ergens in La Douce France met Huguette op een 
terrasje zat, blik op Le Grand Bleu, en me verzekerde dat we zeker deze heerlijke wijn 
of kaas moesten proberen, of zeker ook naar deze expositie moesten gaan.
Jeroen, co-promotor  en TOP-collega. Lieve Jeroen, ook jou wil ik graag bedanken 
voor de vele uren die je voor me hebt vrij gemaakt, de discussies die we samen gehad 
hebben over de structuur, de tabellen, de resultaten en welke accenten de discussies 
moesten hebben en welke niet, als ik er weer eens te veel in wilde stoppen. Samen ook 
nadenken hoe ik jouw college’s een mooi vervolg kon geven in de werkgroepen of met 
je brainstormen over nieuwe onderwerpen voor onderzoek. Naast werk was er ook altijd 
genoeg stof voor discussie over schrijvers en boeken, een interessante tentoonstelling 
ergens in Rotterdam of een film. En natuurlijk ook over die twee mooie dochters van je.
Jeroen, ook jou wil ik heel speciaal bedanken voor de tijd die je de laatste weken hebt 
vrijgemaakt. TOP! Ik hoop dat we vanaf januari weer tijd en ruimte hebben om mooie 
projecten op te zetten. Ik zie er naar uit!
De leden van de promotiecommissie wil ik graag bedanken voor hun bereidheid om in 
de commissie zitting te nemen en tijd vrij te maken om mijn proefschrift te lezen en te 
beoordelen en te opponeren tijdens de verdediging.
En dan mijn paranimfen Linda en Martina.
Lieve Lin, met jouw hulp werd TOPplus en het doen van onderzoek een feest! Ik weet 
niet hoeveel uren we samen naast elkaar hebben doorgebracht, maar dat zijn er vele 
geweest. In het Erasmus MC, tot in de late uurtjes op de TU Delft bij IO en later bij 3ME, 
in de auto door heel Nederland of achter jouw tafel thuis met zicht over Delft. En ook 
met een goede rolverdeling, jij hoofd plaatjes, ik hoofd praatjes. Die uurtjes hebben 
naast samen leren, samen discussiëren, samen analyseren, samen schrijven en samen 
rapportages en presentaties voorbereiden, heel veel plezier gebracht, maar ook de 
basis gelegd voor een vriendschap. In het begin leverde die uurtjes nog een bijdrage 
aan je eigen proefschrift, maar steeds meer werden het jouw vrije uurtjes! Ik hoop dat 
we nog veel van die uurtjes samen zullen doorbrengen, vele discussies zullen voeren 
met nieuwe projecten en nieuwe ideeën. En nu gewoon weer als collega’s! Maar dat 
glaasje wijn moet er dan nu toch eens van komen!
Lieve Martina, wat fijn dat wij vier jaar lang een kamer deelden en naast hard werken, 
bij jou moest er ook een proefschrift geboren worden, over vele zaken heerlijk konden 
kletsen. Fijn om iemand te hebben die ik, in ieder geval voor mij, moeilijke vragen kon 
voorleggen over kwantitatieve analyses, die altijd tijd had om even met me mee te 
denken, maar ook lekker kon praten over nieuwe hebbedingetjes, lekkere luchtjes, de 
nieuwe mode of weer een mooie nieuwe tas! Het was zo fijn en gezellig om met je samen 
te werken, samen nieuwe onderwerpen te bedenken voor een scriptiegroep, samen 
college’s voor te bereiden en tentamenvragen te verdelen en onze hersens pijnigen over 
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weer een nieuwe vraag voor het hertentamen! En natuurlijk samen op stap naar de USA 
voor de INGRoup conferences. Ook jij bent meer dan een collega en ik hoop dat we 
nog veel uurtjes samen kunnen doorbrengen met nieuwe ideeën en nieuwe projecten.
Graag wil ik alle mensen van alle deelnemende ziekenhuizen bedanken zonder wie dit 
onderzoek niet mogelijk was geweest. Heel veel dank voor het delen van alle ervaringen, 
meningen en ideeën.
Dan natuurlijk mijn HSMO-collega’s. Jullie gezelschap was voor mij precies de omgeving 
die ik nodig had om de switch te maken van manager naar onderzoeker. De discussies 
in de schrijfclub, de belangstelling voor mijn onderzoek en niet te vergeten gezellige 
praatjes bij de koffiemachine of ’s avonds aan de deur van onze kamer. Wat fijn dat 
ik me gewoon, ondanks het verschil in leeftijd, een van jullie kon voelen, met vragen 
kon komen of even stoom af blazen als het niet liep zoals je zou willen. En omdat een 
aantal van jullie in hetzelfde proces zitten, het feest der herkenning! Dat alles heeft zeker 
geholpen om vol te houden en mijn proefschrift af te ronden. Dank ook voor het feestje 
dat jullie geregeld hadden, TOP! Joris jou wil ik bedanken voor de jaren dat ik, ondanks 
mijn niet-gepromoveerde status, gewoon mee mocht denken en werken als een senior. 
Je hebt met onze Leadership course for Chinese Nurse Managers een nieuwe cultuur 
mijn leven ingebracht. De gezamenlijke reis naar Shanghai was onvergetelijk.
De collega’s bij de Hogeschool Rotterdam wil ik graag bedanken voor de belangstelling 
voor mijn onderzoek, waar jullie nog het laatste staartje van mee maakten. Binnen het 
Kenniscentrum heb ik me vanaf de eerste dag op mijn gemak gevoeld. Dat gebeurt niet 
overal en heeft zeker geholpen om een nieuwe baan en het afronden van een proefschrift 
te combineren. Bedankt voor jullie belangstelling en collegialiteit. Marleen, bedankt voor 
de ruimte die je me de laatste weken hebt gegeven. AnneLoes, Jacomine, Hanneke, 
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Mieke, Patrica, Harald, Ton en Linda, mijn collega lectoren, vanaf januari ben ik weer 
‘volledig’ aanwezig en kan ik weer mee denken en schrijven!
Dan mijn familie en vrienden. Wat zou ik doen zonder jullie. Rita, mijn zus, bedankt voor 
je wijze woorden en adviezen en je luisterend oor. Als verpleegkundige begrijp je maar 
al te goed waar ik de laatste jaren mee bezig ben geweest. Jij weet altijd alles weer 
tot de essentie terug te brengen. Femke, Friso en Tim, jullie waren al een onverwacht 
cadeautje en het is alleen maar leuker en mooier geworden. Femke heeft Danny aan 
ons gezin toegevoegd en Friso bracht Maaike mee, Tim de nodige vrienden waarvan 
sommigen al vanaf de eerste kleuterklas. We hadden geen betere aanvulling voor ons 
gezin kunnen wensen. Femke en Danny wil ik graag nog eens extra bedanken. Wat is 
het een mooi proefschrift geworden, dank zij jullie professionele en creatieve bijdragen, 
onbetaalbaar! Excuus voor de last minute veranderingen en de late uurtjes! Zit een beetje 
in de familiegenen, maar ik zal proberen mijn leven te beteren. Nu eerst genieten van 
het feest, ook voor het organiseren daarvan mijn dank!
Oskar & Sammie, de liefste kleinkinderen van de wereld! Ik heb jullie de laatste tijd 
een beetje verwaarloosd. Ik hoop dat ik met mijn onderzoek een stukje heb bijgedragen 
aan een verbetering van kwaliteit en veiligheid van de zorg, zodat jullie er later, profijt 
van hebben. Vanaf nu hoop ik weer een echte oma voor jullie te zijn. Een die eens mee 
gaat naar de zwemles, op school naar de maandafsluiting komt en af en toe langs komt 
waaien voor een kopje thee en een knuffel.
Marjan, bedankt dat je er altijd bent! We hebben al zoveel met elkaar gedeeld, heel 
mooie en heel verdrietige momenten, veel discussies gevoerd en de wereld verbeterd, 
met ZES kinderen vakanties gedeeld, ik hoop nog veel met je te delen!  Wat jammer 
dat Rom er niet meer bij kan zijn. Jantien en Sander, Annemieke, Elsbeth en Arno, jouw 
kinderen en mijn extended family, dank voor jullie enthousiasme en steun.
Pieter, vanaf het moment het dat Fred in mijn leven kwam, kwamen jij en Ebelien met 
hem mee. Mij nam je er gewoon bij en naast de eerste beginselen van het bridge, leerde 
ik van jou ook economisch omgaan met het huishouden en de laatste jaren op een andere 
manier naar oude kunst kijken. Ik verheug me op ons volgende uitje naar een mooie 
expositie en het etentje daarna. Ebelien zullen we hierbij steeds missen.
Karla & Ton, Rineke & Kees, Ineke, Jos & Vrona, Hans & Barbera, Willem & Maria, de 
bridge en klaverjasavondjes, lekkere etentjes en af en toe de baan op voor een partijtje 
tennis waren een welkome afwisseling met het schrijven en de laptop. Dank voor jullie 
enthousiasme en vooral ook jullie begrip als ik weer eens iets vergeten was! Ik hoop 
dat onze vriendschap nog vele jaren gaat duren! Ook al zijn we niet meer in de directe 
omgeving, de koffie en een glaasje wijn staan ook in Amsterdam klaar en als er een paar 
glaasjes zijn gedronken altijd een bed en een badkamer!
And last but not least Fred, the love of my life and unconditional supporter. Samen zijn 
we al vele nieuwe wegen ingeslagen en ik ben blij dat je mij de ruimte hebt gegeven 
om ook een stuk mijn eigen weg te gaan. In onze jaren samen zijn er veel gelukkige 
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momenten geweest, maar ook moeilijke momenten, waar ik jouw hulp hard nodig had 
en jij er altijd was. Mijn ‘eigen weg’ was voor jou niet altijd even gemakkelijk. Zeker de 
laatste periode van schrijven, herschrijven in combinatie met een huis verkopen en 
een nieuw huis inrichten, was ik niet altijd aanspreekbaar en was jij er wel “klaar mee”! 
Wat fijn dat je ondanks alles de laatste weken zoveel tijd hebt vrijgemaakt om mee te 
corrigeren en mee te lezen zodat mijn boekje op tijd naar de drukker kon.
Na vandaag heb ik weer tijd om met je mee te gaan op je vele muzikale outings en 
lief, zullen we nu eindelijk ons reisje naar New York gaan maken? Ik beloof dat ik mijn 
laptop niet mee neem!
Dit proefschrift wil ik graag opdragen aan mijn ouders die mij voor een groot deel gemaakt 
hebben tot wat ik ben. Hoe trots zou mijn vader† geweest zijn op zijn dochter. Hij heeft 
zijn vier dochters geleerd om op eigen benen te staan en zijn enthousiasme voor leren 
en altijd nieuwsgierig te blijven overgebracht. Mijn moeder† heeft mij geleerd om ook 
met tegenslagen om te gaan en te genieten van de kleine dingen in het leven. Haar 
man, mijn vader, en vier kinderen, mijn broertjes en zusjes, vroeg verloren en dan nog 
zo kunnen genieten van het leven. Van het  zonnetje dat schijnt, een wandeling langs 
het strand en een frisse wind om je oren. Mam je bent een kei!
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